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HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

PART II: NATIONAL MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE
THE HUNGARIAN MINORITIES IN ROMANIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

MAY 5, 1987

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PUBLIC HEARING ON THE HUNGARIAN MINORITIES IN ROMANIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

TUESDAY, MAY 5, 1987

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE,
Washington, DC.

The Commission met, pursuant to notice, in room 311, Cannon House Office Building, at 9:35 a.m., Representative Steny H. Hoyer, chairman, and Senator Dennis DeConcini, cochairman, presiding.

In attendance: Representative Tom Lantos, Commissioners Edward Feighan and Christopher H. Smith.

Also in attendance: Samuel G. Wise, staff director, Mary Sue Hafner, deputy staff director and general counsel, and Jane S. Fisher, senior staff consultant.

OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN STENY HOYER

Chairman HOYER. I would like to welcome my fellow commissioners and our distinguished panel of witnesses to the second hearing in the Helsinki Commission's series on minorities in Eastern Europe.

Today we will continue to learn of the impact of official state policies on the well-being and integrity of minorities in Eastern Europe, specifically in Romania and Czechoslovakia. The Commission has received reports of increasing repression of the Hungarian minority in Romania—repression which goes against the letter and spirit of the Helsinki Final Act. These reports focus on disturbing issues, ranging from highly restrictive quotas on the number of Hungarian students permitted to pursue Hungarian-language education, to state-ordered replacement of Hungarian-speaking priests with Romanian-speaking priests in Hungarian Catholic churches, to confiscation of museum collections touching on Hungarian history in Transylvania.

Moreover, the Commission has learned that several anti-Hungarian incidents, such as vandalism of Hungarian cultural monuments, have taken place in recent months in Slovakia. Charter 77 representatives, some of whom I met in February in Prague, have raised these incidents publicly, as well as other concerns about restrictive Hungarian-language educational and cultural policies. The Democratic Opposition in Hungary, likewise has brought this plight of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia to world attention.

Today's hearing is even more timely than originally anticipated. Just last Thursday, the House of Representatives passed an amendment to the trade bill which would suspend Romania's Most-Fa-

vored-Nation trade status for 6 months in response to that country's continuing human rights violations.

Prior to the vote, several Members of Congress addressed the plight of the Hungarian minority in Romania. That minority has come to be a focus of increasing congressional concern during the annual Most-Favored-Nation status review and, indeed, year-round.

I share the pessimism of many of my colleagues. I have raised the Hungarian issue with Romanian officials at bilateral meetings. They invariably respond with charges of irridentism and chauvinism. It has been nearly impossible to engage their attention on the specific concerns of the Hungarian minority. The Commission intends for today's hearing to clarify and publicize the human rights problems of the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Czechoslovakia.

We have a very distinguished panel of witnesses to address East European policies as well as U.S. policy on the topic. The Commission and, I personally, want to extend its deepest appreciation to all of the witnesses, but particularly to several who have traveled far to speak on the subject which is deeply felt and obviously very important to them.

Now, I would like to take this opportunity to introduce, for some opening remarks, the Cochairman of the Commission, Senator Dennis DeConcini.

Senator DeConcini.

OPENING REMARKS OF COCHAIRMAN DeCONCINI

Cochairman DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I am pleased to join you and the other members of the Commission today to learn more about the subject of Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia, and especially in Romania, which has garnered increasing attention in the House of Representatives, and also in the Senate. And I join in welcoming our witnesses, Mr. Chairman.

The Helsinki Final Act charges governments to respect the human rights of their citizens, and to permit them to maintain contacts with the citizens of other countries on the subject of national minorities. Principal VII of the Helsiniki Act states:

> The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

Basket III of the Helsinki Final Act calls on governments to provide for expanded human contacts in a positive and humanitarian spirit. Romania's treatment of its Hungarian minorities in this sphere of both human rights and human contacts, appears to be neither positive nor humanitarian.

Ethnic Hungarians in Romania and Czechoslovakia report diminishing opportunities for Hungarian-language education. In Romania, the Hungarians' role in Transylvanian history is belittled. Their contacts with Hungary have been cut, with both people and publications being prevented from crossing into Transylvania. They are being isolated from the world Hungarian community.

As Cochairman of the Helsinki Commission, I have taken seriously the Commission's responsibility to investigate charges of

human rights abuses and to hold accountable governments whose policies run contrary to the very principles they would vow to uphold.

Mr. Chairman, I welcome all the witnesses, as you do, and thank them sincerely for their effort to come forward and to participate in these hearings, and I look forward to their testimony.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Senator DeConcini for that statement.

I would now like to recognize Mr. Chris Smith, the Congressman from the State of New Jersey, who has been very, very involved in the issue which is the centerpiece of this hearing today. Congressman Smith is one of our most active and involved committee members.

Congressman Smith.

BRIEF STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH OF NEW JERSEY

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to commend both you and Senator DeConcini for convening this hearing. I think it is very important that we continue our scrutiny and continue asking the pertinent questions related to human rights in Romania and Czechoslovakia.

As you pointed out in your opening remarks, the vote last week, I think, was a very serious omen for Romania in terms of continued MFN for that country, based on its human rights performance. What we are looking for in both Romania and Czechoslovakia, and all of the nations behind the Iron Curtain, is performance. These nations of course have agreed to the obligations contained within the Helsinki accords, and we expect them to live up to those obligations. Hearings like this help to continue the focus on performance.

Chairman HOYER. At this time I would like to recognize the newest member of the Commission, from the State of Ohio, new on the Commission, but not to the Congress, as he has been very involved in human rights issues for all the years that he has been in Congress. We are very pleased to have him as a member, Congressman Ed Feighan.

STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE EDWARD FEIGHAN OF OHIO

Mr. FEIGHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Let me say that I am absolutely delighted and honored to be a member of the Commission. I am also particularly happy to serve with the Cochairman of this Commission, who has served with such distinction, dedication and enthusiasm in addressing these issues over the past years.

Like my colleague. I am deeply concerned about the continuing reports of virtual cultural genocide being conducted by Romania and other East European countries against the Hungarian minorities living in those countries. I am eager to hear from the very distinguished panel which has been assembled here this morning about how the Hungarian minorities are being treated throughout Eastern Europe. I appreciate their presence here today very much, and again, particularly appreciate the opportunity to serve on the Commission.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Feighan.

And lastly I would like to recognize somebody who is not a member of the Commission, which is true only in a formal sense. He has been very involved in our work and has attended on numerous occasions some of the CSCE experts' meetings such as the Ottawa Conference on Human Rights. He is a leader on human rights in the Congress, and indeed, co-chairs the Congressional Human Rights Caucus.

I am very pleased that he was able to join us. All of you who know that he is Hungarian, and probably is one of our most knowledgeable members of Congress about Eastern Europe. I am pleased that he could attend, Congressman Tom Lantos of California.

REMARKS OF REPRESENTATIVE TOM LANTOS OF CALIFORNIA

Mr. LANTOS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

First, I would like to commend Senator DeConcini and yourself for the outstanding leadership you have given this all important body. In a sense, Mr. Chairman, we need an occasional reinforcement that the work of the Commission is of value, that the work of all of us do on behalf of human rights is of value.

The presence here today of Geza Szocs is such a reinforcement. On August 4, 1983, almost 4 years ago, I put a statement in the Congressional Record concerning his arrest and beating during interrogations by the Romanian authorities. I also included in the Congressional Record a memorandum prepared by him calling for the observance of human rights by Romania and other signatories of the Helsinki accords. It is enormously gratifying—just as it was gratifying to all of us to see Shcharansky out, to see Mr. Szocs and so many others out in recent months.

Mr. Szocs, who was in a Romanian prison, is now here on Capitol Hill testifying before your distinguished Commission. I look forward to the hearing.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Congressman Lantos, and thank you for your support and counsel over the years.

At this time I would like to introduce very briefly our panelists, and I think rather than introduce all of you at the beginning as I usually do, I am going to introduce you as I recognize you to speak.

First of all we have with us Tom Simons, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; we are particularly pleased that he is here. I know that he is not feeling as well as he would like, he has a cold, or a little touch of something, but has nevertheless joined us. He holds the Foreign Service rank of Minister-Counselor; he was born in 1938, in Crosby, Minnesota, he received his Certificat D'Etudes Politiques from the University of Paris in 1957, his B.A. from Yale in 1958, and his M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard in 1959 and 1963, respectively.

Mr. Simons has been a career Foreign Service Officer since 1963. His posts have included the U.S. delegation to the Kennedy Round Trade negotiations in Geneva, 1965-67; Consular and Political Officer in Warsaw, Poland, 1968 through 1971; East-West Relations in the department, 1972 to 1975; and the Chief of the External Reporting Unit in Moscow, 1975 to 1977. He was also the Deputy Chief of Mission in Bucharest, Romania, from 1977 to 1979. Thereafter he was the Political Counselor in London from 1979 to 1981 and Direc-

tor of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, 1981 to 1985. He is also an author of numerous articles on Central and East European history and culture.

It is clear, members of the panel and ladies and gentlemen, that the Secretary is an expert on Eastern Europe, an expert on the subject that this committee is addressing. And we very much appreciate his being with us.

He has a prepared statement, and I have asked him to go through his prepared statement, because I think it sets forth with a great deal of clarity the issues that confront us, and the observations of our Government with respect to those issues.

And, Mr. Secretary, we very much appreciate you being with us—Secretary Simons.

STATEMENT OF THOMAS W. SIMONS, JR., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS

Secretary SIMONS. Mr. Chairman, distinguished Commissioners, Members, my fellow witnesses, I would like to thank the Commission for inviting me to speak today on the situation of the ethnic Hungarian minorities in Romania and Czechoslovakia. The Department of State shares the Commission's interest in working for a just and equitable treatment of minority populations, among other human rights issues. And we thus appreciate the opportunity to set forth our views.

The status of the Hungarian minority in Romania today is an issue of increasing concern to the administration, the Congress and the American people. We also note that this is a highly sensitive matter for both the Romanian and Hungarian Governments, in that their public comments on the subject in recent months have become more heated and confrontational. This is regrettable for, in the first instance, this minority issue is a matter for these two Governments to deal with. We have developed a solid basis for improving relations with both Governments over the years, and we would hope that they could approach this issue in a cooperative and reasoned manner.

At the outset, I would like to make two things very clear. First, the situation of the various minorities in Romania, and particularly in Transylvania, is an old and complicated question. Who settled the area first? Who did what to whom? Who has the better historical claim? These are not questions for the United States Government to answer.

We do not intend to be drawn into debates about deeply rooted historical questions which still provoke deep emotions on all sides, and on which we, as a government, have neither the interest nor the duty to take sides. We have made this clear to both the Hungarian and Romanian Governments, and my impression is that they understand and accept this position.

Second, the United States does not regard the Hungarian minority issue in Romania as a territorial question. I stress this point because in recent years there have been elements in various publications and in draft congressional resolutions, for example, references to "millennial Hungary," and to "self-determination" that convey

the impression that a solution to the minority issue is to be sought through changes in recognized national borders. This is unfortunate because it makes the chances for reasonable accommodation on minority problems even more remote and difficult. The Romanians interpret such references as an endorsement of the right of the Hungarian minority to secede from Romania and argue that our concerns about the minority are stimulated by a campaign by Hungarian irredentists.

It is inaccurate and inapproriate to look at the status of the Hungarian minority as an issue simultaneously of self-determination and as a territorial matter, as some have done, because of the complicated demographic pattern of Transylvania, the region where the minority population is largely concentrated.

Transylvania overall has long had a majority Romanian population. Moreover, the influx of more Romanians into the areas of high ethnic Hungarian concentration has further altered the ethnic composition of many localities. It is possible to have different views on the causes of this influx, but it is not possible to ignore that it makes treatment of minority issues as a territorial question even more unrealistic than in the past.

Having touched on those two issues, I would like to say that most of all the United States stands for respect for treaties and other international legal commitments. And in this context, we support and fully respect the territorial integrity of both Romania and Hungary. The boundary between these two countries is recognized by the international community and by the United States as a signatory of the 1947 Peace Treaty with Romania.

But it is also true that the status of the Hungarian minority in Romania raises fundamental human rights issues which are the proper concern of all the governments which seek to further the rule of law in world affairs. In the 1947 Treaty of Peace, to which I just referred, Romania undertook,

> To secure to all persons under Romanian jurisdiction, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion, the enjoyment of human rights and of the fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, of press and publications, of religious worship, of political opinion and of public meeting.

Mr. Chairman, as was pointed out earlier, Romania has made a similar commitment as a signatory of the Helsinki Final Act, which goes on to state.

> The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

Romania and the United States are both signatories of the Helsinki Final Act, and in this context, it is evident that the opportunities for minority groups in Romania to express and maintain their cultural heritage have steadily narrowed in recent years, and this is a matter of proper concern to us.

In recent years, the Romanian Government has had a policy geared to rapid industrialization and quick payoff of the country's external debt. This has posed a burden on the whole population, as well as bringing some benefits, and there is evidence that minorities have borne a very significant share of this burden. For in-

stance, where social advancement, upper social mobility, depends more than ever on mobility and education in the majority language, a degree of assimilation is a natural phenomenon, and of course affects the minorities in particular.

In addition, along with the rest of the Romanian population, the minorities also endure a harshly repressive internal system. The abuses suffered and the restrictions on civil liberties and basic freedoms under this system are examined in some detail in the Department of State's annual country human rights reports. Economic hardships in Romania have reduced budgetary expenditures across the board, but minority groups have suffered disproportionately from these cuts because of the relatively small size of the programs devoted to them.

The Government continues to support minority institutions financially, but to a smaller extent than in the past.

Moreover, if assimilation into the majority culture is a natural byproduct of development, as it is in the United States as well, there is nevertheless serious evidence that Romanian Government authorities today seek actively to push the natural process of assimilation forward, in practice, if not as a matter of policy.

Some Romanian Government authorities at least are pursuing practices that promote the integration and absorption of minority groups into one unified Romanian culture. Educational, social, and cultural institutions have been merged or closed in ways that favor the majority culture, and reduce the number of facilities run by and for minorities.

Minority publications have been similarly restricted, or closed down. The mergers of schools, theaters and other institutions often result in the loss of a minority group's ethnic characteristics as the institutions become more Romanian. Other practices, concerning changes in street and place names from Hungarian to Romanian, the accessibility and treatment of Hungarian archives and museum displays, the confiscation of certain Hungarian language publications, and restrictions at border crossings point in the same direction.

We receive reports on the treatment of the Hungarian minority in Romania from a great many sources. These include allegations of secret police murder, torture, and harassment of ethnic Hungarians, involuntary population transfers, and increasing denial of access to Hungarian language schools, teachers, and cultural institutions. Restrictions on Hungarian language publications reached a high level earlier this year, when copies of the Hungarian Communist Party newspaper published in Budapest, were confiscated at the Romanian-Hungarian border.

Recently there has been an increase in reports of strikes, of protest graffiti and leaflets, and other manifestations of discontent. Some of the information is usually easily verified, but much of it is difficult to pin down and adequately document.

Romania continues to support minority institutions and is proud of its record in this regard, but the multiplicity of reports of limitation and repression directed specifically at members of minorities gives rise to serious concern.

What, then, can the United States do about it? Well, these hearings are one example of what the United States can do about it.

But speaking for the executive branch, the answer is that we can raise these issues and speak about them in the spirit of frankness which has come to characterize Romanian-American relations over the past decade.

As I noted at the outset of my testimony, this is an issue in the first instance which the Hungarian and Romanian Governments should cooperate to resolve. What we can do is to raise the minority issues with the Romanian Government as legitimate human rights concerns in the context of their obligations under the Helsinki Final Act. We have done this at CSCE expert and plenary meetings, as well as in bilateral conversations here and in Bucharest.

Second, we devote a considerable share of the resources of our Embassy in Bucharest—and our Embassy, I might say, also, in Budapest—to careful monitoring of these issues, to ensure that we obtain the most complete and accurate information possible, but also to bring the fact that these are matters of concern to us, to the attention of the Romanian authorities.

Our coverage of these issues has included regular travel to Transylvania by officers from both embassies, thus ensuring the capability to speak to people in either Romanian or Hungarian. We have raised concerns during such trips in subsequent meetings with the Romanian Government. For example, our ambassadors to the CSCE Human Rights Experts Meeting in Ottawa and CSCE Cultural Forum in Budapest expressed particular concern about the status and accessibility of Hungarian archives from Cluj University, formerly Babes-Bolyai University, which have been almost inaccessible to scholars since the late 1970's. Recently, the Romanian Government has objected to official joint travel by officers from our two Embassies. This is unfortunate, and we intend to pursue the matter further with the Romanian authorities.

Third, we are pressing the Romanian Government to provide accurate and complete statistical data on minorities, which have generally not been available in recent years. The Romanian Government recently provided a set of statistics on minority educational, cultural and religious activities and economic development in minority areas. I know the Romanian Embassy here has provided similar data to the Commission. We appreciate this information, but have noticed certain gaps and omissions which require explanation. For example, there are no figures on the number of university students receiving instruction in minority languages, or the number of classes given in those languages at the university level. Also, there are no year-to-year comparisons of education in minority languages, an omission which tends to suggest that a major ethnic minority complaint about radically reduced educational opportunities has some basis in fact. And we have asked the Romanian authorities for further information on these matters.

Fourth, we have made certain that our concerns about the Hungarian minority have focused both upon emigration and the status of dissidents. Approximately 10 percent of the emigration cases we have raised with the Romanian Government in CSCE settings, and which are contained on the representation lists our Embassy submits monthly in Bucharest, involve ethnic Hungarians, a number slightly higher than their proportion in Romania's overall population. I have attached to this statement, which I have made avail-

able to the Commission, the names of the ethnic Hungarian political prisoners whose status we have raised with the Romanian Government.

I would like to conclude my remarks about the Hungarian minority in Romania by noting that some have recommended that the United States employ economic sanctions, such as withdrawal of Most-Favored-Nation tariff status, to express dissatisfaction with Romanian policy on this issue.

A determination on MFN, of course, is made annually by the President, and his recommendation will be submitted to the Congress in June. The point I would like to make today is that such presidential determinations are based upon an assessment of Romanian emigration policy in terms of Jackson-Vanik criteria. We also consider overall human rights developments in Romania. Our focus has always been upon the limited influence that trade provides to create a climate for dialogue with the Romanians, and thus for progress on these issues.

And I would interject at this point that in my remarks on the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia you will observe that we have much less information. And one reason is that our relations with Romania are very much better than our relations with Czechoslovakia, so we have access to information, and we are able to raise these issues with the Romanian Government to a degree that we cannot with the Czechoslovakian Government, precisely because we lack the broad base which in Romania's case includes Most-Favored-Nation tariff treatment.

Progress has been slow and frustrating, but it has been real in terms of the thousands of people whom we have been able to help, either to emigrate, or in terms of improved conditions for living and worship.

Whatever decision we reach on Most-Favored-Nation tariff treatment this year, or in any year, should, in my judgment be based upon this overall assessment, in full recognition of the limits of our influence.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would also like to address the situation of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. We face a significant challenge on this issue because our Embassy in Prague is distant from southern and eastern Slovakia, where most of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia live. Furthermore, as I mentioned before, our relations with Czechoslovakia are much less good than they are with Romania, so our capacity to deal with the issue is more limited.

Embassy officers from our Embassy in Prague visit Slovakia regularly, and have some first-hand knowledge of human rights circumstances there; nevertheless, our knowledge of the situation of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, as well as the broader picture of human rights situations in Slovakia, is never as detailed as we would ideally like. Our diplomats will make additional visits to the region over the coming year, the better to broaden our understanding of this important aspect of Czechoslovak society.

Official Czechoslovak statistics report that there are about 555,000 ethnic Hungarians in the country; they are Czechoslovakia's largest minority and they comprise about 3.5 percent of the population. They, like other citizens of that country, live under a government which in our view very often disregards the principles

of basic human rights spelled out in the Helsinki accords and other documents.

The reports we receive indicate that the Czechoslovak authorities have made free use of such forms of repression as frequent house searches, detentions and interrogations; suspended prison sentences and "protective supervision," so-called; intrusive surveillance; discrimination in employment; and denial of educational and other benefits to the children of persons the regime regards as its opponents. Under such circumstances, the authorities seldom resort to more heavy-handed forms of repression, which would be superfluous.

In principle, ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia are to enjoy the same access to educational and career benefits that Czechs and Slovaks encounter. However, some ethnic Hungarians contend that the practice falls short of the theory. They have noted that Hungarian-language instruction at the elementary and secondary levels is being reduced, and that the lack of opportunities for higher education in Hungarian is creating a growing shortage of qualified Hungarian-language teachers. Indeed, some observers report that the education of Hungarian kindergarten teachers in western Slovakia has ceased, although we have been unable to confirm those reports.

Ethnic Hungarians would also note that they are underrepresented in high level jobs in industry, the Government and the Communist Party apparatus, to the extent that this is an aspiration.

But the issue of the resources which the Czechoslovak Government is prepared to devote to the Hungarian minority is not the only potential cause for dissatisfaction among that community. We have also received reports of more pointed actions against ethnic Hungarians. In February, reliable sources reported that the security police in Nitra in Slovakia had been harassing the ethnic Hungarian students and teachers at the Pedagogical Institute there, calling them in for summonses and interfering in their organized social activities. Activists called this problem to the attention of the General Prosecutor of Slovakia. More recently, the offices and buildings of Hungarian minority cultural institutions in Bratislava, the capital city of Slovakia, were vandalized. The Czechoslovak Human Rights Initiative Chapter 77 characterized these actions as the culmination of various regrettable expressions of nationalist intolerance, and protested the vandalism to the Federal Government and the National Assembly of Czechoslovakia.

As these incidents show, the situation of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia merits our attention and we will do our best to keep ourselves and you informed on this issue.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Secretary, we thank you very much for your very comprehensive report. And we appreciate your going through it for us. I know, based upon that cold, it was a little tougher than you would have liked it to have been.

I am going to hold on questions, Mr. Secretary, if I can. Senator DeConcini has to chair another hearing over in the Senate side, so we want to hear now—and I am going to call on Mr. Geza Szocs, to whom Congressman Lantos previously referred. He is an ethnic Hungarian poet and human rights activist. He emigrated to the

West in August 1986, after a long struggle with Romanian authorities. He was born in Transylvania in 1953, and was one of the editors of Ellenpontak, Counterpoints, a Hungarian-language samizdat periodical which put out 10 issues between December 1981 and its forced closing in January 1983.

In 1982, he co-authored a program proposal for improvements in Romanian policy affecting the Transylvanian Hungarians; this proposal was submitted to the Madrid CSCE meeting. Szocs also co-authored a memorandum to the United Nations suggesting creation of an agency to protect minority rights, and a letter of protest to the CSCE Budapest Cultural Forum in October 1985. Mr. Szocs is currently residing in Switzerland.

Mr. Szocs, we are very pleased to have you here and look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF GEZA SZOCS

Mr. HAMOS. Mr. Chairman, my name is Laszlo Hamos and I would read the English translation of Mr. Szocs' testimony which he wrote in Hungarian.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Hamos, we very much appreciate your being with us. You have been very helpful to us, and we will certainly be pleased to hear Mr. Szocs' statement through you.

Mr. HAMOS. Thank you [reading]:

I testify as a Hungarian born in Romania, where I lived for 33 years, until I was constrained to leave that country last August. In 1975, many of us living in that country attached great significance to the fact that Romania signed the Helsinki Final Act. We expected this step to result in a generally more relaxed atmosphere. Unfortunately, the process which occurred in Romania was exactly the reverse and it dashed all our hopes. On the one hand, the Romanian Government failed to remove certain existing and unprecedented kinds of restrictions which clearly violated the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act, such as the decree which prohibits the citizen of Romania from accommodating a foreign visitor, except an immediate relative, in his own home.

On the other hand, after signing the Helsinki Final Act, the Romanian Government instituted still newer regulations which sought to further restrict human contact and communications. These restrictions, apart from violating the rights and human dignity of all citizens, especially aggravated the plight of Hungarians living in Romania. The Hungarian minority is especially dependent upon Hungarian culture from abroad because its own culture is subjected to extreme pressures which seek to destroy its sense of identity, and which are unparalleled among the social policies and practices of civilized countries.

This policy of denationalization and forced assimilation, which the authorities of late seek less and less to conceal, and which is referred to in official Romanian jargon as "homogenization," amounts to nationalist totalitarianism, or, expressed differently, etatist aggression. The manifestations of this sinister and all-embracing policy include the following:

The artificial alteration of the ethnic composition of Hungarian-inhabited regions through forced population transfers into and outside of those regions.

The restriction and elimination of Hungarian-language instruction at all levels of the educational system, from kindergarten to university.

The banishment of the Hungarian language from all areas of public life.

The liquidation of Hungarian cultural institutions and the harassment of minority churches.

The aggressive campaign designed to create in Hungarians a sense of shame toward their own history and to denigrate their feeling of identity, including the dissemination of hostile anti-Hungarian propaganda publications, and the destruction from the environment of all traces of the Hungarian past in that region.

Mr. Chairman, and distinguished Commissioners, each of you has in front of you a copy of my written statement, together with the various annexed documents and petitions which further detail these abuses. What I wish to add are only a few personal observations. I want only to relate my memories of a country which Hungarians and Romanians, Jews and Germans, the young and the elderly, workers and intellectuals alike are attempting to flee by the hundreds of thousands. And they *are* escaping the country, leaving behind their homes and belongings, their families and friends, in a word, their entire lives, each one harboring his or her own hopes and ambitions, striking out for a new life in the unknown.

Today thousands of Hungarians from Romania fill the refugee camps in Austria, looking to America, which they still have reason to trust, despite the many tragic disappointments of this century. What they hope for from America is a new home, a new life and a new opportunity, just as the millions who stayed behind also look to America with the same sense of desperate anticipation. What they, the ones who stayed behind, hope for is not a new home. All they want is to be able to feel at home once more in the land where they were born. What they want is not to learn to speak a new language, but to be allowed to use their own language, in their own centuries-old schools and universities. What they yearn for is not new employment in a new location, but the right to a decent living where they already live.

The citizen of Romania today wants to escape the country, not out of dismay at the fact that he is allowed to use his car, if he is lucky enough to have one, only during certain months of the year, and even then his gas ration is limited to only 5 gallons a month. Rather, the citizen of Romania wants to escape the country out of disgust at the fact that the secret police have access to unlimited supplies of gasoline for the very cars they use to hound and harass the citizens.

The citizen's complaint is not that he is frequently ordered to work even on sundays, but that there is not a single religious holiday, including Christmas and Easter, that counts as an official holiday in Romania.

The source of the citizen's discontent is not the lack of food, or the lack of heat, but the omnipresence of the police officer who

lurks in the shadows and interrogates the citizen's thoughts, even before he has had a chance to formulate them.

The place where the citizen of Romania wants to live a freer life is not in America, but in Romania.

Distinguished Commissioners, you are American legislators and as such you may be inclined to think: who cares about the personal observations and recollections of this Hungarian poet from Romania? What difference does it make how it felt for me as a child to be able to read the street signs where I lived in my own native language, and what it feels like today, after all those signs have been taken down? And it may be just as superfluous to tell you my feelings as I watched the final moments of the last Hungarian-language television program flicker off the screen forever.

Would you be interested in how all Hungarian-language radio programs in Romania were suddenly terminated, cut-off literally in mid-sentence, as if with giant scissors? Or what about the spectacle of the centuries-old Hungarian Calvary Hill Cemetery in Kolozsvar flattened by bulldozers, and the historic monuments of medieval towns and cities destroyed forever?

I should add here that the curtain has closed not only on Hungarian towns and cities. The people of Romania as a whole have no right to their own history, with Hungarians in particular deprived of this right.

Today Hungarian is the native language of more than 2 million people in Romania. But, you may answer, we know of only 1.7 million Hungarians, based on official Romanian census figures. You may accept this number because, after all, who on earth is going to do an independent count.

And let me answer, distinguished Commissioners, I am certain that Hungarians living in the West would be happy to assume the burden and expense of compiling the list of names and addresses of all Hungarians in Romania. But that would not be the point. We do not want to count how many Hungarians there are in Romania, we only want the Romanian Government to publish the authentic and verifiable statistics.

Let me repeat, we will pay for the work, if that is what it takes, but at least then you will not have to engage in such comical guesswork as in the Commission's press release announcing this hearing which speculates that there are "between 1.7 and 2.4 million" Hungarians in Romania.

But if not this, if it falls outside the proper role of a witness to come up with such suggestions, then please allow me to testify about something else, based on personal experience. Let me tell you about my friend, Erno Borbely and the poor physical condition he was already in following several operations for stomach ulcers, when he was imprisoned in November 1982. I can personally testify about this friend of mine, a schoolteacher by profession, a Hungarian, formerly residing at 17 Vladimirescu Street in the town of Csikszereda. I can tell you as a first-hand witness about the absolute fear that gripped the population of an entire country when no one, not even his own parents, was told the reason Erno Borbely was convicted. In the same way, to this day no one knows why his friend Laszlo Buzas was also arrested, or why both of them remain in prison close to 4 years later.

The reasons are shrouded in mystery, just as many, many similar mysteries persist in Romania today. The citizen of Romania has no one left to turn to for help in solving these mysteries. But he does believe that there is one last place that will listen. That place is America, and the people he turns to for assistance are you, distinguished Commissioners.

Having spent many years in Romania, I can attest that the lives of the people in that country are favorably influenced by the attention paid to their fate from abroad, especially if that attention is accorded in an ongoing or institutional fashion. The people of Romania look to the United States as the guardian of democracy and freedom, or, at the very least, the most important advocate of those rights in the world today.

This population is deeply disillusioned and demoralized whenever it is constrained to witness any recognition or support granted by the United States to the very dictatorship which oppresses them. Presumably such recognition and support is designed to acknowledge Romania's supposedly liberal emigration policies. But the right to emigrate is only one of many, many rights provided under the Romanian Constitution, to the same extent as under the Helsinki Final Act and other international covenants and declarations, solemn rights and undertakings routinely denied to the entire population of Romania, including the persecuted minority of 2.5 million Hungarians.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for this opportunity to testify, and ask only that the attention you have focused today on the plight of Hungarian minorities not be allowed to diminish, but that you continue to withhold your endorsement and support of any regime which practices minority oppression.

Thank you.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Szocs, for your testimony, for being with us.

I am sure we are going to be able to get back with some questions later on.

At this time I would like to call on George Schopflin, who has been a joint lecturer in the political institutions of Eastern Europe at the London School of Economics and the School of Slavonic Studies of the University of London since 1976.

Mr. Schopflin was born in Hungary in 1939, he emigrated to the United Kingdom in 1950, was educated in the University of Glasgow and the College of Europe in Brugge, and worked at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London from 1963 to 1967, and at the BBC from 1967 until 1976, before his present appointment.

Mr. Schopflin's publications include: the *Hungarians of Rumania;* "Nationalism, Politics and the European Experience" in *Survey,* summer of 1985; "The Ideology of Rumanian Nationalism" in *Survey,* winter of 1974; and "Nationality in the Fabric of Yugoslav Politics," in *"Survey,* spring of 1980.

Mr. Schopflin, we are very pleased that you could join us. I know you have gone to considerable trouble to be with us, and we appreciate that and look forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF GEORGE SCHOPFLIN

Mr. SCHOPFLIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished Commissioners, ladies and gentlemen. I would like to address five broad points, if I may.

First, I would like to say a few words on the historical background on how there are Hungarian minorities at all in central Europe. These are all matters of fact, not of opinion. Essentially the minorities exist because at the end of the First World War historic Hungary was divided, large parts of Hungarian territory were ceded to so-called successor states: Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia.

The frontiers which were drawn at that point did not necessarily respect the ethnic line, in many cases other criteria, strategic or historic, were chosen and through this and as a consequence of this, large numbers of ethnic Hungarians, approximately 3 million, found themselves citizens of the three states that I have mentioned. These frontiers were very largely confirmed after the Second World War.

In the interwar period, the treatment of the minorities by the pre-Communist governments varied, but on the whole, because these states may have been authoritarian and undemocratic because they were not totally authoritarian, they had some leeway and some room to develop their own native institutions, even although these states were by no means all of them democratic.

With the Communist seizure of power after 1947–48, all ethnic minorities were supposedly given equal rights, formally on paper. We know that the reality was somewhat different, but I would say that up until the late 1950's, or early 1960's, there was a kind of equality and inequality, all citizens were discriminated against, but it did not necessarily follow that members of ethnic minorities suffered extra discrimination at that particular time.

With the change in the early 1960's, in all the Communist countries at which point the rulers of these states were given some latitude by the Soviet Union to come to terms with the national identities of the peoples over whom they ruled, and to accept that being Romanian, or Slovak, or a Hungarian were ineradicable traits and they would have to come to terms with them, with this change, the question of national minorities or ethnic minorities returned to the political agenda.

As Slovaks and Romanians, the two countries that we are concerned with particularly, were increasingly encouraged to regard nationalism, their own nationhood, as the dominant focus of their lives. And this automatically raised the question of relationship between the Slovaks and Romanians, on the one hand, and the Hungarian minority that lived on these particular territories and; still do.

And one particular point I would like to make is that although it is perfectly true in the overall context of Czechoslovakia and Romania, the proportion of Hungarians is relatively small. Mr. Simons mentioned 3.5 percent of Czechoslovakia; the figure for Romania is around 12 percent. This overlooks the proposition that there are local concentrations of Hungarians which go up to 80 or 90 percent of the population in some districts, in some localities,

which I think does change the perspective through which we should view the territorial and demographic distribution of the minority.

From the standpoint of the majority, the idea that minorities do lead lives of their own culturally is seen as deviant, it is seen as unacceptable, and their own nationalism is predicated, is based on the idea that at some point these territories will become ethnically homogeneous and minorities will disappear.

To this end, particularly in the 1970's and 1980's, a variety of measures have been introduced, both formally and perhaps, more importantly, informally in these various countries restricting the cultural, educational and linguistic facilities which minorities enjoyed until that time. And to my mind there is every reason to believe that these restrictive initiatives commanded a good deal of popular backing.

Let me address the second point now, which is what is actually happening, what is the nature of discrimination in these societies. I think the first point I want to stress is that in analyzing the Communist societies, the Communist countries, we have to take the nature and the realities of Communist politics into account. We cannot assess these countries by making comparisons on a 1 to 1 basis with our own open societies. And I do not believe for one moment that it is possible validly to assess what happens in Romania and Slovakia by making comparisons with practices in the United States, or the United Kingdom, or any other democratic country.

Crucially, in Communist societies, as I have already suggested, there is a variety of informal practices giving a great deal of discretion to local bodies, local authorities, notably of course the secret police, which is simply no comparison with the societies in which we live and to which we are used.

Some people might still argue that it is an open question, whether or not leaderships in Slovakia and Romania are actually aiming unequivocally at assimilation. There is an argument to be made that in both these countries the leaderships need the minorities as a scapegoat for their own failures. They are basing their policies on nationalism, and it is very easy to say the situation today would be much better, if only we didn't have these ethnic minorities in our territory. And the situation will become very much better by implication at the point when the ethnic minorities disappear.

It seems to me, however, that a wide ranging set of measures has been introduced in these countries which do go a very long way towards curtailing minority rights in culture, in education and in the right to use the language, the mother tongue of the ethnic minorities.

I think the problem of discrimination is a difficult one to demonstrate unequivocally, but I would make two points on this. First of all, official failure by Romanian and Slovak authorities rigorously to enforce the legislation guaranteeing equality is tantamount to a policy of repression and of discrimination.

Second, in societies which are in any case repressive, what one has to demonstrate is relative oppression, namely that one group suffers more than another, in this particular case that the Hungar-

ian minorities suffer more than the Slovak and Romanian majorities respectively.

My argument here is that, particularly in Romania, the entire population is suffering in consequence of the policies of the Ceausescu leadership, economically, politically and in all sorts of areas that are major violations of human rights, but the Hungarians suffer double jeopardy by reason of their ethnic status of being members of minorities.

The proposition that this discrimination takes place is, I think, supported by all of the evidence that you have heard to date, and there is a great deal more which some of you must be familiar with. There is one further item which I would like to mention in this particular connection, which comes, in fact, from an ethnic Romanian source, a member of the Romanian majority in Transylvania, who has written a letter to the West in which he describes some of the policies of repression, and argues that discrimination against the Hungarians will ultimately result in a grave disadvantage of the Romanians, and indeed, implies that this is happening already, inasmuch as Western countries have largely ceased to take Romania's protestations seriously in the matter of human rights.

This particular letter has appeared in the Journal East European Reporter, and copies of this can be made available.

I would next like to address the problem of the prospects for the Hungariar minority in Romania, in the post-Ceausescu period. It seems to me that any post-Ceausescu government is going to find itself in a very difficult position, it is going to have to take stock, it will find an exhausted, dispirited, demoralized population which is apathetic and suspicious, and it will have to find support from whatever source it can, both at home and abroad. At home this implies it will have to seek the support of as many social groups, it will have to build up a constituency for itself, as it possibly can, and this by definition includes the Hungarian minority.

I would suggest, therefore, that in this situation a post-Ceausescu government will ease some of the restrictions on the Hungarian minority, at any rate for a period of time. Furthermore, if it does pursue this policy, it will find an added benefit that the pressure which is being applied to Romania by the Hungarian Government will ease, and no doubt, this might also influence the Soviet Union in its attitude towards Romania, which I am assuming is at least partially influenced by the way in which Romania treats its minority.

Finally, on this particular point, I would take the view that this much weaker post-Ceausescu Romanian leadership will inevitably turn much more closely to the Soviet Union, both in terms of rhetoric and in terms of reality, not the least because there is no other power in the world which is going to give Romania the kind of support that it needs to survive the period of reconstruction that Romania will have to undergo in the post-Ceausescu era.

The fourth point that I would like to address is the way in which the minority issue influences international relations in the area we are dealing with. I have already suggested that all the countries in the area use nationalism as a way to mobilize support for them-

selves, given the fact that their own Communist ideology is increasingly weak in its effectiveness in this particular respect.

The Hungarian Government uses the minority issue to mobilize support for itself in Hungary as a way of distracting attention from a deteriorating economic situation. More broadly, particularly in the case of Transylvania, the Hungarian Government allows the very genuine, very authentic Hungarian sentiments to be merged as a way of deflecting attention from Hungary's greatest national problem, which is that of subordination to the Soviet Union.

If there is a possibility of finding an alternative focus to the Soviet Union, which in this case is Romania, this is to the benefit of the Hungarian authorities. The minority in Slovakia has an analogous, though to my mind a much less salient role to play in this particular respect. And on the whole, Hungarian sentiments in Hungary are far more inflamed by the issue of Transylvania, than they are by what happens to the minority in Slovakia, although let me add, this is irrelevant.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it too, has used the minority issue as between Hungary and Romania. I have seen no evidence that the minority issue plays any kind of role between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia.

What the Soviet Union has done is that for many years, 25 years approximately, it has played on the mutual antagonisms of both Hungary and Romania, more implicitly than explicitly as a way of maintaining control over both these states, implying that if one state, or the other states does something untoward the nationality issue and it is a kind of blackmail for which there is a long tradition in that particular part of the world.

It is noteworthy that very recently, I think in the last 2 weeks, a Soviet Politburo member, Ligachev made a statement in Budapest, denying that the Soviet Union has any role to play in the minority issue. This is the first time that any senior Soviet spokesman has raised the minority issue at all. And although the way in which he raised it was negative, this does, in effect, take cognizance, Soviet cognizance of the minority issue for the first time. And I think should be seen as a landmark in the Soviet's relationship to the minority issue.

The final question I would like to address is the way in which Gorbachev will impact on the minority issue. My reading of Gorbachev is that he is a very traditional Soviet Russian national and nationalist, and has little patience with nationality questions. He is prepared to use them where this is to the advantage of the Soviet Union, but I believe that he regards human rights, in general, and ethnic rights, in particular, as a distraction from the real task, as he sees it, that of ensuring that the Soviet Union and its allies can retain their power position in the world, above all, that the Soviet Union retains its position as a global superpower in the 1990's.

From this particular point of view he is, I think, perfectly capable of putting pressure on Ceausescu, and as I am sure you all know, he is planning to visit Romania at the end of this month—that Ceausescu should moderate the anti-Hungarian policies which Romania has been pursuing. And not only the policies, but also the rhetoric, simply in order to diffuse tensions. And from that particular point of view, to allow Romania and Hungary to get on with

what he regards as the real task on the agenda, gearing up for the technological revolution.

Hungarian-Romanian tensions in this particular context are a distraction.

Finally, one point, a very final point that I would like to make is that Soviet-Romanian relations, which we in the West have been inclined to think for many years are not particularly good, and that Romania has been pursuing an independent foreign policy. My reading of the situation is that some of the rhetoric of Romanian independence may remain, but in fact, cooperation between the Soviet Union and Romania have become very close in trade matters, in commercial matters, and also, in a number of military matters, but in a rather quiet, in a rather tacit fashion.

It seems to me that one of the consequences of this is that in this punitive, late-Ceausescu, indeed, can possibly run up to the post-Ceausescu era, the Soviet Union has a great deal of leverage over Romania. And, as I have already hinted, would not hesitate to use it for its own objective.

That's all I have today. Thank you very much for your patience and for your attention.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, we very much appreciate your taking the time to be with us. We might add that we owe you some debt of gratitude, also, for the training you give to one of your students, who is on our staff, and does an outstanding job.

Next, our last witness will be Mr. Robert Robertson. Mr. Robertson, we want to thank you for being with us as well, sir.

Mr. Robertson is chairman of American for International Trade and vice president of the Occidental International Corporation, where he has worked since 1978. From 1984 to 1985, he served as cochairman on the Presidential Commission on Indian Reservation Economies. In the 1960's and 1970's, Mr. Robertson worked in the State of Nevada, as Executive Director of the U.S. National Council on Indian Opportunity, and as Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior. He has traveled to Romania several times, and most recently was there in March, as head of a trade delegation.

Mr. Robertson, as I said, the Commission very much appreciates your being with us, and looks forward to your testimony.

STATEMENT OF ROBERT ROBERTSON

Mr. ROBERTSON. Thank you, Chairman Hoyer, and members of the Commission.

My name is Robert Robertson, and I appreciate this invitation to appear before you today, to give my observations on the treatment of Romania's Hungarian minority. I am vice president of Occidental International Corporation, and am here today as a representative of American Businesses for International Trade (ABIT).

ABIT was formed in June of 1986 because those American firms, large and small trading with Romania saw that Most-Favored-Nation status for Romania was in trouble. A great many of these businessmen have been dealing with Romania for many years and had become accustomed to the annual threats to MFN renewal, but they saw that during the 2d session of the 99th Congress that troubles had escalated to a serious point.

They have found in this 1st session of the 100th Congress that their worst fears are coming to pass. Just last Thursday, April 30, as you indicated at the outset, Mr. Chairman, the House approved the Wolf amendment to the omnibus trade bill suspending MFN for Romania for 6 months, which, these ABIT members know, is the same as killing it outright.

I realize that this hearing is not concerned, per se, with the issues of MFN. However, we in ABIT are confident that those who are putting forth allegations of Romanian mistreatment of citizens of Magyar descent did impact the vote on the Wolf amendment to H.R. 3. The success of their efforts to convince Members of the House and Senate that those of Hungarian origin in Romania are being maltreated is graphically reflected in passage of this amendment last Thursday.

This respected Commission's conclusions and pronouncements can, if the full picture of Hungarian treatment in Romania is not gotten, adversely impact for a long, indeterminate period the trading relationships between American companies and their Romanian counterparts. I submit that these trading relationships constitute a leverage which can improve the lot of the average Romanian citizen, including those of Hungarian descent. It is for this reason that I am particularly pleased with the opportunity to be here today.

I will attempt to the best of my ability to carry out the specific charges you gave me in your letter of invitation, namely: what I witnessed in my travels to Transylvania; what changes I have noted in the treatment of Romania's Hungarian minority; and what comparison I would make of the situations of the Romanians and Hungarians in Romania.

I will not venture into the dark, forbidding thicket of controversy between the Romanians and Hungarians over who was in Transylvania first. This long-running battle, which predates recorded history, is too much for a nonhistorian like myself. It is apparent to me though that the recently published 2,000-page work by the Hungarian Government, "The History of Transylvania," has enflamed the emotions of many Hungarians within and without Romania.

Additionally, the Washington Times of April 24, 1987, carried a story headlined "Romanian Minority Restless." It tells of break-ins of newspaper offices in Oradea by ethnic Hungarians and concludes by saying that "Hungarian leader Janos Kadar raised the issues of the Hungarian minority in Romania during a press conference in Stockholm where he is on an official visit." I would like to know what is the real reason one Socialist country would attack another over an issue like this? Is there a message here as to why we have no complaints of mistreatment from the other ethnic groups in Romania? I don't know. Perhaps you can find out why.

I am not here today as an apologist for the Ceausescu regime, for God only knows it has been guilty of recorded misdeeds against many of its citizens in the past. What do the facts show today, not yesterday, about how many Romanian or, specifically, Hungarian people are in prison in violation of their human rights? I know of none.

Is the work of this Commission and the leverage of MFN paying off in a better Romanian track record in human and religious rights? I think so.

I am not convinced, as are some in the Congress and elsewhere, that Romania is retrogressing insofar as human and religious rights are concerned for its Hungarian and other citizens. A comparison of the 1985 and 1986 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, issued by the U.S. Department of State through the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee, shows that the quantitative changes in the content of the report backed by the objective comparison of their respective content shows there has been improvement in the observance of human rights issues in Romania during 1986.

Hopefully, this ascending pattern will continue each year into the future. But, as a country, isn't this the kind of pattern we are striving for?

Well, if one cannot travel to Romania to pursue the problems of the ethnic Hungarians on the ground as I have done, what aspects of Magyar life do you examine to get an idea of what their quality of life is? Is their lifestyle and quality different from that of other minorities, or even of the average Romanian? A bottom line conclusion for me was that I observed none during my visits.

Attempts by any government to assimilate or destroy a minority within its borders results in physical manifestations of these attempts. For instance, our own Government in dealing with the Indian problem in the early 1950's promulgated a policy promoting termination of the special relationship American Indians and Alaskan natives have with their Government. America's policy did produce those physical manifestations—entire tribes were eradicated, never to be seen again.

Fortunately, the Congress has reversed this policy.

Is there any physical evidence that the Romanian Government is out to destroy Hungarian culture within its borders? I have not seen it.

Throughout Transylvania, use of the Hungarian language is to be seen on statues, shop signs, and in the dual language labeling of government and other buildings where signs are done in both Romanian and Hungarian.

And, Mr. Chairman, I have for your view a number of pictures taken in Romania, in the month of March, on the whole business of the evidence of the use of the Hungarian language.

In the schools over 277,000 Hungarian students, taught by over 12,200 Hungarian teachers, receive their education in their mother tongue, beginning with kindergarten through high school. There are more than 8,000 students of Hungarian origin in institutions of higher education and universities. In some universities, where the proportion of Hungarian students is high, so is the proportion of students being taught in their native tongue.

There are 14 theaters catering to non-Romanian productions; of these, 10 are Hungarian, 3 are German and 1 is Yiddish. I asked for and was given statistics on the number of Hungarian performances last year, 1,800 seen by hundreds of thousands of theatergoers. The numbers attending to the publication of Hungarian magazines and newspapers is equally impressive.

I think I am accurate when I say that the departure some years ago of Congressman Ben Rifle saw us lose our only American Indian representative in the Congress. A look at the makeup of the top legislative body in Romania, the Grand National Assembly, the Federal Government, the local legislatures and administrative bodies discloses that citizens of Hungarian descent occupy a higher percentage of these posts than their percentage of the total population. A delegation of the Grand National Assembly, including several Hungarian members, is in Washington this very day.

During my visits to Romania, and particularly those to Transylvania, I asked Hungarians and non-Hungarians about the repression of the Magyar minority. I was given no examples of such repression. To the contrary, the general reaction I received was one of "Oh, no, not that matter again."

I talked to many Hungarians in the professions, business and government, and none of them said privately or otherwise that they, or their brethren were beset with problems because of their ethnic origin. A typical reaction to my questions in this vein is one I encountered at Poiana Brashov in March. The director general of that impressive resort facility told me that he paid no attention to nationality only to a person's ability to do the job; he then introduced me to his right-hand man, a Hungarian. At the Felix spa in Transylvania, one of the senior doctors is Hungarian, as are a number of other staff members.

In Oradea last year I asked the vice president of the Economic Council there about Hungarian repression. This high government official jokingly said that only Hungarian problem he had was his wife, who is one. And I experienced many other instances of intermarriage between Romanians and Hungarians on my visits.

It is my considered opinion, that the life of the average Romanian citizen, irrespective of nationality, is a tough one measured against our standards, but then this is true in so many of the countries of the world. In recent years many things in Romania have been especially difficult for the citizens because it is on their backs that the burdens associated with struggling to eliminate their external debt has fallen.

I cannot honestly say that during my visits to Romania that I saw any evidence that the Hungarian people, or any of the other minorities, from whom we have heard no complaints, are any better off, or worse off than the average, nonethnic Romanian. As I have said, it is a tough life throughout, measured against our freedoms and our standard of living.

I would encourage the members of this Commission to visit Romania, to visit the people and see first hand the conditions you are interested in hearing about today.

For the Hungarian people and all the citizens of Romania, if we really care about their quality of life in the long pull, we have to utilize every inducement, lever or whatever, including MFN, to this end. We must trade together and through that medium communicate our dedication to our fellow human beings in whatever country they might reside.

I will stop my comments here by saying that I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me this opportunity to testify.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Robertson. We appreciate your testimony and your observations as someone who has been in Romania recently. And we appreciate your particular perspective.

Let me say, before I ask any questions, first of all, as I told you, Senator DeConcini asked me to express his apology that he had to leave. He has to chair another meeting.

Mr. Feighan is at the Judiciary Committee, but I expect Mr. Feighan back before we conclude. Mr. Smith, also, I think will be coming back as well, he had another commitment that he was keeping.

First of all, let me observe that it is my intention and the intention of the Commission to visit Romania in August, or early September of this year. We have been visiting various Eastern European countries, two of which we have already visited, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. We hope to have the opportunity before the end of the year to visit all of the Eastern Warsaw Pact nations to discuss with them our concerns, and to make our own observations, which we think is important.

I have also had the opportunity of discussing our concerns in Bern with Ambassador Diaconu and in Vienna with both Ambassador Diaconu and then his successor, Ambassador Aninoiu, the concerns of the Commission as it relates generally to the Helsinki Final Act and Romania, and particularly, as it relates to the treatment of minorities, specifically the Hungarian minority.

Let me make it clear to all of those who are testifying, and I know the Commission shares this view, that it is not the Commission's charter, nor intent to look at and deal with the national borders of Romania. We know that is a concern it was mentioned most specifically by Ambassador Aninoiu, and I made it clear to him, that that was not the policy of our Government, as Secretary Simons has indicated, and was certainly not the perspective of the Commission.

That is not to say that we endorse one position or another, it is to say simply that the Helsinki Final Act did, in fact, indicate that those issues would be decided politically, and it is not the purpose of this Commission to interject ourselves in that issue.

However, it is very much the mission of this Commission to be concerned about the rights of citizens irrespective of national borders.

Obviously, we deal within national borders because all individuals find themselves within national borders, there are no free territories that I know of. So we deal with the nation states and the policies of those governments. But our focus and concern is with the individual's rights, irrespective of the Government that may be adversely affecting those rights.

That is not to say that we don't have as well political interests on those national questions, but they are not the focus of this hearing.

There has been a very significant action taken last Thursday, in which there was a vote, I believe it was in the 230's to about 180 category, whereby the Wolf amendment was approved. It was a bipartisan amendment and bipartisan vote. That vote reflected the deep concern of the Congress of the United States, that the MFN policy of the United States and the leverage that is envisioned by

that MFN policy was, for whatever reasons, not being very successful.

Now I, personally, opposed that amendment on the floor, not on behalf of the Commission, because the Commission had not taken a formal position on it, but as an individual who felt that perhaps the timing was incorrect. I think it is important to understand that, that it was a timing question because of the fact that the President will be making a recommendation in June. This Commission has been involved in discussions with the administration and I think the administration shares the Congress' concern, although the administration has not itself made a decision.

However, I think that the vote last Thursday should send a very loud and clear message that it is important if we are to continue the economic relationship, the trade relationship that we have had with Romania for some years now. If that is to be continued, there will have to be very substantive steps taken to convince the Congress that that leverage is effective.

Now, before I get into questions—I am going to be here for sometime—I don't know what Congressman Lantos' schedule is, but let me—Tom, if you would like to ask some questions, I recognize you, sir.

Mr. LANTOS. I am very grateful to you, Mr. Chairman. I am very much interested in everyone's testimony and I have been preoccupied with this issue for a long time.

If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would like to address a few questions to Mr. Robertson.

I was very disturbed by your testimony, Mr. Robertson, particularly since I find that your testimony is at great variance with the reality of the Hungarian minority in Romania.

Let me begin first by suggesting, perhaps you will be pleased to note that we do, in fact, have a Native Indian in the Congress, so I think you need to bring your information up-to-date on that. We are fortunate to have a very distinguished Member from Colorado, Congressman Ben Nighthorse Campbell, who is a Native American Indian.

Second, let me refer to your observation on page 3 of your testimony, that the long-running battle between Romanians and Hungarians pre-dates recorded history. It does nothing of the sort. The Hungarian ethnic population entered the Carpathian Basin in the year 896. The history of the Hungarian population, in all parts of the Carpathian Basin since 896 is richly documented.

I think it would be helpful if this historical context would be part and parcel of the thinking of the group that you represent on these issues. As a matter of fact, during the 16th and 17th centuries, when much of Hungary was occupied by the Turks, it was basically in Transylvania that the Hungarian population preserved its ethnic, linguistic, cultural and educational purity in its most pristine form.

So this is not a question of a murky historical background that no one understands. The historical record is there, in many languages, clearly indicating the enormously significant Hungarian presence in Transylvania. As a matter of fact, Transylvania, in a fundamental sense, is probably the most Hungarian part of the whole Carpathian Basin. It would be analogous to suggest that Vir-

ginia and New England really don't have American historic origins. This is where the most continuous and most significant Hungarian cultural, linguistic and physical presence is in the whole Carpathian Basin.

I am also disturbed by the observation, also on page 3 of your testimony, asking are there Hungarian people in prison, in violation of their human rights in Romania. You say, "I know of none."

The State Department tells us that there are human rights violations in Romania, and our own independent observation tells us also that there are such violations. Furthermore, I believe, Mr. Simons, in your testimony, you have an appendix designating the individual Hungarians who are in Romanian prison, in violation of their human rights.

The question that I would like to come to, which I think is very significant, relates to the tremendous upsurge in concern with respect to the mistreatment and maltreatment of the Hungarian ethnic population by the Ceausescu regime. As our distinguished Chairman indicated, we had a vote just a few days ago. This vote was one of many we have taken over the course of the years. And speaking for myself, historically I have voted to continue Most-Favored-Nation treatment for Romania, not because I wasn't concerned with human rights violations by the Romanian authorities, but I was persuaded on balance that we could maintain our leverage more effectively by maintaining this relationship, than by denying this relationship.

Last Thursday I voted to deny Romania Most-Favored-Nation treatment. I did so because the pattern of human rights violations is increasing at a very severe rate. One of the most remarkable proof of that pattern is that the Hungarian Government, after years of reluctance in raising this issue, has finally, by the pressure of Hungarian public opinion, been compelled to raise the issue itself.

Some 2 weeks ago, in a lengthy meeting with the Hungarian leader, Mr. Kadar, I had the opportunity to explore this issue, as I did with other Hungarian leaders. It is clear that the deterioration of the condition of the Hungarian minority is now so severe that the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian democratic opposition are now united in being determined to push this issue.

My question to you, Mr. Robertson, is what opportunity did you have in seeking out Hungarians, other than those who were presented to you by the Romanian authorities?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I had freedom of movement. I don't speak Hungarian, I don't speak Romanian, so I had to talk with the people that I confronted—some of the Hungarians I confronted in private conversations had the ability to speak English, or French, which I speak. So, I did converse with them in those two languages.

And as I say, Mr. Lantos, I am no expert in this area. I am bringing one man's pristine viewpoint, if you will, to this issue, based upon, albeit limited, experiences on the ground in Transylvania and other parts of Romania.

Mr. LANTOS. Would it be fair to say that your trip was basically managed by the Romanian Government authorities? Were they influential in arranging whom you saw and where you went?

Mr. ROBERTSON. To a great extent, I would admit to that, yes.

Mr. LANTOS. It would seem to this Member of Congress that it is the usual pattern of oppressive regimes when they have visitors from democratic societies, to present what historically we used to call a "pattern of potemkin villages," of showcases of people who are denying that there are human rights violations.

After all, in the Soviet Union, as our distinguished Chairman knows so well, there is a group which systematically denies that there is any persecution of Soviet Jews. And this committee has always trotted out when visitors arrive, and they make statements about the marvelous human rights conditions that prevail in the Soviet Union. But when you go behind the Government sanctioned, and typically Government paid entities, you find a widespread pattern of human rights violations.

I don't want to belabor the point, Mr. Chairman, but let me just suggest that there is a reason why we are witnessing an upsurge of concern in the Congress about Romanian human rights violations of the Hungarian ethnic minority. The reason is that the pattern of pressure is intensifying, that the attempt to diminish the 1,000-year-old Hungarian cultural and linguistic presence is intensifying, and the Romanian authorities need to be made aware of the fact that the interest of the Congress will not diminish in this issue, it will intensify.

You are quite correct, Mr. Chairman, as was Mr. Simons, that we are not dealing with a territorial issue, we are dealing with a human rights issue. I also believe you are absolutely correct in saying that we need to look at this issue, as I believe Mr. Simons indicated, not just as a question of migration, but the quality of life and fundamental rights within the country. The 2.5 million Hungarians are not going to leave Romania, that is not a realistic option. The overwhelming bulk of them will stay there, their children will stay there, their grandchildren will stay there. They have lived there for over 1,000 years.

What we are concerned with is their right to function linguistically, culturally, religiously in a manner to which the Helsinki accords entitle them to. I do not believe the business community does itself much credit by denying the palpable presence of outrageous human rights violations.

It would be a far more effective and useful stance to take to work with those of us who are concerned with human rights violations as Members of Congress, to see that the Romanian authorities cease and desist from those practices.

We have here in the presence of Mr. Szocs, an individual who himself as a poet and a writer, was subjected to outrageous human rights violations.

May I say that it was the effort of those in the Congress who insisted that he be given his freedom that brought him here. Had we swept under the rug his human rights violations 4 years ago, he would probably still be in a Romanian jail.

So it seems to me that all of us who have the privilege of living in a free society, our fundamental, moral responsibility is to listen to the persecuted victims and not to the persecuting governments in formulating our opinions.

The Ceausescu propaganda machine has a strong voice—the Hungarian writers and teachers who are discriminated against do not. They are the ones whose voices we have to magnify.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Lantos, not only for your questions, but for your statement, and for your participation. We know how strongly you feel about the issue, and what a leadership role you play in this area.

I am going to ask a number of questions now, if I can. We are going to end at 12 o'clock, we are not going to try, we are going to end at 12 o'clock, and I hope that most of you can stay just for another 45 minutes, for us to go through those questions.

Mr. Secretary, I have a number of questions for you, most of which I will submit to you, and if you could, give us answers for the record, they will be included in the record later on.

Let me ask just a few of the questions I wanted to ask of you. We have heard the term "cultural genocide," not only applied here, but in other areas. As a matter of fact, last month—I believe it was last month, or in February, we had a hearing with respect to Bulgaria's treatment of the Turks. We have heard it used in connection with Romania's treatment of the Hungarians.

Mr. Secretary, do you think such a genocide is taking place? And in the process of the answer, does your information indicate that the cultural integrity of the Transylvania Hungarians, including the possibility to transmit their culture to their children is being maintained, or is under threat?

Secretary SIMONS. Mr. Chairman, it is a complicated question, so I am going to have to give a complicated answer. I am not persuaded myself that—and Mr. Schopflin and I have been having an exchange of notes on the question, since I think we disagree. You might want to hear from him on the issue, also, as well as me—I am not persuaded myself that total assimilation, in other words the creation of a unitary population and culture in what is now the majority language is the actual policy of the Romanian leadership.

I think Professor Schopflin feels that it is over the very long-term, but as I say, you might ask him. I think, however, that there is a degree of assimilation going on, but I would divide that into two categories. I think first with the policy of rapid industrialization, such as Romania has adopted over very many years, you have an educational revolution with more and more higher education for more and more people, and a more and more developed economic system requiring higher and higher skills and qualifications.

And it is a country where between 80 and 90 percent of the population is ethnic Romanian. In that situation you get assimilation as a side effect of development, regardless of the intention of the central leadership, because for someone to be educated and active, and to improve the situation of their families, it requires knowledge of the Romanian language and in many cases, working in the Romanian language, because that is the way the economy is and the way the Government is.

Now when that happens, even if there were totally free access, equal access for ethnic Magyars, or Germans, or Jews, you would get a situation of assimilation because there is the danger you would lose your mother tongue, or you would marry a Romanian,

or someone of the majority, and that your children would be raised in Romanian. That appears to me to be the situation that we are used to in this country, and we are dealing with the problem of Hispanic people—and we have dealt throughout our history with new incoming minorities who wish to get ahead in life, in a situation where English is the dominant language. You lose some of your ancient cultural characteristics in that situation. So that is one thing that is going on, "willy-nilly" assimilation.

And it is likely, it seems to me, based on my personal experience which goes back a decade now in the country, and in dealing with the country, that there is assimilation of that kind. Whether this is pushed forward as a matter of conscious policy by the Government is where I have more questions. I am satisfied that it is being pushed forward by local authorities up there in Transylvania, people who run the schools, people who run the counties, the local government authorities. I think there are, as I said in my statement, that there are Romanian Government authorities who are pushing forward this natural process of assimilation for policy purposes. That is something that we object to, that we deplore.

Whether that is the policy of the Central Government leadership over the long-term is something that I just have not had sufficient evidence to persuade me that it is so.

Now, Mr. Chairman, on your final question as to whether it is possible to maintain one's cultural heritage and cultural ethnic characteristics in Romania, I believe it is true, I think one can do that. I think you can go from the cradle to the grave, probably, in Romania today speaking nothing but Hungarian, but it is at a very low level on the social scale. It will mainly be peasants, inhabitants of villages who are able to maintain that kind of ethnic identity pristine and intact. As soon as they go outside and as soon, especially as they seek advancement for their families, they are forced, partly "willy-nilly," also as a result of government practice, into the culture and ambiance of the majority language with damage to their cultural integrity.

So, Mr. Chairman, I am not sure that it is worse there than it is here.

Chairman HOYER. All right.

Mr. Schopflin, I know Secretary Simons indicated you may want to comment on that. If you can make a note to yourself, if you do want to comment on that question we will come back to it—I am going to be asking you some questions and you can do as so many of us do, on a TV show, or something, they ask you the question they want to ask and you answer the question you want to answer. Hopefully, we won't get quite to that situation.

Mr. Secretary, is it the administration's view that the problems of the Hungarian minority in Romania are getting worse?

Secretary SIMONS. Mr. Chairman, the short answer would be that it is. We think the problems of the Romanian population, in general, are getting worse. Under this policy the burden is placed on the country, as I said once again in my statement, of paying off the debt, levies very severe burdens on the living standard, the cultural capability of the entire population.

We believe that also affects the majority. But the multiplicity of reports to which Congressman Lantos referred, suggests very

strongly to us that the burden on the Magyar minority is disproportionately greater than it is on the whole population. But the question as I think was put earlier by Professor Schopflin is relative discrimination, in other words whether the Magyar minority is systematically discriminated against relative to the rest of the population. And there I would say the evidence is more mixed. I mean, I don't have a very clear view on that.

I suspect it is true the administration's short answer would be yes, but the evidence is, frankly, mixed.

Chairman HOYER. Has there been any forward movement at all with respect to minority rights in Romania over the last 24 months? Do we have any evidence whatsoever that the expressions of concerns on this issue have brought about any results?

Secretary SIMONS. The situation of the Jewish minority and of the German minority appears to be basically unchanged. There has been some, but very slight deterioration in the emigration figures for Romanian Germans. That may be moving up again, as our own emigration figures for the United States are beginning now to move up again.

In terms of their cultural institutions, their cultural integrity, no basic change. The Jewish community is in a special position in Romania, it is very small. Emigration figures are going down because of the size and the age of the community. Their cultural institutions are intact. So, basically no change. I would not point to any improvement.

The difficulty arises—that's the reason you have called these hearings—with regard to the Magyar-speaking minority. And there we see no improvement.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Secretary, let me ask you specifically about this same question, although the Commission has no legislative authority, its view is solicited and looked to with respect to the MFN question. I would be very interested in your views on the MFN status of Romania, as it relates not only to the specific issue of this hearing, but the general human rights performance. And although Jackson-Vanik speaks specifically to emigration figures, there is no doubt that the debate on the floor on Thursday did not deal solely with emigration figures, but dealt with the much broader focus perspective and concern.

My question to you is how do we respond to those who advocate the 6 months suspension which—Mr. Robertson observes, as does the administration and Congressman Gibbons that such suspension amounts to termination. How do you respond to the observation that the lever is not working?

Secretary SIMONS. Mr. Chairman, the administration has the full range of views within its own counsels, and I would not wish to pre-judge what the President's recommendation on June 3 will be. We will spend this month in an orderly process of formulating and recommending to the President what his recommendation to the Congress should be.

I think our opposition to the Wolf amendment had more to do with this question of orderly process. That we would prefer to be able to conduct our review, formulate a presidential recommendation for the Congress, also to review in an orderly fashion, rather

than have it attached to another bill, in another timing—you mentioned timing was also your objective.

With regard to the general question you have posed, we have, up until now, from 1975 until now, every American administration has felt that although there were serious concerns about human rights. From the beginning to the end, we have had serious concerns about human rights performance in Romania, even before the Helsinki Final Act. In other words, it was not dependent on the Helsinki Final Act.

We have felt that on balance the kind of overall relationship of which most-favored-nation tariff treatment was an essential component, a vital component, gave us leverage that on balance was working, despite the defects and the abuses, the inadequacies of Romanian performance.

I think what you say in response to the people who make the argument that it has not been working, is simply that you have to give the evidence to the contrary over a period of a great many years, over 150,000 people leaving the country overall, including 30,000 to the United States. That which is the statutory connection, Jackson-Vanik, is connected to emigration; as a matter of practice and as a matter of politics, we recognize and share the human rights concerns across the spectrum, in terms of Romanian performance. We feel that there have been improvements on that field, too, in terms of religious rights, in terms of religious institutions whose buildings have been preserved from demolition under the nationwide urban renewal programs now underway.

This year in terms of the printing of Bibles for Protestants, over the years in terms of release of political prisoners. Mr. Szocs mentioned some, there are others whose names are attached to my testimony. But over the years there has been a record of the release of political prisoners, some of whom are in this country, against whom the Romanian authorities brought very severe charges.

So over a 10, now going on 12-year period, we feel that the kind of influence that a relationship which includes MFN can give us with the Romanian Government has worked. The question this year, as every year, will be: has it worked enough on the kinds of issues that Congress is concerned about, to justify not putting in a negative recommendation?

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Secretary, again without asking you to pre-judge the issue—and I understand your observation that an orderly process is now ongoing for recommendation to be made to the President, and obviously I am not asking, nor do I think it appropriate for you to pre-judge that issue in answer to my question. However, one of the components of that would be a consideration of what adverse effect the denial of MFN might have.

What would be the component of the decision as it relates to possible adverse effect, and do you think there would be any adverse effect, either to minority rights that we are discussing specifically with respect to this hearing, or other considerations?

Secretary SIMONS. Mr. Chairman, I am glad you clarified it. I have been a little ill, so I am not as sharp as I ought to be. That one is a little easier. I think that either suspension, which in practical terms is tantamount, I think, to abrogation, I mean loss of most-favored-nation treatment, for a very extended period. So

either suspension or removal, withdrawal of most-favored-nation tariff treatments would clearly result in a very severe degeneration and decline in U.S. Government influence on the Government of Romania with respect to the whole range of human rights issues which are of interest to this Commission.

I think with regard to emigration, I would anticipate that there would be a dwindling away to zero probably of emigration to the United States. I can't speak about emigration to the Federal Republic, or to Israel, but certainly with regard to the United States. I would anticipate, and I am confident in anticipating that the Romanian authorities would not, even to the degree that they have been receptive over the years to our representations on human rights issues, that they would no longer be so receptive, or receptive at all.

That is easier to answer than what good our leverage has done us. The absence of the leverage would bring an absolute deterioration in our capacity to encourage better human rights performance in Romania.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

As I indicated, I have other questions and we will submit those. Your statement was excellent, very helpful, and I know your answers will be as well. The Commission appreciates very much your being with us, hopefully, you can stay for another one-half hour. I know we have kept you sitting there, not feeling well for 2 hours now.

Secretary SIMONS. Well, Mr. Chairman, if I may excuse myself, I have an 11:45 appointment. But I have been very happy to have been with you, and I certainly will be glad to answer your questions.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. Szocs, if I could ask you a couple of questions. To what extent has the Romanian Government succeeded, in your opinion, in denying Hungarians their cultural rights?

Mr. HAMOS [for Mr. Szocs]. In this regard, for many years I had prepared documentation, petitions and memoranda which are attached to the written statement that I have submitted, so I would only sum up the contents of those documents.

One of the most serious violations of the rights of Hungarians has consisted of their forced resettlement. Such population transfers which have resulted in Hungarians living in ever smaller concentrations in their traditional communities. It is not of small consequence whether a Hungarian lives among 2,000 of his fellow nationals, or lives only with his one companion in a community.

Chairman HOYER. How does that occur, how is that carried out?

Mr. HAMOS [for Mr. Szocs]. There are numerous methods to accomplish this purpose. One is to displace, to assign to jobs Hungarian university graduates in regions outside of Transylvania, that is, in ethnic Romanian regions. This happened to my own wife, a schoolteacher, who was assigned to a job outside of Hungarian inhabited communities.

In the same fashion, workers are attracted to factories, with specific incentives for Romanian workers from beyond the Carpathian Basin to come into Transylvanian-Hungarian communities, and for

Hungarian workers from those communities to leave those Transylvanian communities.

I also mention in the documents that I have submitted, the elimination or the reduction of Hungarian-language instruction opportunities in the educational system at all levels.

In contrast to what the representative of the State Department said here, that there is no great difference between the situation of assimilation in this country versus in Romania, one example which well illustrates that difference is the fact that in Romania there are less Hungarian-language radio programs that are possible than in this country. In this country Hungarians have been able to create and maintain radio programs broadcasting in their own language, which is exactly what was terminated in Romania.

Chairman HOYER. Are there no Hungarian radio stations in Romania at this time, as far as you know?

Mr. HAMOS [for Mr. Szocs]. There is a very brief, few minutes worth of news reporting on radio from Bucharest in the Hungarian language, and that's all.

Chairman HOYER. If I might, Mr. Szocs, I would like to ask a question about Erno Borbely, I believe you referred to him earlier. He is one of several prisoners of conscience in Romania, could you tell us something about Mr. Borbely? As you indicated, he is a friend of yours, why were he and Mr. Buzas and Pali singled out for incarceration, in your opinion?

Mr. HAMOS [for Mr. Szocs]. Bela Pall I am not personally acquainted with, so I can't give you first-hand information about his situation.

With regard to Erno Borbely, who was my friend, I can tell you from personal knowledge that he called the attention of the authorities upon himself because of activities he conducted to gain better knowledge of the historical, cultural condition and situation of Hungarians in Romania. He had a circle in Csikszereda, the town where he lived, whose purpose it was to conduct such cultural acquainting activities.

But what the specific charges were on the grounds of which he was convicted is something that I was never able to determine, even though I took great effort, great pains to try to determine that. I went to his parents and asked them, and even they don't know. No one is aware of why he was convicted.

Chairman HOYER. Were the parents allowed to attend the trial?

Mr. HAMOS [for Mr. Szocs]. No one was allowed to attend the trial.

Chairman HOYER. And, Mr. Buzas, you did not know Mr. Buzas? know Mr. Buzas?

Mr. HAMOS [for Mr. Szocs]. I didn't know Laszlo Buzas personally, although I do know that he was a friend of Erno Borbely's.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you.

Now, with respect to yourself, personally, were you forced to leave Romania?

Mr. HAMOS [for Mr. Szocs]. The force and pressure which constrained me to leave can best be expressed as an accumulation of force and pressure that lasted several years against myself, my surroundings and my friends. It was this force and pressure that ulti-

mately constrained me, to leave the country for my human rights activities.

Chairman HOYER. The pressure, or the directive was not specific, you were not specifically asked to leave, as I understand it, but the pressures that were applied to you in an indirect way, were designed to constructively force you to leave, is that correct?

Mr. HAMOS [for Mr. Szocs]. Yes, I was ordered to leave in an indirect fashion, not by virtue of a specifically phrased order that directed me to leave.

Chairman HOYER. Now, I want to ask you two questions, Mr. Szocs, you may have answers for them, or you may want to submit answers for them. The first one is if you could make three recommendations to this Commission to transmit to Romanian authorities, what would they be? Specifically, I want to give a short list of, perhaps, special actions the Romanian Government could now take to safeguard the Transylvanian-Hungarians' cultural integrity.

Mr. HAMOS [for Mr. Szocs]. I would like to submit in writing answers to that question.

Chairman HOYER. Fine, we would very much appreciate your taking the time to do that.

My last question you may also want to respond to in writing. Would the concerns of the United States regarding human rights in Romania, in particular regarding the Hungarian minority, be better met if the U.S. Government were more public in raising these concerns—although I might observe that the U.S. Government has been raising its concern publicly—or, as some would argue, that it is more effective to quietly raise these questions, and to pursue these ends?

Mr. HAMOS [for Mr. Szocs]. I strongly believe that it would be important for the U.S. Government to raise these questions in a more public fashion vis-a-vis the Romanian Government.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, Mr. Szocs. We have some other questions as well, but time will not permit me to pursue, but if perhaps you could consider those as well in your answers to the other questions I asked, we would appreciate it.

Mr. Schopflin, let me ask you a few questions, and then we will get back, to the differences that may exist between you and Mr. Simons with respect to the conscious policy, as opposed to the affects of policies not directed, perhaps, at the specific objective of undermining, or eliminating the Hungarian minority.

Why don't I ask that question first, in light of the fact that it has been raised. What are your views with respect to the policies of the Government, as it relates to the national and cultural integrity of the Hungarian minority?

Mr. SCHOPFLIN. I do, in fact, disagree on this particular point in some respects with Mr. Simons. I believe that in the very long-term, as indeed he suggested, the ideal situation which these leaderships would like to bring about, is an ethnically homogenous Romania, or Slovakia for that matter, not necessarily this year, or next year, but in the very long-term I believe that this is the imperative which is inherent in their national ideologies, insofar as Romanians think of themselves as Romanians, which they do, a very large part of their lives. They find it very difficult to accept that the territory of Romania contains upwards, well above 2 mil-

lion Hungarians. Because this is simply, in terms of the way in which they see themselves as Romanians, unacceptable.

This doesn't necessarily mean that they want to see the Hungarian minority physically destroyed in direct genocide, I don't believe this is the case, but the authorities, I think, are trying to construct the framework within which the Hungarian minority has its homogeneity broken up, that it is no longer possible to lead the Hungarian life, as Mr. Simons suggested, that upward mobility automatically involves—assimilation into Romanian culture. And that, hopefully, from that particular point of view, in the longer term there will be no Hungarian intelligentsia, and thereby the Hungarian community will accept that its long-term future lies in becoming Romanian.

I do agree with Mr. Simons that at the bottom of the social scale it is possible to lead some kind of a Hungarian life. I would differ from him only very marginally in one respect, and this is that in most contacts with the state, and that really involves any kind of contact whether speaking to a policeman, or buying a postage stamp, it is not really possible to use the Hungarian language on a regular basis. There are occasions when it is, but as I stress in my opening remarks, the system is highly discretionary, it is highly informal and the local agents of the state often have a great deal of personal power over how a particular policy is implemented.

I think this is destructive of the self-confidence of the minority. The minority, because it is a minority, feels that its own position is to some extent automatically at risk. When this sense is reinforced by the policies of the state, I think it is very hard to get away from the impression that in the long-term the ideal, the preferred solution is that there be no minority from the standpoint of the majority.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Schopflin, I am interested in a point that Mr. Szocs spoke to in trying to differentiate some of what happens in the United States, as it relates to language, in particular. Mr. Szocs of course drew the distinction of Hungarian media, radio that exists. And of course, as you know, we have a Spanish International Network that is on most cable TV in the United States, certainly is in this area.

But as a non-American, as somebody who can observe, perhaps with more objectivity, I am interested in what your thoughts would be with respect to the distinction between the California initiative which seeks to establish English as the official language of the United States, and the statement that you just made with respect to it is difficult to deal with the Government in a tongue, other than Romanian.

I would think that that probably is true in almost every country of the world, in many respects. And I would be interested in your observations of the appropriate distinctions that do exist, if you think distinctions do.

Mr. SCHOPFLIN. I am not wholly comfortable with comparisons between the United States and Communist countries for two reasons, one is the obvious one, the political systems are really very radically different. The second one is, that in the United States the minority populations are immigrant populations. In Eastern and Central Europe you are dealing with long settled populations, who,

as I suggested in my opening remarks, find themselves as minorities by an accident of history, they didn't choose to go to Romania. They found themselves there after 1918, with the dismemberment of Hungary.

I think this is a qualitative distinction.

The third point is that—which I referred to a moment ago, the imperative of nationalism in the Romanian case, and I wouldn't single out the Romanians here for special treatment, I think all the national ideologies, all the nations of East-Central Europe feel themselves extremely insecure in their national being, because they have had a highly fragmented, broken history. They feel that the nation is in perpetual danger because they are small nations, and there are larger powers outside.

To that extent, when one views this from the Romanian standpoint, one can see why the Romanians are so hypersensitive on the issue of the minority. I believe that morally their position is very difficult to defend.

Let me give you one example where, in fact, a majority of the minority have found it reasonably easy to live together and have, in fact, provided the kind of institutions and rights which we have heard Mr. Szocs and others say ought to be safeguarded. I am thinking here—appropriately given this is the Helsinki Commission, of Finland, where there is a Swedish minority of about 8 percent of the population, which enjoys very, very extensive rights, the kinds of rights which Mr. Szocs and others have spoken about in the context of Romania. It is perfectly possible to lead a Swedish life in the case of Finland, and indeed, go right to the top. One does not have to assimilate and become a Finn, if one wants to become a member of the Finnish Diet, there are Government ministers who are Swedes, and so on.

And even more importantly, perhaps, a significant number of Finns learn Swedish. There is a certain amount of bi-lingualism.

In the case of Romania, I think there has been development in the opposite direction, fewer and fewer Romanians know Hungarian. Two generations ago most educated Romanians in Transylvania did know Hungarian, I think this is no longer the case. And, as we have heard repeatedly over the last 20 years, particularly under the Ceausescu regime, Hungarianists, being a member of the Hungarian minority, has brought disadvantages in all sorts of ways.

Chairman HOYER. Mr. Schopflin, our time is running short, and I want to ask Mr. Robertson a question, or two, as well.

Let me say, I don't know whether you are familiar with it, but we held a hearing in February on the Turkish minority in Bulgaria. If you can, I would like you to compare the present situation, present and the future of the Hungarians in Transylvania and those of the Turks in Bulgaria, if you can.

Mr. SCHOPFLIN. I think it is a very difficult one, I am not as knowledgeable about the position of the Turks in Bulgaria. My understanding of the situation is that the Bulgarian authorities used direct military and security units in resettlement and in some cases there was actual fighting in the Turkish areas of settlement.

I am not conscious that, anyway in the last 10 or 15 years, there has been anything like this in Romania.

On the other hand, in terms of the subtle, slow erosive quality of Romanian policy towards the Hungarian minority, there is a comparison to be made. As I have already suggested, I think both governments do look to an ethnic homogeneous situation, because in both cases they find it intolerable that an ethnic minority exists in the territory which they regard as theirs.

But I, at this point, would add one very brief word to the exchange of Congressman Lantos and Mr. Robertson, which is about history. It seems to me that the point here is that Transylvania has both a Romanian and a Hungarian history. They are equally valid. And I think that using history as a pretext for what happens in terms of human rights is misleading, it is a false analogy.

Chairman HOYER. I appreciate your observation, and of course Congressman Lantos said at the outset of our questioning period that the issue before us was not one of nationalities, or the geopolitical framework of Europe, which was certainly a continuing concern for other arenas, and is of concern to members of this Commission.

It is a concern of all of us. However, in the context of our hearing, and in the context of the thrust of the focus of the Commission, we are concerned about the rights of individuals who find themselves as part of national minorities. And I think Congressman Lantos also observed that he understood that. Congressman Lantos' observations I think were deeply felt, and certainly demonstrated or reflected a very valid hypothesis, but I also understand your point of view.

My last question, Mr. Schopflin, that I would like to ask you, sir, is to what extent does the Hungarian advocacy of the Hungarian rights in Transylvania affect adversely the Hungarian ethnic population of Transylvania, or does it?

Mr. SCHOPFLIN. When you say the Hungarian advocacy, that of the Hungarian Government or the Hungarian groups in the West?

Chairman HOYER. No, the Hungarian Government.

Mr. SCHOPFLIN. I believe that it is very difficult to be anything resembling accurate in this situation, it is very difficult to see cause and effect. I do also believe that the fact that the Hungarian Government has been raising this issue in a number of ways with the Romanian authorities for a good number of years, though in a relatively low key, has had some marginal positive results, conceivably in halting some of the actions of the Romanian Government.

The policy is based on the agreement of 1977, when it was agreed that the Hungarian authorities have some say in what happens in cultural matters with the Hungarian minority of Romania, and conversely, the Romanian authorities have some say in what happens to the Romanian minority in Hungary. It is very small, about 20,000–25,000 strong.

On the whole, the evidence is that the Romanian authorities pay very little attention to what the Hungarians say, and there is a certain amount of evidence when Hungarian politicians go to Romania, they do raise these matters. The Hungarian authorities maintain very full files, very full information based on what happens to the minority. And conceivably bring specific issues to the attention of the Romanians, there may be—I can't think of a specific case—where this has been helpful.

But I think that the best that one could say is, it is an added source of pressure on the Romanian Government.

Chairman HOYER. Without an adverse consequence?

Mr. SCHOPFLIN. Probably marginally positive.

Chairman HOYER. Thank you, sir.

Mr. Robertson, again, let me thank you for your testimony. I have a number of questions that I would like to also submit to you—I said we had to end at 12 o'clock, you see the three lights on there, I presume that we are going to have a vote pretty soon. We go into session at 12 o'clock.

So, let me just ask you one question, if I might, Mr. Robertson. You have dealt as a businessman with the Ceausescu government, I believe that you share this Commission's concern about human rights of individuals wherever they may be found. Now, let me ask you, from your experience, how best do you think we can impact on and bring an improvement in the human rights situation in Romania?

The question is, how do you think we can best impact on that? And I might sort of preach a little bit, if I can, clearly you have come before us as an individual representing a group of businesses who are doing business with Romania.

One of the points that was made on the floor on Thursday was that, yes, we do do business with Romania, and in point of fact, we have the worst trade balance with Romania of any nation in the world. Now it is clearly of much smaller consequences from a percentage standpoint, smaller trade imbalance with Japan, or other nations of the European community, but nevertheless, in terms of the ratio, it is the largest.

Clearly there is concern about that. The argument is that not only if we cut off MFN status we will solve a trade imbalance, minimal effect, but nevertheless a 3 to 1 relationship, but we will make the point as strongly as we could at all, that whatever progress has been made to date has been relatively insubstantial and is not consistent with the Helsinki Final Act. I really think that last Thursday the Congress was reflecting a moral opposition to continuing the MFN status.

So, I guess I will ask two questions; No. 1. How can we most impact that?

I have written a letter to Mr. Ceausescu myself—and as I told you, I intend to visit Romania in August—suggesting that there needs to be substantial progress when this issue is again revisited, which it will be in the relatively near future. How would you suggest that we best impact?

Mr. ROBERTSON. I listened to your question to Secretary Simons, the second one, the generic question about the—you know, what would happen if we took it away. I am alluding to MFN, which in our arsenal of persuasive weapons is the only one that I know that we really have over the Ceausescu government.

Chairman HOYER. Let me interject, if I can, so you can comment on it. I understand that, and of course the response on the floor and in the Congress is, "yes;" but if you never use it—that is to say, if you just threaten to take it away all the time, it becomes somewhat of a useless—as you phrase it, element of our policy.

Mr. ROBERTSON. Well, Dr. Schopflin in an answer to one of your questions, commented in a qualitative aspect of an action.

Just one month ago, Mr. Chairman, I had a 1-on-1—well, actually, 2-on-1 meeting with President Ceausescu that lasted far in excess of the amount of time that was initially allotted to me. On that occasion I headed up a delegation of 100 American businesses to Romania, in specific to Bucharest for the second half of my visit, the rest of it I was up in Transylvania, and those pictures are a wee bit of evidence of that.

Ever since MFN has been in place, there has been almost an—there has been an annual visitation of American businessmen under the aegis of the U.S.-Romanian Economic Council of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. During my last visit, I wore two hats, I represented ABIT, which I alluded to in my testimony, the American Businesses for International Trade, and also, was vice chairman of the U.S.-Romanian Economic Council of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States.

What can we do? I think what we can do, if we really feel for individuals in Romania, as Romanians, as Turks, as Gypsies, as Slavs, as Hungarians, and whatever is to continue the utilization of MFN.

What good has it done? Has it been used? I would say, yes; every year that these American businessmen have been going over, in the 10 years that MFN has been in place, a forum has been created for these American businessmen, who are good American citizens, to converse with high-level officials in the Romanian Government, and with President Ceausescu himself, to bring forth these problems that are facing the continuation of MFN, because it is a "carrot and stick" situation. Ceausescu, of all of the leaders of all of the developing countries in the world, I think by far, albeit to the distress of his own people, has been fighting to payoff external debts. And to payoff external debt he needs hard currency, to get hard currency he has to have business trading relationships with the biggest consumer nation on the face of the earth, the United States. We are a big influence, obviously, in the world economic sphere.

So continuation of MFN is important so far as the lives and the quality of lives, and the hopes for betterment of their conditions over there, human and religious and ethnic. And I think that what we can do as a Congress, as an administration, as a Federal Government that really cares about the little old Romanian guy on the street, whatever his ethnic origin, is to continue MFN, to continue the existence of that leverage which can and is being used. I used it. I wouldn't have had a meeting with President Ceausescu—and I took along Ambassador Kirk with me, as a witness—I wouldn't have had that meeting, I wouldn't have met with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the heads of all of the various ministeries, with the president of Cults that governs the approved 14 religious sects in Romania.

So the existence of MFN is important because it provides us the entree to these people, and we don't bat 1,000, Joe DiMaggio didn't, and we won't. But it is an erosive situation, I think, and I think it is essential to do the very best we can, and to do the best we can,

we need this lever. And to take it away will result in the negative impact that Secretary Simons alluded to.

Chairman HOYER. In the negative impacts to which you refer, you believe the human rights situation would deteriorate in Romania, if the MFN status were ended?

Mr. ROBERTSON. We have an emotional thing going on here that I really can't boom out with, I am working on, and it involves the life of a human being. And the restitution of this man to his family. And MFN is giving us the forum to talk about that.

Chairman HOYER. First of all, I think everybody here today is pleased with your efforts, shares the ambivalence that perhaps you have, but let me say for all of those who are in attendance, one of the things that concerns me as an individual—and I think concerns the Commission—is a concept that Ambassador Schifter spoke of in Ottawa, when he was speaking of the Soviet Union. He made the observation that historically, of course, nations have threatened the rights of the citizens of other nations. We are now finding, however, that we are in a situation where nations are holding their own citizen hostage for the attaining of objectives in a bilateral, or multilateral relationship with other nations.

The Helsinki Final Act said that shouldn't be. That was the bottom line on Helsinki, I think the administration and Congress are in agreement on this issue. We may not be in agreement on tactics such as on MFN, but clearly the objectives of the Congress and the administration are the same, that is as Congressman Lantos so eloquently stated, to have the promises of Helsinki realized by each and every nation.

Notwithstanding the economic interest of individual businesses which are not insubstantial and are of concern to the Congress—I don't mean by any stretch of the imagination they are not, but ultimately the quality of our Nation will be judged by the adherence to our principles, even in questions where it may cost us some money.

And in that context, I think, Mr. Robertson, you can be particularly influential among the business community that does business in Romania. We believe it is important to impress upon the Romanian Government, even more so since the House vote on Thursday, that it is necessary to implement the Helsinki accords. We can't tell Romania what to do. We are passed the time when we are going to invade, if they don't do what we want them to do, that's not a useful element of policy at this point in time, I think in the opinion of most of us. But politically the United States must act upon its principles, and one of its principles very strongly held is that the Helsinki Final Act meant something for the 35 signatories and their citizens.

We need to work toward that end. We would hope that we could all work together and try to devise the tactics most effective to accomplish that objective.

I thank all of you. Mr. Szocs, I thank you. Mr. Hamos, I thank you for being with us to allow us to communicate better than we otherwise could have.

Mr. Schopflin, again, I want to thank you, sir, for taking some of your own hard earned money, I presume, to come to be with us, to share your time and your expertise.

And, Mr. Robertson, again, thank you for being with us.

This hearing is concluded.

By the way, Mr. Robertson, I also have some additional questions for you, that if you could, I would very much like to have the opportunity of giving them to you, and perhaps—you don't have to give us a formal response, but perhaps a letter back to us with some of your observations would be helpful.

Mr. ROBERTSON. If you will give me those questions, I will be happy to do that, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HOYER. Let me say that the Commission welcomes testimony and persons with different views, because we think that that is ultimately the best way to reach rational, effective policy. In any event, however uncomfortable that may be from time-to-time, it is at the bedrock of what this society believes.

Thank you all very much.

[Whereupon, the hearing was adjourned at 12:14 p.m.]

Appendix A

STATEMENT OF SENATOR ALFONSE D'AMATO

ON

THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN ROMAINIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

MR. CHAIRMAN:

I AM PLEASED TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS, THE SECOND IN A SERIES OF COMMISSION HEARINGS ON MINORITIES IN EASTERN EUROPE. IT IS PARTICULARLY TIMELY THAT WE FOCUS ON THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN ROMANIA IN LIGHT OF THE CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE ON THE EXTENSION OF MOST FAVORED NATION STATUS FOR THAT NATION. THOUGH ROMANIA IS OFTEN VIEWED AS A MAVERICK, ITS HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IS AMONG THE WORSE IN EASTERN EUROPE. THE SYSTEMATIC REPRESSION OF ETHNIC HUNGARIANS IN ROMANIA CAN BE SEEN IN VIRTUALLY EVERY ASPECT OF LIFE -- FROM DISCRIMINATION IN EDUCATION AND RELIGION TO THE SUPRESSION OF THE RICH HUNGARIAN CULTURE.

BUT THESE PRACTICES ARE NOT LIMITED TO ROMANIA. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE THAT SIMILAR PRACTICES ARE COMMON IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AS WELL. I LOOK FORWARD TO HEARING FROM THE EXPERTS ASSEMBLED HERE THIS MORNING AND COMMEND YOU AND THE COCHAIRMAN, SENATOR DeCONCINI, FOR FOCUSING ON THIS IMPORTANT ISSUE.

THANK YOU MR. CHAIRMAN.

Appendix B

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Mr. Hoyer:

I am forwarding herewith responses to the additional questions sent to Deputy Assistant Secretary Thomas W. Simons following his May 5 testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

J. Edward Fox

J. Edward Fox
Assistant Secretary
Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs

Enclosure:
As stated.

The Honorable
Steny Hoyer,
House of Representatives.

Q. Could you compare the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania and Czechoslovakia with the situation of other minorities there, such as the Germans or the Jews?

A. Although ethnic Hungarians are by far the largest and most prominent minority group in Romania, much of my prepared statement and remarks regarding their situation also hold true for other minorities there as well. It is evident that, generally, opportunities for minority groups in Romania to express and maintain their cultural heritage have steadily narrowed in recent years, but the circumstances of each group do vary somewhat. All groups, however, are subject to the strict control of the State.

With respect to Germans and Jews, a central factor is that large numbers from both groups have emigrated from Romania, and this departure process continues at a substantial rate. Over the past decade, over one-third of the ethnic Germans in Romania have emigrated to the FRG. The total for 1986 was 11,944. There has been a corresponding decrease in German cultural institutions. However, more than 250,000 ethnic Germans remain, and their access to education and culture in their native tongue is an ongoing concern.

Although fewer than 25,000 Jews remain in Romania, they are able to maintain active community institutions which are in part subsidized by contributions from abroad. In addition to synagogues, these include a community newpaper, restaurants,

old-age homes, and religious training programs for children. However, there are only four Rabbis. Romanian Jews are able to emigrate to Israel if they choose.

Hungarians also constitute the largest minority in Czechoslovakia; other minority groups are significantly smaller. Gypsies, who are the only other sizeable group, comprise about 1.6% of the population. As elsewhere in Europe, they tend to suffer disproportionately high rates of poverty, crime and disease. Tradition and popular prejudice have hindered the integration of Gypsies into mainstream Czechoslovak society.

Though symbolically significant, the Jewish community in Czechoslovakia is numerically very small. Two Jewish communities, one in the Czech lands and one in Slovakia, operate prayer houses and synagogues. Like other religious bodies, they are subject to state controls. There are no Jewish schools or rabbinical seminaries, and only two rabbis for the entire country.

Large-scale population exchanges with Germany following World War II effectively removed the German minority from Czechoslovakia.

Q. In addition to those in Czechoslovakia and Romania, there are Hungarians living in the Soviet Union and in Yugoslavia. Could you comment on their situation relative to their kin in Czechoslovakia and Romania?

A. Most Hungarians in the Soviet Union are there as a result of the trans-Carpathian border adjustments of 1945. In 1926, for example, there were only 5,400 Hungarians living in the Soviet Union. After World War II, however, the number had increased to 155,000. The most recent census figures, those of 1979, show 171,000.

Hungarians in the USSR are not treated especially well, but are probably less discriminated against than some of the other Eastern European ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, such as the Poles. They also face less official harassment than the Hungarian minority in Romania. There are a few Hungarian language schools and a Hungarian language newspaper. A principal source of discord is the fact that Hungarians in this region are primarily Uniate Catholics, a non-recognized religion in the Soviet Union.

The Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia (approximately 400,000) is settled primarily in the Socialist Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. Hungarian minority rights are officially recognized in the Yugoslav constitution as is the Hungarian language. The minority lives peacefully and relatively prosperously in Vojvodina.

Q. Do you think that Ceausescu is attempting forcibly to assimilate the Hungarian minority? Is official Romanian policy aimed completely to engulf the Hungarian minority into the Romanian nation or to silence dissent?

A. Assimilation of the Hungarian minority into the majority culture is to some degree a natural by-product of development and Romania's drive for rapid industrialization. Social advancement increasingly depends on mobility and education in the majority language.

However, it also seems true that Romanian Government authorities actively seek to push the process of assimilation forward. This is reflected in decisions on merging or closing educational, social and cultural institions, restrictions on publications and access to Hungarian language materials, and changes in street and place names -- all seemingly designed to promote a unified Romanian culture. Beyond this, ethnic Hungarians, like others in Romania, endure a system of harsh restrictions on civil liberties and basic freedoms.

Q. When did the State Department begin actively to monitor Romanian treatment of the Hungarian minority?

A. The Department has long been interested in the situation of the various minorities in Romania, including ethnic Hungarians. Officers from our Embassy in Bucharest periodically have visited the areas of the country with high concentrations of ethnic Hungarians. Several years ago, we started the practice of joint travel by officers from our Embassies in Bucharest and Budapest, thus providing a capability to speak to people in either Romanian or Hungarian. More recently, our monitoring of the treatment of ethnic Hungarians has been given strong impetus by the number and seriousness of reports of problems that we receive.

Q. Has the Administration expressed concern to the Romanians about the Hungarian minority? In what fora and by what means has it expressed concern? And what is the Romanian Government's response to such expressions of concern about the Hungarian Minority?

A. We have raised Hungarian minority issues with the Romanian Government on a regular basis both in bilateral meetings and in the context of major multilateral gatherings such as the current follow-up meeting in Vienna of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and earlier meetings in Budapest and Ottawa. We view this continuing dialogue with the Romanians as the most effective means of pressing for improved treatment of minority groups.

The Romanian Government often has sought to downplay our concerns by asserting that they have been stimulated by a campaign by Hungarian irredentists. We do not accept this argument, but have made it clear that we respect Romania's territorial integrity. We do not see the minority issue as a matter of national boundaries. However, we do maintain that the status of the minority raises basic questions of human rights which are the proper concern of all Helsinki signatories. We believe our relationship with Romania is strong enough to permit frank discussion of the minority issue.

Q. Would U.S. concerns regarding human rights in Romania, in particular regarding the Hungarian minority there, be better met if the U.S. Government was much more public in raising these concerns?

A. In dealing with the minority issue, we seek the best ways of stimulating positive action on the problems that concern us. At times, raising our concerns in a public forum can be useful, and we have done this. However, we believe we can be most effective by persistently pursuing the issue, in a very frank and constructive manner, directly with the Romanian Government.

Q. What influence do you believe the Soviet Union has on the internal policies of the Romanian Government? Do you believe the Soviets see the harsh repression of the Ceausescu regime as serving their interests, given the tensions between Hungary and Romania as well as the very poor performance of the Romanian economy?

A. Romania values its independence and seeks to guard it carefully. But as the leader of the Warsaw Pact and Romania's main trading partner, the Soviet Union does have a direct, albeit limited, impact on Romanian policies. To the extent that the Romanian leadership has maintained control, promoted the primacy of the Communist party and avoided the popular uprisings we have seen in other Eastern European countries, Soviet interests have been served. However, at present the harsh internal situation in Romania and the severe deterioration of the economy must be an embarrassment and a burden to the Soviet Union. Rising tensions between Hungary and Romania, two Soviet allies, also must be a matter of concern to the USSR.

Q. How do Romanian policies affect human contacts between Hungarians in Hungary and Romania?

A. Romanian Government policies have tended to impede contacts between Hungarians in the two countries. This has increased as the status of the minority in Romania has become a point of public contention between the two governments. Restrictions at border crossing points and the confiscation of Hungarian-language publications are two of the more obvious examples of how contacts are being restricted.

Q. The democratic opposition in Hungary reports frequently on the plight of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and Romania, among other things. Sometimes they are harassed by the authorities for doing so, apparently because of the fear of growing support among the general population for their efforts. In addition, there are several populist writers in Hungary who cannot publish some of their works because they expressed concerns regarding the Hungarian minorities. Have their efforts helped bring the plight of the minorities to the attention of the West? Have they had any effect on the position of the Hungarian Government on the minority problem?

A. The efforts of the democratic opposition and others have helped draw attention to the situation of the Hungarian minorities in Romania and Czecoslovakia. The information they provide supplements that already available to the average Hungarian from relatives in these countries and from other sources. Further dissemination of this information to Western news services and organizations focuses wider attention on the issue. This has resulted in a greater degree of involvement by the Hungarian Government whose positions on the minority issue generally have followed rather than led public opinion.

Appendix C

MRS. ANNA FALTUS
THE SAVOY, APT. 610
1101 NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE., N. W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20037

Translation

To the Committee for the Defense of Rights of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia

Prague April 13, 1987

Dear friends:

I received your letter dated April 6, 1987 with the enclosed report of the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, concerning the development of the situation after the anti-Hungarian actions in Bratislava, as well as a copy of the letter you addressed to the Prime Minister of the Federal Government of the CSSR on the same subject.

I informed of your communication the two other Charter 77 spokespersons, Jan Litomisky and Libuse Silhanova; I am also making the information available to former Charter 77 spokesmen, who have, in the past years, participated in the discussions and dealings in matters concerning the problem of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia.

It is evident that the state organs are not informing in a proper way the public about the investigations, nor did they show any effort to act in a spirit of tolerance through the media and schools. The investigators have, in the meantime, stepped up their threatening attitude towards Hungarians in Czechoslovakia.

Especially alarming are the reports about the opinions of the secretary of the Slovak Communist Party Ludovit Pezlar. Should they not be officially denied, they could influence the investigation. In a state, guided by laws, it is unacceptable for even rumors on such matters not to be unambiguously denied as soon as they appear.

Please, send us a report again, should there be any other important developments concerning the incidents that occured during the night of March 9, 1987.

Sincerely,

Josef Vohryzek

(Infoch No.6/87).

* * * * * * * * * *

(Note: Miklos Duray sent on March 24, 1987 to the General Prosecutor a complaint concerning the methods of members of StB (security police) who detained him on March 17, 1987 and interrogated him about the activities of the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. --- Infoch No.6/87).

* * * * * * * * * *

Translation

Letter to Charter 77 from the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia

Dear friends:

We received your letter (77-24-87) on March 31, 1987, for which we thank you. We are glad that in your document No.23, dated March 27, 1987, you took a stand with regard to the terrorist actions in Bratislava. We are enclosing two documents - a report on development of the situation concerning these anti-Hungarian actions, and a letter to the Prime Minister of the CSSR, in which we are bringing to his attention possible tendencies in the investigation of the case.

Anti-Hungarian attacks in Bratislava, as well as other anti-Hungarian expressions, on the part of private persons and groups, as well as the efforts of the official power to degrade the social-culture of the Hungarian minority, confirm our conviction, that it is necessary - in the interest of the protection of minorities - to enforce more intensively collective rights and to establish an institution for the protection of minorities on an international scale. There do not exist, since 1945, any international legal norms for the protection of minorities (not even in the Czechoslovak-Hungarian Agreement). Their absence opens the door not only to a planned discrimination, but also to a real social repression of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. The absence of these norms is even more pronounced in a political system in which not even citizens have the guarantee of individual democratic rights.

We are pleased that you understand our difficult situation.

We are afraid - we actually know - that the expressions against the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, that occured in the past decades, as well as those that are happning now, are not transient nor are they incidental; neither are they conditioned by the existing totalitarian system, even though this political system makes all the social and political deformation more pronounced. That is the reason why we have fears for the future, also in the sense that the dislocation in the "living together" of the Slovak nation with the Hungarian national minority, which is a spiritual part of the Hungarian nation, will get itself into a destructive motion. We hope that we see the future more pessimistically than it really will come out.

Bratislava, April 6, 1987

Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia

Verified by: Miklos Duray, Jaskovy rad 161 831 01 Bratislava, tel.: (07) 408-714

(Infoch No.6/87)

Translation

Report of the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian Linority in Czechoslovakia concerning the development of the situation with regard to anti-Hungarian actions in Bratislava

In its report of March 10, 1987, our Committee informed of the anti-Hungarian actions, which occured during the night of March 9th at four different places in Bratislava. There were two fires in buildings owned by the Hungarian Ensemble of Songs and Dances, called "Young Heart" which were the actions of "unknown perpetrators", and which were reported even in the Czechoslovak newspapers on March 11, 1987 in a column, entitled "Black chronicle". (Note: the Ensemble is not a part of Czemadok - as was reported in the press - but is a part of the Ministry of Culture of the SSR).

As far as we know - the police is continuing the investigation of the two fires and is searching for the perpetrator. However, members of the police are interrogating members of the "Young Heart" Ensemble, while they are accusing them of participation in these actions. The police also ordered an economic investigation of the management of the Ensemble, which might uncover eventual financial inconsistences; these inconsistences could provide a motive to start a fire in order to cover up unauthorized business activities. (It is a fact that the management of the Ensemble was forced to obtain from Hungary, through unofficial channels, some materials for its activities, such as musical scores for the singers and musicians, which are not available in Czechoslovakia and for which they did not get a permit in order to purchase them in Hungary. It is noteworthy, that these materials were destroyed in the fire, just as was the choreography for the dance group). Some part of the Slovak population of Bratislava is also of the opinion, that the Hungarians themselves have organized these actions in order to stir up the emotions.

This state of affairs makes us believe that it is those, against whom these terrorist actions were organized, who are now coming under suspicion.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that there was an earlier fire. On March 2, 1987, during morning hours, about 40 kilometers from Bratislava, a restaurant - "Kondoros-czarda" burned down in a Hungarian community near "Dunajska Streda". The restaurant was closed that day - it was Monday. Only now it was learned from a reliable source that a message was found at the scene of the fire saying:" This is only the beginning, Hungarians". It is not known who left that message.

Bratislava, April 6, 1987

Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia.

Verified by: Miklos Duray

(Infoch No.6/87)

Translation

Letter from The Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia to

Lubomir Strougal, Prime Minister, the Federal Government of Czechoslovakia

Nabr.kpt.Jarose 4
Praha I, Mala Strana

Re: Anti-Hungarian attacks in Bratislava

Mr.Prime Minister:

You may be aware of the fact that, during the night of March 9, 1987 unknown perpetrators attacked, at four different locations in Bratislava, the buildings of Hungarian minority institutions. Fires were started in two instances.

Our Committee sent immediately a letter to the General Prosecutor of Slovakia, in which we requested that the perpetrators be found and that the background of these cases be explained to the public.

As far as we know - the police is continuing the investigation of the two fires. The course of the investigation, however, indicates that an incomprehensible reversal is to occur in the investigation. The organs, engaged in the investigation, are interrogating members of the Hungarian Ensemble of Songs and Dances "Young Heart" (two buildings used by the Ensemble burned down) during which they threaten them with accusations of participating in starting the fires. Some public opinion in Bratislava supports this version of the motive for starting the fires. We were shocked when we found out that Ludovit Pezlar, the ideological secretary of the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party, has, in the inner circles of the party, expressed the same opinion; he justified his opinion with the idea, that the Hungarians want, in this way, demonstrate anti-Hungarian sentiment in Slovakia, and thus bring attention to themselves. We categorically reject such accusation, which upsets us very much, especially because it is being fomented by official circles.

We know that comparisons do not always make the truth clearer. However, the accusations of the Hungarian minority with regard to their alleged participation in anti-Hungarian actions and fires, reminds us of a case from recent European history: the case of the Reichstag.

We have also brought to the attention of the Prosecutor General that emotions, which are rising against the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia have their roots in school and social education. The anti-Hungarian expressions are more frequent which seems to indicate the spread of neo-Nazi sentiments in Slovakia.

We hope, Mr.Prime Minister of the Federal Government, that you will realize the potential consequences of this situation and we hope that your reply, which we have a right to expect, will satisfy us.

Bratislava April 6, 1987

Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia

Verified by: Dr.Miklos Duray
Jaskovy rad 161
831 01 Bratislava, tel. (7) 408-714

(Infoch No.6/87)

Appendix D

Answers of Géza Szőcs to Additional Questions from the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe

1. To what extent has the Rumanian government suceeded in denying Hungarians their cultural rights? Are an increasing number of ethnic-Hungarian children growing up speaking Rumanian as a first or only language? Or is the Hungarian minority becoming more "Hungarian" in reaction to governmental policies?

(a) The Rumanian government has eliminated the once extensive Hungarian-language school network which encompassed all levels of education from kindergarten through the post graduate level. The number of Hungarian-language theaters has been reduced to a minimum. Some Hungarian-language publications have been eliminated outright, while the printing of others has been significantly reduced. Hungarian-language TV broadcasts have been abolished, and Hungarian-language radio broadcasts have been cut back to a mere few minutes. The import of books from Hungary has been banned; Rumanian border guards confiscate all Hungarian-language printed matter at the border. Archival material pertaining to the history of Hungarians has most probably been destroyed; in any event, access to such material is denied. All Hungarian historical relics have been removed from museums. In centuries-old cemeteries, tombstones bearing Hungarian names are routinely replaced with markers bearing Rumanian names.

(b) Where there is some minimal cultural support — for instance, at a nearby Hungarian church or a school with a Hungarian-language section — Hungarians are able to resist assimilation to a degree. Elsewhere, the reverse is true: Hungarian children are not able to preserve their native tongue in cases where they have been transplanted into a Rumanian environment, or where the cultural support and infrastructure have been eliminated from their own surroundings.

(c) The Hungarian minority has no desire to become "more Hungarian," but only a wish to retain its national identity in face of the severe government pressures to assimilate.

2. Can you comment on how the average ethnic Rumanian in Rumania feels toward the Hungarian minority? Do you feel ethnic Rumanians support the government's actions against the minority? Do neighboring Rumanian and Hungarian communities interact with each other?

(a) Ethnic Rumanian sentiment toward Hungarians can be categorized according to class. The working class, in the best cases, feels solidarity toward Hungarians, or, at the very least, does not exhibit discriminatory tendencies. Two examples are the August 1977 Zsil (Jiu) valley miners' strike, and the formation of the trade union SLOMR in 1979. Both efforts, though organized primarily by Rumanians, saw active participation by Hungarians and a sense of solidarity between the two groups. Similarly, the top elite of the Rumanian intelligentsia recognizes, by and large, that Ceausescu's nationalistic propaganda is intended to mislead the masses. However, among the other strata of Rumanian society, especially in Bucharest and Transylvania, the nationalistic propaganda has unfortunately been successful, and a significant proportion of Rumanians now believe that the country's economic problems are caused by the presence of minorities. In holding such views, those strata in effect support the government's actions against the Hungarian minority.

(b) There is, by and large, no interaction between neighboring Hungarian and Rumanian communities. Hungarians feel threatened (and rightly so), because with few exceptions once a village becomes mixed, Rumanian interests will be served.

3. Is there any difference between the economic situation in Transylvania and elsewhere in Rumania? In other words, do the Hungarians, on average, have a higher or lower standard of living than the average Rumanian citizen?

(a) Basically there is no difference between the economic situation in Transylvania and the rest of Rumania.

(b) On the average, there is no difference in the standard of living for Hungarians and Rumanians within the same class or occupation. Discrimination is evidenced, however, in the fact that a Hungarian cannot rise to the position a Rumanian can. For example, though a

Hungarian doctor and a Rumanian doctor may earn the same wages, the Hungarian doctor will not be appointed director of a hospital.

4. **To what extent do you think the worsening economic situation in Rumania has fed the grievances of the Hungarian minority? Would the average Hungarian in Transylvania object more to the Rumanians' nationalistic policies or to his or her own economic and political situation in comparison to Hungarian citizens?**

(a) In order to deflect attention away from the worsening economic situation, the Rumanian government pursues a relentless propaganda campaign against the minorities, designed to portray them as the scapegoats. Unfortunately, as I indicated, this propaganda has been successful vis-à-vis certain strata of Rumanian society. In addition, the worsening economic situation has affected Hungarians in particular in the sense that they have traditionally sacrificed more in order to obtain cultural products and to maintain and support their ethnic heritage. Naturally, the deepening overall poverty makes such endeavors more costly and difficult.

(b) For the average Hungarian in Transylvania, in contrast to a coordinated government policy designed to rob him of his identity, economic deprivation is the least of his problems.

5. **Is opposition to the Rumanian government greater among the ethnic Hungarians and Germans than among the ethnic Rumanians?**

Yes, opposition to the government is greater among ethnic Hungarians and Germans, because they are subjected to the additional burden of ethnic discrimination.

6. **Rumanian nationalities policies seem to have the most effect on the Hungarian and German intelligentsia. Are they part and parcel of Ceausescu's goal to coopt or force the emigration of Rumania's intellectuals, no matter what their nationality?**

The Rumanian government wants, first and foremost, the Hungarian or German intellectual to cease being a *Hungarian* or *German* intellectual. This objective is achieved either by forcibly assimilating the individual, or failing that, forcing his emigration. By its nature, this nationality policy has no impact on the country's non-minority intelligentsia, whose emigration incidentally (especially the technical professionals) the government does not encourage.

7. How has the average, non-intellectual Hungarian in Transylvania reacted to official Rumanian nationalities policies?

The average, non-intellectual Hungarian in Rumania is angry, but powerless. He does not have the means by which to defend himself and is therefore at the mercy of the powers that be. His sense of dissatisfaction and willingness to openly resist are increasing.

8. How have the Hungarian communities in Rumania reacted to governmental actions denying them their rights as a minority group? Have there been protests, and, if so, were those who protested arrested? Do they ever resort to vandalizing government property or to violence? Do many try to cross illegally into Hungary or Yugoslavia?

(a) There have been no organized protests on behalf of minority rights. Hungarians have joined together to express their grievances, as, for instance, in the case of *Ellenpontok* (*Counterpoints*), the forcibly disbanded samizdat periodical of which I was an editor, and the currently functioning *Hungarian Press of Transylvania*, which, since 1983, has continuously issued reports about anti-minority actions. In contrast to *Counterpoints* (whose self-avowed editors were arrested, tortured and expelled from the country), the editors and sources of the *Hungarian Press of Transylvania* work in total anonymity.

(b) An estimated 10,000 Hungarian refugees escaped from Rumania during the past two years. Many cross legally into Hungary and Yugoslavia, then illegally on to the West. The number of refugees, and would-be emigrants, is growing exponentially.

9. What is the role of the minority representatives of the councils of the working people? Do they ever seek to protect minority rights?

The role of the Hungarian and German Nationality Workers Councils is not to protect minority rights, but solely to serve the interests of the regime. The Councils are creations and agents of the regime, designed to coopt and manipulate those who display unquestioned loyalty to the regime and are willing to undermine minority interests.

10. When did the reported ban on importing Hungarian-language publications into Rumania go into effect?

The ban on importing Hungarian-language publications into Rumania was a gradually incremented process which began in the mid-1970's. While at that time a small elite still had access to imported Hungarian-language publications, now that possibility is denied without exception. Typically, where 100 people may have been permitted subscribe to Hungarian periodicals in the mid-70's, that number was reduced to 50 and then to none.

11. The Hungarian Press of Transylvania has reported that Rumanian authorities are replacing Hungarian-speaking priests with Rumanian-speaking priests. Would you identify this as an anti-Hungarian policy or as an attempt to rein in the churches?

The practice of replacing Hungarian-speaking priests with Rumanian-speaking priests occurs primarily within the Roman Catholic Church as an attempt to deprive that church (whose one million membership is overwhelmingly Hungarian) of its ethnic character. This measure constitutes not only a blatant violation of minority rights (by attacking the last remaining institutional haven for Hungarians to congregate), but also an assault on the right to worship freely, in the language chosen by the believers.

81-755 0 - 88 - 3

12. You left Rumania in August 1986, and have spent time since then in Switzerland, Canada and the United States. You have met the Hungarian communities in these countries. Do you feel that those communities outside of Rumania accurately portray the plight of Transylvania's Hungarians, as well as their aspirations?

In contrast to the Hungarian government, those Hungarians in the West who maintain active contact with Hungarians in Rumania and who gather, disseminate, publish and generally attempt to draw the world's attention to the oppression of the Hungarian minority, accurately portray their plight and ably represent the interests and aspirations of that minority. In fact, because Hungarians in the West can obtain only partial information and are themselves prevented from seeing the full picture, the situation is often worse than they describe.

13. If you could make three recommendations to this Commission to transmit to Rumanian authorities what would they be? Can you give us a short list of specific actions the Rumanian government could take now to safeguard the Transylvanian Hungarians' cultural integrity?

I have learned that Rumanian officials often feign suprise and puzzlement when confronted with charges on account of their anti-minority policies. We ought not to allow them to play this game. Because the destruction of the minorities' cultural infrastructure and their complete subjugation are pursued in a deliberate and methodical fashion, the Rumanian government knows perfectly well how to reverse this course. Nevertheless, respecting the Commission's inquiry, the following are what I consider to be the three most sorely needed policy changes:

1. The Rumanian government should restore to minorities the ability to form the genuine organizational bases needed for self-administration and self-protection, at least in the cultural domain. This reform could be easily implemented, even under an otherwise centralized and restrictive political system.

2. The entire Hungarian-language school system, from kindergarten to the university level, should be gradually restored. The 2.5 million

Hungarians in Rumania were perfectly capable of supporting and running such a system in the past. In actuality, it has cost and continues to cost the Rumanian government money to dismantle the network of Hungarian schools. Of utmost importance is the re-establishement of the University of Kolozsvár (Cluj) (created through the forced merger in 1959 of the Rumanian Babes University with the 400 year-old, independent Hungarian Bolyai University) as a solely Hungarian institution.

3. The Rumanian government should remove all present obstacles to the free flow of information, people and ideas, at least between Rumania and Hungary. Steps in this direction could include repealing the decree which prohibits the accomodation of foreign visitors in private homes; restoring the right to visit Hungary more than once every two years; discontinuing the practice of confiscating Hungarian-language books and periodicals at border crossings; allowing the mail order and delivery of publications from Hungary; and permitting student exchange programs between Rumania and Hungary.

Appendix E

ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS

Commission Hearing of May 5, 1987

For: Robert Robertson

QUESTION #1. Your testimony indicates that rising concern over the fate of Romania's ethnic Hungarians has been engineered by the Hungarian government. Why would that government engineer such a program? What do you think the Hungarian government's goal is?

ANSWER #1. As I indicated in my testimony, I am not by profession a historian, but, as an interested person, I have read quite a bit of the history of Transylvania and feel that the Hungarian government is merely repeating in issuing their "History of Transylvania" work what they have done before in pleading for control of what is now Romanian controlled Transylvania. For example, at the Paris Peace Conference of 1946 Laszlo Makkai (one of the authors of the work cited above), pleading for Hungary, published in French a history of Transylvania, asking that the Transylvanian lands be returned to Hungary and that the Treatyof Trianon at the end of World War I be repudiated. The Allies ignored the pleas. Earlier in another publication (August 1, 1940), the same Mr. Makki, along with several other Hungarian historians, attempted to convince Hitler and Mussolini that Transylvania should belong to Hungary. Even Hitler's propaganda ministry' commission appointed to review this publication cited this publication's claim to the land as being a "political fraud". However, the interest of the Axis powers, in spite of this conclusion, lay in awarding the northwestern part of Romania to their ally.

What do I think the Hungarian government's goal is? My own unlettered conclusion is to regain the land and in so doing bring the ethnic Hungarians into their orbit.

QUESTION #2. Why would Hungary's opposition intellectuals support the government's campaign to discredit Romanian nationalities policies? (The democratic opposition reports frequently on the plight of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and Romania, among other things. Sometimes they are harrassed by the authorities for doing so, apparently because of the fear of growing support among the general population for their efforts. In addition, there are several populist writersin Hungary who cannot publish some of their works because they expressed concerns regarding the Hungarian minorities.)

ANSWER #2. I have no personal knowledge of why some Hungarian intellectuals would support the government's campaign. As to why some are harrassed, as reported in your parenthetic statement,I can only assume that the government itself wants total control over when they go after Romania on the Transylvanian question and when they feel obliged to ease off on their efforts.

QUESTION #3. How many times have you been to Romania? Have you noted a deterioration or improvement in Romanian human rights since you first travelled there?

ANSWER #3. I have made two trips to Romania over the past year and plan to visit again in several days (June 9, 1987). Each visit has been of approximately two weeks duration.

I feel that conditions on the record have been improving markedly over the past year. On the subject of emigration: President Reagan in his message to the Congress on continuation of most-favored-nation status for Romania commented, "Emigration from Romania, both overall and to the United States, has been substantial in the period of over a decade since the waiver has been in effect. All told more than 170,000 Romanians have emigrated to the United States, Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) during this period. In 1986, over 15,000 Romanians departed legally for these three countries.

"The American Embassy in Bucharest issued visas or other documentation to 1,996 people in 1986 for legal departure to the United States. Although this figure reflects a decline in Romanian passport issuances to individuals qualified for U.S. admissions processing in the latter part of 1986, and a decrease from the previous year's total of 2, 913, it is still substantial in human terms. The more than 900 new approvals since January and discussions with the Romanian Government suggest that steps are being taken to increase the flow to a level consistent with U.S. immigration and admissions procedures."

Over the past year I was personally involved trying to resolve some problems affecting certain religious sects in Romania (publishing of the Protestant Bibles, relocation of the Seventh Say Adventist Church in Bucharest, the retention of the Second Baptist Church in Oradea, saving the Sphardic Synagog in Bucharest). We lost on the Synagog unfortunately but the other issues have either been resolved or are on their way to resolution. Other important Jewish buildings have been preserved in accordance with agreements with the Romanian Government (e.g. the Choral and Great Synagogs and the Jewish Museum).

There are cases of great interest to the Congress and the public which have been resolved in recent times: Constantin Sfatcu and Dorel Catarama are now in the U.S.; mathematicians Radu Rosu and Silviu Teleman now have academic positions in this country. A Romanian court has dismissed charges against Ilie Neamtu. Although the case of Ioan Constantin Ruta has not yet been resolved he are hopeful that he will soon be allowed to join his family in this country.

A great deal has been made out of reported "cases" of

religious persecution in Romania, where believers are alledgedly imprisoned for practicing their faith. I personally know of no such cases and in a recent conversation with Dr. John Crossley, executive director of the Christian Relief Effort for the Emancipation of Dissidents (CREED), which monitors such human rights violations around the world, told me, "I know of no one in Romania who is in prison because of their religious beliefs". He went on to note that the Congress and the media in the U.S. is frequently given misleading information. He cited a recent instance in which a list of 14 such cases were presented to the Congress. CREED checked into these cases through their contacts in Romania to find only two of these people were in prison, having been apprehended in Yugoslavia for attempting to leave Romania without a visa. Yugoslavia returned these people to Romania where they received ten-month sentences. This hardly amounts to religious persecution.

QUESTION #4. Do you think the worsening economic situation in Romania has fed the grievances of the Hungarian minority?

ANSWER #4. Yes, probably they have, as they have for all other Romanians regardless of ethnic position. No one, it seems to me, anywhere, wants less than a comfortable life for themselves and their children. The economic situation in Romania, as well as other neighboring countries, is not on a par with ours. Romania over the past two decades has embarked on, to me, a too-rapid program of industrialization. They have been trying to rebuild their country. They have a far better record in repaying their foreign debt than any other developing country I know of - East or West; this has created dire hardships for all Romanians regarding of their national background.

It is obvious to me that some of the ethnic Hungarian complaints about assimilation can be laid at the doorstep of this fact: that in order to prosper in the Romanian technical "revolution" it is increasingly necessary to speak the language of the majority -- similar to minority groups entering the United States today -- rarely do they function in their national language at a high or moderate economic level. This advancement process is a natural occurance in developing and developed societies worldwide ; it is to a degree economically based not ethnically.

QUESTION #5. You indicate in your testimony that no other ethnic groups in Romania complain about mistreatment. Yet the emigration of ethnic Germans from Romania has been around 13,000 per year. Why would they want to emigrate now, after being settled in Romania for hundreds of years?

ANSWER #5. Probably for many of the same reasons that many of the ethnic groups which make up our great country left their homelands where they had lived for hundreds of years. My

family emigrated to the United States from Scotland because of the dire state of the economy in Scotland following World War I and because, in the late 1920s, the union in the ship yard where my father worked were infiltrated by the communists. Perhaps these ethnic Germans are quite conservative and do not want their children to lose any of their language and culture, which they would have to for the industrialization reasons cited above.

Appendix F

HELSINKI WATCH

U.S. CITIZENS' COMMITTEE TO MONITOR THE HELSINKI ACCORDS
KOMITEE DER U.S. BÜRGER ZUR EINHALTUNG DER HELSINKI VERTRÄGE
COMITATO DEI CITTADINI DEGLI S.U.A. PER IL CONTROLLO DEGLI ACCORDI HELSINKI
COMITÉ DES CITOYENS DES E.U. POUR LA SURVEILLANCE DES ACCORDS D'HELSINKI
COMITÉ DE CIUDADANOS DE LOS EE. UU. PRO VIGILANCIA DE LOS ACUERDOS DE HELSINKI
ОБЩЕСТВЕННЫЙ КОМИТЕТ США ПО НАБЛЮДЕНИЮ ЗА ВЫПОЛНЕНИЕМ ХЕЛЬСИНКСКИХ СОГЛАШЕНИЙ

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• Ed Doctorow
• Fr. Robert Drinan
• Lee Elman
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• Jonathan Fenton
• Frances Fevrenthal
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• Bernard Fischman
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• Anne Johnson
• Philip M. Kaiser
• Russell Kanp
• Stephen Kaser
• Bentley Kassal
• Wenny Kaufman
• Edward Kaw
• Winthrop Knowlton
• Margaret A. Lang
• Norman Lear
• Yevgina Leary
• Leon Lary
• Leon Lipson
• Richard Maass
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• Matthew Nimetz
• Eleanor Holmes Norton
• John B. Oakes
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• Bruce Rabb
• Andrzej Rapaczynski
• Stuart Robinowitz
• Felix G. Rohatyn
• William Schaufele
• Donna E. Shalala
• Stanley K. Sheinbaum
• Jerome Shestack
• Sanford Solender
• George Soros
• Michael Sovern
• Svetlana Stone
• Rose Styron
• Aby Tagore
• Le Ullmann
• Jorge Valls
• Greg Wallance
• Robert Penn Warren
• Glenn Watts
• Susan Weber
• Lois Wheeler
• Jerome Wiesner
• Roger Wilkins

The Hungarian Minority of Romania

Written Testimony of Helsinki Watch

Submitted to the Commission on

Security and Cooperation in Europe

May 5, 1987

Helsinki Watch, a nongovernmental organization that monitors the human rights provisions of the 1975 Helsinki accords, has testified on numerous occasions concerning human rights in Romania. For the purpose of these hearings, we would like to concentrate on the situation of the Hungarian minority in Romania.

The Hungarian minority, centered mainly in the section of Romania known as Transylvania, claims that the Ceausescu regime is engaged in a deliberate policy of cultural extinction, or "cultural genocide." Hungarian schools, churches, traditions and even the Hungarian language are being systematically eliminated from Romanian society. The forced assimilation to which ethnic Hungarians are being subjected increasingly takes

Helsinki Watch is affiliated with the Fund for Free Expression. Americas Watch and Asia Watch and is a member of the International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights

the form of discriminatory and sometimes brutal practices.

o Arpad Visky, an actor with the Hungarian Theaters of Marovasarhely (Tigru Mures) and of Sepsiszentgyorgy (Sfintul Gheorghe), was sentenced on August 7, 1983, to five years of imprisonment for "slandering Romania, the Romanian people and the socialist system" and "disseminating hostile propaganda." He was released in September 1984.

On January 5, 1986, Visky was found dead by a police officer, hanged in a forest outside Sfintul Gheorghe. Though the official report claimed that he had committed suicide, the circumstances are extremely unclear. Visky had applied to emigrate to Hungary in the fall of 1985 and, according to sources close to him, he was not suicidal.

o On February 14, 1986, the Securitate searched the home of Gusztav Molnar, an ethnic Hungarian philosopher living in Bucharest, and confiscated some 100 books in Hungarian in addition to letters and manuscripts. Reports indicate that Molnar has lost his job and is applying for emigration to Hungary.

Similar house searches were carried out in Transylvania: on February 17 in Cluj, police raided the home of Gabor Tompa, a film director; on February 18 in Tirgu Mures, police searched the homes of Dunes Fueloep

and Levente Horvath, two Protestant ministers; and on February 19 in Cluj, a search was conducted at the home of Jusztinia Vita, a political economics teacher.

Romania is one of the very few East European countries in which samizdat periodicals are practically nonexistent. Citizens are required to register their typewriters and typefaces with the police, a measure clearly designed to prevent the production of samizdat. No private ownership of duplicating or copying machines is permitted.

The only known samizdat publications in Romania are those of the Hungarian minority. Since November 1982, the editors of the Hungarian samizdat publication Ellenpontok (Counterpoints) -- Geza Szocs, Attilia Ara-Kovacs and Karoly Toth -- have been harassed and/or imprisoned. Ara-Kovacs and Toth emigrated to Hungary, and Szocs left Romania in August 1986. Issues of the Hungarian Press of Transylvania (HPT), a samizdat publication established in 1983, continue to be distributed in Transylvania.

During 1986, HPT reported the following developments with respect to the deterioration of minority rights in Transylvania.

- The office of the Party Committee of Kolozsvar (Cluj-Napoca) that monitors cultural activities announced that public buildings of historic significance to the Hungarians may not be used for cultural events or gatherings.

On January 14, several Hungarian and Romanian intellectuals of Kolozsvar (Cluj-Napoca) were interrogated for more than ten hours by the Securitate. There were indications that the reason for the interrogations was to prevent the Hungarians of Transylvania from making any statements at the time of an International PEN Congress in New York.

Pal Murgu, an ethnic Hungarian poet, was taken into custody by the Securitate and subjected to a series of interrogations on the basis of a poem he wrote on the occasion of Ceausescu's birthday. The poem, entitled "With Faith in our Future," apparently passed the censors because of its laudatory tone. Subsequently, it was noticed that the first letters in each line spelled "Poetry and Tyranny."

In March, the Securitate conducted searches of the homes of two ethnic Hungarian professors -- Dr. Pal Doczi and Dr. Jozsef Spillman. Reports indicate that no incriminating evidence was found, and that the purpose of the searches was simply to intimidate and harass the professors.

On March 2, the local authorities of Kolozsvar (Cluj) banned a series of cultural events sponsored by the magazine Korunk which was to include performances of the works of Prokofiev and poems by Kolozsvar poets

recited by Zoltan Banner. On March 22, the poetry program was again banned, and a permit for the musical part of the program was issued on the condition that the works of a Romanian composer, Enescu, be included.

o In late March, a collection of articles by Corneliu Vadim Tudor was published by the Sport and Tourism Publishing House of Bucharest. The book contains explicit anti-Hungarian passages.

o On Palm Sunday, the police surrounded the Roman Catholic Church of Bako (Bacau) and confiscated all prayer books. All the books were in Hungarian.

o On June 2, Sergiu Savin, the brother-in-law of Attilia Ara-Kovacs, was beaten by six agents of the Securitate in Oradea. Savin has been subjected to several instances of interrogation by the authorities for his solidarity with the Hungarians of Transylvania.

o In June, the series of cultural events known as the "Korunk Galeria" was permanently banned. The events were held in the editorial offices of the literary magazine, Korunk. The authorities stated that "the editorial office is a workplace, and therefore it is not permissible to stage entertainment programs there."

o On July 21, Attila Kun, a surgeon from Kolozsvar (Cluj-Napoca), was arrested and charged with nationalism

and providing medical assistance beyond his duties to the Hungarian village of Szek. Reports indicate that he was beaten by police. There were reports in August that he attempted suicide in his cell, but the prison staff intervened in time to prevent his death.

- Demolition projects have begun near one of Kolozsvar's (Cluj) most historical districts, thus endangering a group of medieval buildings.

One of the leading campaigners for minority rights in Transylvania is Geza Szocs, an ethnic Hungarian writer.

- Geza Szocs was an editor of the Hungarian samizdat publication Ellenpontok, which was closed down by the authorities in 1982. Szocs was arrested and interrogated for his work with Ellenpontok. He was finally released due to international protest.

  Szocs had been subjected to numerous house searches and police interrogations, especially after having submitted memoranda to the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party protesting abuses of minority rights. In February 1985, he prepared a memorandum entitled "Proposal for the Creation of a UN-Supervised International Agency to Protect the Rights of National Minorities," which was later signed by Karoly Kiraly and Dorin Tudoran. Because of this, Szocs's home was searched on June 29, 1985, all hand-written materials

were confiscated and he was interrogated for 14 hours by the Securitate.

From October 1, 1985, until October 14 (the day before the CSCE Cultural Forum was to open), Szocs was interrogated by the Securitate for 12 hours per day. The authorities were trying to prevent him from sending any documents to the conference. Nevertheless, a letter from Szocs reached Budapest and was read on October 15.

Szocs emigrated from Romania in August 1986 and is living in the West.

- Ivan Chelu, an artist of puppetry who refused to give the authorities information about Szocs during interrogations, lost his job in November 1986. He was also banned from performing.

The London Times of June 6, 1985, reported that a discriminatory decree had been passed limiting the number of Hungarian-speaking students at the University of Cluj to five percent. Prior to this decree, Hungarian students made up 65 percent of the student body. The government also decreed that all geography and history teachers in all schools in Transylvania must be Romanian -- a provocative move given the conflicting Romanian and Hungarian interpretations of the area's history.

There have been numerous reports that ethnic Hungarians who do graduate work in Hungarian language studies are prevented from

working in Transylvania or teaching Hungarian. The graduates are often assigned jobs far from their native region with little or no relationship to their studies or training. If they refuse to accept the relocation, their degrees can be invalidated and they may be unable to find other work. These governmental actions can only be interpreted as attempts to dissolve further the Hungarian ethnic identity.

- Eva Cseke-Gyimesi, a professor of Hungarian literature, protested against the practice of assigning Hungarian graduates to other parts of the country. On October 1, 1986, her house was searched by police. Information indicates that she is still teaching because of her prestigious reputation, but that her situation is precarious.

Publications sent from Hungary are often confiscated by the Romanian authorities. It is virtually impossible to subscribe to newspapers or periodicals from Hungary that are not on sale in Romania. The Romanians have also placed restrictions on sending some Hungarian-language publications printed in Romania to Hungary. This makes it difficult for people in Hungary to get reliable information about the Hungarian minority in Romania.

Appendix G

American Hungarian Federation

AMERIKAI MAGYAR SZÖVETSÉG

REPRESENTING OVER 500 HUNGARIAN CHURCHES ORGANIZATIONS AND CHAPTERS FROM COAST TO COAST

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May 4, 1987

Ms. Mary Sue Hefner
Chief Counsel
Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe
House Annex II
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Ms. Hefner,

Thank you for the invitation to submit written testimony to the May 5th Hearing.

After some consideration, we believed that instead of submitting our written testimony, we will submit to you the last appeal by the People's Democratic Resistance Movement of Transylvania. The translation is mine, as the original reached us in the Hungarian language.

Also enclosed a few even newer items from the same source which had only reached us a week ago.

Hopefully you will be able to use the material which provides eloquent proof of the inhuman and denationalizing policies of the Romanian government.

With best regards, we are

Sincerely yours,

Z. Michael Szaz

Z. Michael Szaz, Ph.D.
Executive Vice President

Encls.

APPEAL OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT OF TRANSYLVANIA

Since our appeal and report of December 1986, the situation of the national minorities in Romania worsened substantially. The nationality policies of the Romanian government are well-known. If we still emphasize some of its aspects, we do so in order to clarify the methods used in pursuing these policies.

The economic situation in Romania is in many respects subordinated to the nationality question. E.g., the industrialization of the Szekely region, surpassing the available resources of Romania and the concommitant construction of entire suburbs consisting of apartment houses for the new Romanian settlers, were undertaken to lessen the Hungarian character of the region. The new plants created are working on a deficit basis as their shoddy products are unable to compete on the world market. This explains part of the reason for the economic crisis in Romania. At the same time, the most dangerous and environmentally polluting industries were established in Transylvania so that the occurrence of cancer at Balan (Balánbánya) is seventeen times higher than the national average. The Mures (Maros), Olt, Tirnava (Kükülló) and the Bega rivers are dead streams. The insanity of the nationality policies is reflected in the eroding of the soil and cutting down the pine forest in the Hungarian region.

THESE FACTS MUST BE RECOUNTED AS IT IS GENERALLY ASSUMED THAT CEAUCESCU AND HIS GOVERNMENT IS STIRRING UP NATIONAL PASSIONS IN ORDER TO DIVERT THE ATTENTION OF THE PEOPLE FROM THE ECONOMIC CRISIS. THIS IS NOT SO, RATHER THE DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICIES OF ROMANIA ARE FOCUSED ON THE FORCIBLE ASSIMILATION OF THE NATIONALITIES.

New and dangerous measures are being implemented to further the elimination of the Hungarians in Romania. E.g., the capacity of the prisons is being expanded and in order to intimidate the Hungarian population the police and secret police in the Transylvanian cities are being marched both during daytime and nightime. The cities involved include Brasov (Brassó), Timisoara (Temesvár), Miercurea Ciuc (Csikszereda), Gheorgheni (Gyergyószentmiklós), Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár) and Satmar (Szatmárnémeti).

Body searches are frequent in schools and if any Hungarian symbols are found on the students, they are expelled and their parents are also punished at their working place.

Plainclothesmen loiter in front of the churches to observe those attending mass or divine services. In the churches, the police tapes the sermons and the priests and ministers vainly try to follow government regulations because they are considered to be the preserver of ethnic culture and are exposed to brutal atrocities. E.g., Dénes Fülöp, a Hungarian Reformed minister was interrogated several times by the secret police where he was physically assaulted. He is the father of four children and his wife was never provided with a job by the state. Numerous house searches occurred at his home and most of his books were confiscated. Another Hungarian Reformed minister at Oradea (Nagyvárad), Miklós Péter, was also interrogated by the secret police.

In front of the Roman Cathilic bishop's palace in Alba Julia (Gyulafehérvár) there is a permanent unit of plainclothesmen who stop most visitors from entering the palace.

Instead of reciting a long litany of abuses against the clergy, we concentrate on new methods utilized against the Roman Catholic church in Romania. For the first time in Romania's history, the archbishop (at the present time the Apostolic Administrator) of the archdiocese of Bucharest is a Romanian not an ethnic German. The Bucharest archdiocese has some powers over the diocese of Alba Julia (Gyulafehérvár) which is mostly Hungarian Catholic. Following protests, mostly by Uniates who are deprived of their own church since 1948 and who attended Roman Catholic masses, the state ordered the Hungarian nationality parishes in Transylvania to say masses in Romanian as well as in Hungarian, although most faithful in Transylvania are Hungarians and in the Banat, Germans. The names of the cities in which Romanian Catholic masses are now offered are: Brasov (Brassó), Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár), Gheorgheni (Gyergyószentmiklós), Satmar (Szatmárnémeti) and Gherla (Zilah). To prevent free exercise of the freedom of conscience, the regime sponsors compulsory youth activities on Sunday mornings and those who fail to attend are punished, whether they are still in school or already working.

One of the major grievances of the Hungarians is that the newborn babies are entered into the registry with Romanian first names. It is also true that Romanian pregnant women are still brought in from Oltenia to to Miercurea Ciuc (Csikszereda) and Csikszentdomokos; from Moldavia to Gheorgheni (Gyergyószentmiklós) and Ditrau (Ditró) and from Muntenia to Sfintu Gheorghe (Sepsiszentgyörgy) and Brasov (Brassó) Their babaies are then registered in the Hungarian counties of Covasna and Hargita.

The authorities pay little attention to procedure. They use their police power to shut down Hungarian sections in the high, intermediary and grade schools. The Agrarian Science, the Mechanical Arts, Applied Lumber Arts High Schools and the Teacher's College at Tirgu Mures (Marosvásárhely) have no longer any Hungarian sections. The Fine Arts High School in the same city was also absorbed in the Romanian language Teacher's College. In many other localities the Hungarian sections are being discontinued and where they are still in existence, nine out of the twelve subjects in them are taught in Romanian.

In addition to closing Hungarian school sections, the Romanian government bans the importation of 102 newspapers and magazines and almost all books from Hungary into Transylvania. Even the Kossuth and Petöfi radios of Budapest can hardly be heard in Transylvania because of constant Romanian jamming. The authorities want to deprive the Hungarian population from any independent information base. In order to eliminate contacts between friends, relatives and families between Transylvanian Hungarians and people living in Hungary, the authorities often refuse Hungarian citizens the right to enter Romania without any pretext. This occurs especially around state and religious holidays, like Christmas and Easter. At the border crossing of Curtic (Kürtös) 160 Hungarian citizens were ordered off the trains and sent back last Christmastide. Others were sent back from Biharkeresztes and Satmar (Szatmárnémeti) crossing points. Transylvanian Hungarians receive less and less passports to visit Hungary and then only after receiving threats of the secret police to keep qiet about conditions in Romania.

The Romanian government is no longer satisfied only with the progressive elimination of the Hungarian language, the banning of literature from Hungary and the frequent arrest of Hungarians and concommitant house searches, but not also arranges "disappearances." From the mines of Balan (Balánbánya), Petroseni (Petrozsény) and Baia Mare (Nagybánya) those who have voiced the general discontent of the miners are disappearing one by one. Gábor Fülöp, István József Nagy, Olivér Török, Ferenc Hosszú, Aron Kurkó, Paul Kelemen and others are among the victims. Their relatives are not permitted to search for them and the newspapers are forbidden to print ads about these "missing persons." It would take pages to list the names of all those who had originally disappeared and then reappeared dead in the rivers or hanged on a tree in remote forests after receiving brutal beatings. Not even the doctors are safe. Hungarian patients are scared to go to some Romanian doctors lest they become victims of malpractice or botched surgery. Among those who died of these causes are Ferenc Magyari (Gheorgheni - Gyergyószentmiklós), Dr. Antal Madarász, a geologist (Tirgu Mures - Marosvásárhely), János Márkus, a machine engineer (Brasov - Brassó), Károly Szatmáry, an official (Baia Mare - Nagybánya). Denationalization drive extends even to the deafmutes. The Hungarian deafmutes of Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár) are sent to Romanian institutions and are not permitted to travel to Hungary even for treatment.

It is generally known that Hungarian choirs, dance ensembles and other social groups which tried to resist Romanization, or at-

tempted to save their Hungarian character, have been dissolved. Their leaders were the targets of brutal atrocities by the police or the secret police. Dr. Zoltán Zsigmond, a Hungarian folk singer who had to work as an electrician despite his degree, was beaten so badly that one of his arms became permanently paralyzed. Sándor Kiss, the organizer of the Tirgu Mures (Marosvásárhely) Folk Ensemble was sentencedto eighteen months in prison, but the original charges were changed to homosexuality in the last minute in order to discredit him. Károly Somosdy Veress, a poet, was physically and nervously ruined by incessant harassment and house searches and finally commited suicide. Sándor Albert, the editor of Hargita newspaper at Miercurea Ciuc (Csikszereda) was dismissed and had to work as a day laborer. Márton Kolozsi, a writer for the same paper, died of a heart attack after three days of interrogation by the secret police. The former editor of the Falvak Dolgozó Népe (Working People of the Villages), László Simonka, was tortured for two weeks by the agents of the Ministry of the Interior in Bucharest until he died. Béla Csipkés, a chauffeur, was thrown into the Torda Gap together with his car. János Buzás, the administrator of the István Szentgyörgyi Academy of the Performing Arts in Tirgu Mures (Marosvásárhely) was ordered to hand over all documents at the academy relating to the Hungarian past of Transylvania. Thereupon, rather than to comply, he committed suicide. Unfortunately, there have been many suicides. Old farmers commit suicide because they cannot endure the misery any longer while young people are afraid of the interrrogation methods of the secret police and the police summons them, they rather kill themselves than to fall into the hands of the Securitate.

Living under these circumstances, it is understandable that the Hungarians, Germans, Serbs, Jews and other national minorities turn to world public opinion for assistance. Therefore, we sincerely welcome and regard with hope the statements of the Hungarian People's Republic in the last few weeks and the steps taken by the U.S. Congress, e.g., the letter of Representative Donald E. Lukens (R., Ohio) to Secretary of State George Shultz which was cosigned by 234 other members and the unanimous vote of the House Foreign Affairs Committee recognizing the self-determination rights of the Hungarians of Transylvania.

This, however, is still insufficient to secure the survival of the Hungarians of Romania. However, we express hope that the signatories of the Helsinki Final Sct will intervene on our behalf, lest the denationalizing policies of the Romanian apartheid policy should succeed in eliminating the more than three million Hungarians in Romania.

Alba Julia (Gyulafehérvár)

April 2, 1987

PRESIDIUM OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE

MOVEMENT OF TRANSYLVANIA

NEWS FROM THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

OF TRANSYLVANIA

April 24, 1987

EMIGRATION REQUESTS

Beginning April 1987, anyone who submits an emigration request to the proper authorities, will lose not only his personal identity card, but becomes liable to do forced labor, or if he is of military age, will be called to military service.

STABBING FOR SPEAKING HUNGARIAN

Judith Nagy, a laborer at one of the plants in Tirgu Mures (marosvásárhély) was stabbed and subsequently thrown out of the bus she was riding for speaking Hungarian at the end of March. This has occurred in a city which is at least half-Hungarian inhabited at the present time.

POLICE REMOVES HUNGARIAN SIGNS

Police removed Hungarian signs from schools, hospitals and churches in many Transylvanian cities during the last two months.

The cities included Regen (Szászrégen), Miercurea Ciuc (Csíkszereda), Brasov (Brassó), Fogaras, Timisoara (Temesvár), Satmar (Szatmárnémeti), Cluj-Napoca (Kolozsvár), Sfintu Gheorghe (Sepsiszentgyörgy) and several villages along the Romanian-Hungarian border.

STIRRING OF THE HUNGARIAN NATIONALITY IN TRANSYLVANIA

According to our sources, recent reports about broken windows and Hungarian-language wall signs calling for the removal of President Ceausescu in Oradaea (Nagyvárad) are the work of the Romanian secret police trying to discredit the Hungarian minority as trouble-makers.

However, the beating received by the writer and editor Győző Hajdu at Tirgu Mures (Marosvásárhely) in mid-March was the expression of general Hungarian disgust against the author. Hajdu spoke in February at the meeting of the National Council of Hungarian Workers denouncing the Hungarian historians as Fascists and assured President Ceausescu of the full support of the Hungarians of Transylvania in regard to his nationality policies.

SANDOR HUWZAR UNEMPLOYED IN BUCHAREST

The writer Sándor Huszár, former editor of the Hungarian-language weekly, A Hét (The Week), who has spoken out several times for the interests of the Transylvanian Hungarians, is now without work in Bucharest. Already in 1986 he was removed from his position as editor, but he even lost in January 1987 his small job that he was allowed to find last year.

Since January 1987, he is not allowed to work anywhere in Romania. As he has no income, his friends cover his modest needs. This is the fate of a Hungarian writer who did not deny the interests of the Transylvanian Hungarians.

Despite the fact that more than 200,000 Hungarians live in Bucharest, they did not start a new Hungarian section at the only academic high school still teaching in Hungarian in part. According to present planning, the school will cease to exist at the end of the next three year when all its students have graduated. Yet, after Budapest Bucharest has most Hungarians among all cities in Hungary or in the world.

Appendix H

COORDINATING COMMITTEE
OF
HUNGARIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA

ISTVAN B. GEREBEN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

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ROCKVILLE, MD. 20853
TELEPHONE 301•871•7018

May 19, 1987

The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
Chairman, Commission on Security and Cooperation
in Europe
Room 237
House Annex #2
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr Chairman:

The Coordinating Committee of Hungarian Organizations in North America is thankful for your invitation to share our views on the issues of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and Rumania. We are pleased to submit our statement regarding this subject for the records of the May 5, 1987 hearing by your Commission. We hope that our joint efforts to ease the pain of those who suffer under regimes violating human and nationality rights will be successful.

Respectfully yours,

Istvan B. Gereben

COORDINATING COMMITTEE
OF
HUNGARIAN ORGANIZATIONS IN NORTH AMERICA

ISTVAN B. GEREBEN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

4101 BLACKPOOL ROAD
ROCKVILLE, MD 20853

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Statement on the Hungarian Minorities
in Rumania and Czechoslovakia
by the Coordinating Committee of Hungarian Organizations
in North America

to be included in the records of the hearing on the same subject
before the
Committee on Security and Cooperation in Europe

5 May 1987

The Coordinating Committee of Hungarian Organizations in North America, the consultative body of major Hungarian-American organizations appreciates this opportunity to present its views on the problems of the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

We observe with dismay Slovak and Rumanian government policies which deny the political, economic and cultural rights of Hungarian minorities and are shocked by the multitude of specific instances in which these discriminatory policies cause hardship and suffering to Hungarian individuals and groups.

Our committee fully supports the factual description of the plight of the Hungarian minorities living in these countries provided to you by Messrs. Geza Szocs and George Schopflin.

Recently, the Coordinating Committee was shocked to learn about the 8 March attacks on buildings set aside for the cultural activities of the Hungarian minority in Bratislava. We were heartened by Charter 77's strong protests about the incidents to the Czechoslovak government and parliament. We join them in their demand to the Czechoslovak authorities for a full and open investigation of "these terrorist acts." We agree with their statement that "public life, the mass media and education in schools should be permeated with the idea that it is necessary as well as desirable for the citizens of all nationalities in Czechoslovakia to live together in tolerance and friendship."

We wish to present the following brief summary of our opinions concerning Czechoslovak and Rumanian treatment of and policies toward Hungarian minorities:

1. We support all efforts, including those of the Helsinki Commission, to help improve the human rights situation in Rumania, especially that of the Hungarian minority, the largest minority in that or in any other European country. This support is part of our over-all support for human rights throughout Eastern Europe. We particularly emphasize the importance of rectifying religious, political, economic, cultural and any other injustices which were designed to discourage minorities from living according to their consciences, and choosing their own political, cultural, and linguistic affiliations. Since the Rumanian government and the present communist system that it represents are the most egregious practitioners of human rights abuses in the Central European region, we particularly call for a concerted effort on the part of all those concerned with these abuses to bring pressure on that government to cease its discriminatory policies.

2. We hope that scholars and historians in the region and from outside will have greater and greater access to historical records and opportunities to pursue research into the questions that concern historical, archeological and anthropological developments. We support all efforts to make these studies as exacting and rigorous as possible and to keep them and their sources open to the scrutiny of international specialists.

3. We reject all attempts on the part of any government to use the misfortunes of minorities to achieve its own political objectives.

4. For the past 30 years, the government of the Hungarian Peoples Republic has neglected the problems of Hungarian minorities, and has thereby contributed to their past and present hardships. Therefore, we urge the United States Congress that as part of its efforts to improve the status of the Hungarian minorities in Rumania and Czechoslovakia, it call on the Hungarian government to

a. do everything in its power to help individual victims of human rights abuses, and to raise specific issues concerning the economic, political, physical and psychological well-being of ethnic Hungarians living in minority status in neighboring countries,

b. go substantially beyond its recent weak and general statements, to openly advocate the cause of individual victims and to work for the redress of specific Hungarian minority grievences at international forums, such as Helsinki follow-up conferences and the United Nations,

c. and most importantly, to change its own practices affecting Hungarian citizens, whether they belong to Hungary's largest unacknowledged minority group, or are members of political and religious groups who do not share the views of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party or the government.

Congress should not accept either official Hungarian silence about actions against the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia or Rumania or the direct and indirect allusions and insinuations of Hungarian officials, the scientific and journalistic exercises which are used as substitutes for concrete actions in the numerous cases of human rights abuses in these countries. The problems of those who suffer the injustices of these communist regimes are quite real and they demand the attention of the Hungarian government, which should represent the interests of not only those who live inside Hungary's present borders, but of all Hungarians in the region.

5. We urge representatives of the United States government not to accept policies which either directly or indirectly pass on the responsibility of representing the interests of Hungarian minorities in Rumania or anywhere else in Eastern Europe to the United States, or which allude to the Soviet Union as the power which prevents the Hungarian government from acting as openly and as resolutely on behalf of Hungarian minorities as it should.

As far as determining the standards by which we judge the Hungarian government's actions, we would suggest the example of the Flemings in Belgium whose rights and interests are often defended and represented by the government of Holland, or that of Germans throughout Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union whose rights and interests have been effectively defended by the Federal Republic of Germany. Neither of the above countries has ever shirked its responsibilities vis-a-vis the national minorities tied to it by culture and common ancestry by blaming its lack of action on policies of the United States or any other country. We demand no more and no less of the People's Republic of Hungary.

6. We urge that any resolution of the minority problems in Eastern Europe be approached on a regional basis, in the spirit of the following sentence from the joint communique published on the 30th anniversary of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, signed by Czechs, Germans, Poles, Rumanians, Slovaks, and Hungarians:

"We proclaim our common determination to struggle for political democracy in our countries, for their independence, for pluralism founded on the principles of self-government, for the peaceful unification of a divided Europe and for its democratic integration, as well as for the rights of all national minorities."

We firmly believe in the importance of unity, democracy, pluralism and independence as the basic requirements not only for the solution of minority problems in Eastern Europe, but as the basis of resolving all the outstanding problems of the region. We demand that the above ideas be used according to their original meanings, the ones developed over the 2,000 year history of Western Civilization.

We urge the representatives of the United States government to demand that none of the above ideas be either excluded or modified in such a way that they serve the interests of any single political group or party.

We urge the representatives of the United States government to demand that once the peoples of this region are allowed to return to the original principles of democracy, justice and freedom that they be allowed openly to work out their differences, and to solve the problems of various ethnic and national minorities scattered throughout the region.

We are convinced that until every nation, every group in the region is given the same right to express its ideas about how it wishes to solve its problems and what role it wants to play in the future political, social and cultural structure of the region, the injustices committed against minorities will remain an ugly reality.

We see no other acceptable or realistic basis for a resolution of inequities in Eastern Europe than by satisfying the above preconditions and providing the peoples of the region the opportunity to resolve their differences in a truly democratic environment which guarantees the rights of all individuals and protects them from the excesses of any and all political or national groups. The problems of minorities must be approached as an integral part of the general political, social and cultural problems of Eastern Europe.

Even before the goals of universal freedom and justice in Eastern Europe are attained, we urge that the United States Congress, the President, and all other representatives of the United States government do everything in their power to prevail upon the governments in Eastern Europe to pursue human rights policies in accord with their international agreements, as these pertain to both majority and minority groups in their countries.

Appendix I

COMMITTEE OF TRANSYLVANIA, INC.

Founded 1956

LOUIS L. LOTE
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STATEMENT OF

LOUIS L. L O T E

PRESIDENT, COMMITTEE OF TRANSYLVANIA

ON THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN RUMANIA

FOR THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION

IN EUROPE

MAY 15, 1 9 8 7

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I very much appreciate that the CSCE commission gave me the opportunity to submit my written statement as an addition to the statements at the hearing on May 5 on Hungarian minorities in Rumania. It gives me also the chance to make some comments on those statements.

I believe that no one who sees himself as an expert on the minority problems in Rumania can doubt that the mistreatment of the Hungarian minority in Rumania is a well documented fact. Denying it might come out of sheer ignorance or intentional deception to disinform concerned foreign opinion /which later seems to be the Rumanian strategy in so called privat talks with American officials or interviews. I confirm as well - based on personal meetings/.

It is therefore not my purpose to describe in details the many overt and covert means the Rumanian central and regional authorities carry out an outright denationalization process. I just list some of the grievances which - I think - endanger national survival of Hungarians in Rumania:

A/

a/ Discontinuation of all the Hungarian highschools, i.e. where the language of instruction was Hungarian and which had a 700-800 years past.

b/ Dismantling the Hungarian section of the Babes-Bolyai University in Kolozsvár /Cluj-Napoca/ allowing a Hungarian language and literature section only where the language of instruction is Rumanian.

c/ Dispersing Hungarian graduates of this section of the University to the original Rumanian provinces of Rumania where there is no teaching of Hungarian language and literature instead of placing them with the still remaining Hungarian junior highschools in Transylvania.

d/ Starting Rumanian classes for a few Rumanian children when the rest of them is Hungarian as a result of the unjust and anti-Hungarian quota system./For instance, for two Rumanian pupils and 20 Hungarian ones, a class will be started where the language of instruction is Rumanian./

e/ Gradual Rumanianization of the Hungarian Medical School in Marosvásárhely /Tirgu Mures/.

f/ Squeezing out usage of Hungarian language of all the public places.

g/ Discontinuing Hungarian and German language television broadcasting.

h/ Dismantling roof top antennas able to receive broadcasts /television and radio/ from Hungary in the western part of Transylvania.

i/ Lessing the number of theology students to less than 10 percent of the vacancies by death and retirement of clergymen thereby endangering the very existence of the Hungarian Reformed /Calvinist/ Church in Rumania.

j/ Disallowing Hungarian clergymen to study abroad, a several hundred years old tradition, even though scholarships are available.

k/ Threatening Hungarian Roman Catholic priests for participating in religious pilgrimages.

l/ Recycling 20,000 Hungarian bibles into toilet tissues.

m/ Intimidating intellectuals, writers, poets, teachers, clergymen by frequent house searches, lengthy interrogations, arrests, beating at police headquarters, imprisonment for trumped up charges, beating up at least one Catholic priests, and murdering another one.

n/ Confiscating Hungarian books at border checkpoints.

This is an incomplete list of grievances of the Hungarian minority. Not one of them was alleviated. We know about only one alleged promise for improvement: to raise the number of Reformed theology students. There is no confirmation, however, that this pledge was fulfilled.

From these samples it is evident for us that Hungarian education, language usage and culture are hampered with the effect and purpose of forcible de-nationalization of the Hungarian minority.

B/

With reference to the statement of Thomas W. Simons, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State it is good to know that "the Department of State shares the CSCE Commission's interest in working for the just and equitable treatment of minority populations", and that "the status of the Hungarian minority in Rumania today is an issue of increasing concern to the Administration, the Congress and the American people".

It is ,however, frustrating that the Rumanian government did not heed American warnings and keeps throwing serious obstacles against minority endeavours such as education, culture, use of mother tongue, religious life, contact with neighboring Hungary,or the American efforts to influence Rumania were inadequate.

In evaluating minority human rights abuses it is not important which nation, Hungarians or Rumanians had settled first in Transylvania. Both nations' historians agree that the other nation settled there at least 800 years ago.The Saxons were also invited by the Hungarian kings to immigrate in the 12th century. If 8 centuries are not enough to have equal rights and to keep national identity undisturbed for Rumanians, Hungarians and Germans, then how many more centuries are needed for the Rumanians to recognize that kind of equality for the minorities? Just think of united Italy which is hardly 170 years old, or Germany the unity of which was established only 117 years ago. And think of the United States with its 200 years history.

Hungary and Hungarian-American Transylvanian organizations see the present treatment of the Hungarian minority in Rumania

not as a territorial but as a cultural and societal problem just like the United States Administration sees it.The national-cultural life of the Transylvanian Hungarians must be assured within the present framework of state borders. Nevertheless it is undeniable that the sources of the problem are the Trianon peacetreaty and the succesive Paris peace concluding officially World War II. It is good to remark that the United States made some efforts in Paris to retain Northern Transylvania for Hungary. But these efforts were feeble compared to the will of the Soviet Union to reward Rumania which - forced by the geopolitical situation of the country - had to give up its fight against Soviet communism and join the Red Army to defeat its former friend,Nazi-Germany. For good behaviour and second rate strategical importance of Rumania the Soviet Union early withdrew its occupying forces from the country.

It is the Rumanians who bring up the territorial issue by frequently accusing Transylvanian Hungarians of being "revisionist", "irredentists", wanting to reunite Transylvania with Hungary.But those Hungarians may have requested starting a new Hungarian class in school, or complaining for some Rumanian assault against Hungarians in government sponsored publication. The accusations are nothing but deceitful distortions perhaps with the purpose of discrediting honest Hungarian efforts to help save relatives and friends from further human and minority rights abuses.

Rumania's financial support of minority institutions is an inevitable consequence of abolishing capitalism when churches, well to do people and the general public were able to finance minority institutions. Socialism brought about equality in poverty, thus government had to take over all the functions which in the pre-communist era were supported by the privat sector.

Solving minority problems by the Hungarian and Rumanian governments seems as remote as making peace in the Middle

East. Rumania enjoyed the support of the Great Powers in the Paris peace treaty, and now more than a decade has the trust and friendship of the United States. We believe that the U.S.-Rumanian relations are strong enough to bear pressure on Rumania. Hungary has not much bargaining chips with Rumania. No matter how liberally Hungary treats its small Rumanian minority of twentythousand, Rumania has not reciprocated Hungary's good will by fair treatment of its 2.5 million Hungarian population.

The refusal of Rumania to furnish statistical data on minorities is an obvious intention to keep the high number of Hungarians in secret.

We made year-to-year comparisons of minority schools based on Rumanian official reports. Our analysis shows that Hungarian schools have been consistently decreased in the report years of 1975 /"Romania and the National Question"/, 1976 /"The Hungarian Nationality in Romania"/ and 1987 /"The Truth about the National Question in Rumania"/. Without the comparisons some figures of Hungarian schools may seem impressive to the uninformed readers, and obviously these figures are the ones which Rumanian propagandists want to capitalize on. We do not know about a later than 1987 publication of the Rumanian government.

Hungarian-Americans are less concerned for emigration out of Rumania than the overwelming majority staying in the country. We think that too much official concern for emigration automatically reduces attention from the human and national rights of the minorities. Reassurances by the administration have been encouraging throughout the past many years but it seems to us that the administration does not address the minority and human rights problems in Rumania as the first priority vis-a-vis Rumania. Ambassador Schifter stated in Ottawa that cultural rights of Hungarians in Rumania "will have to be an essential element of any bilateral human rights discussions" between the United States and Rumania. We think that his is the right approach to the minority problems but it would be even more encouraging and effective if the political wing of the Department of State would also think the question of minorities should be an essential element of any discussions between the two countries.

Mr. Simons states in his testimony that "assimilation into the majority culture is a natural byproduct of development as it is in the U.S.". I have to challenge the validity of his statement. The United States and many others, like Australia, Canada, the South American countries are countries whose populations are made up mostly from emigrants who gave up their ancestors'land to resettle in an other country which they choose as their second home land. It is obvious that the emigrants have to adopt themselves to the new country where they immigrated.

On the other hand, Hungarians living in Rumania are still living on their ancestors's land, they did not immigrate to Rumania. Their ancestors had been the conquerors of the land they still live on. Their over one thousand years of presence warrant their natural human rights to safeguard their national identity. They are part of the Hungarian nation, their culture and language is Hungarian, their literature is part of the overall Hungarian literature. To expect them to give up their national identity is unrealistic and inhuman demand.

Mr. Simons points out in his statement some of the Hungarian complaints in Rumania. We appreciate his efforts to prepare his report. Among them there is nothing extraordinary or excessive. In theory the solution is also simple: call upon the Rumanian government to live up to the Rumanian constitution, the Helsinki agreement and other international pronouncements on human and minority rights. But when President Ceausescu openly asserted that Rumania is a "unitary" nation/ state he meant he wants to make Rumania to such a country. For this purpose he has to do away one way or another the non-Rumanian population which amount in Transylvania to an estimated 30 % of the total population.

If we see the Hungarian problem in Rumania with these thoughts in our mind, it will be clear that the problem is not only the mistreatment of some or many Transylvanian Hungarians but a life and death struggle for cultural-national survival of the entire Hungarian nation in Rumania.

C.

Mr. Robert Robertson, a representative of American Businesses for International Trade, brings up a few figures with regard to Hungarian education in Rumania. He states that 977,000 Hungarian students go to Hungarian schools. This is 10,984 students less than in the 1982/83 school year. So Mr.Robertson's good looking figure is not so good in the light of comparison with previous periods. From the 1955/56 schoolyear to the 1982/83 one the proportion of Hungarian students dropped from 9.8% to 5.5 %, a decrease of 43.9%. The figures used for comparison are all taken from official Rumanian data.

Mr.Robertson questions "why we have no complaints of mistreatment from the other ethnic groups in Rumania". Of course, we did not speak with other ethnic leaders in Rumania but we offer some probable explanations:

a/ West Germany made a deal with Rumania for 10,000 Germans' emigration to that country annually,connected with monetary benefit for Rumania. Besides the est.350,000 Germans in Rumania are insignificant part of the population of the two Germanies, while the Hungarians amount to 95% of Hungary's population. Germans of Rumania also complain against cultural deprivation in Rumania. It is rather more characteristic for the situation that Transylvanian Germans have never wanted to leave their homeland during the 800 years of Hungarian rule and the pre-communist era of Rumania.But under the Ceausescu regime it seems that they cannot take any more the anti-minority policies of Rumania.

b/ The Yugoslav-Rumanian relations have been disturbed for years by complaints of mistreating the Serbian minority in Rumania.

c/Rumanian Jews and American-Jewish top organizations appear to be satisfied, if not with the treatment of prospective emigrants but the flow of the U.S.monitored emigration.

d/ Gypsies may not be organized as a united ethnic group.

e/ The rest of the minorities are rather small groups.

Mr. Robertson does not know about any Hungarians in prison in violation of their human rights, he did not see any "physical evidence that the Rumanian government is out to destroy Hungarian culture within its borders". We cannot accept the idea that what Mr.Robertson is uninformed about, what he does not know and does not see on the streets of Transylvanian cities, it does not exist.

Mr. Robertson is a highly competent witness to talk about the American-Rumanian export-import figures. He could have pointed out that last year our trade deficit with Rumania was $588 million,our import ratio to our exports is 3.4 to 1. He could have brought up that side of the coin but he did not do it. His testimony would be better balanced with pointing out the bad facts with our trade to Rumania, not only those painting a rosy picture about that most repressive country among all communist governed countries.

Appendix J

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP
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TESTIMONY OF THE

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW GROUP

SUBMITTED TO THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

IN CONNECTION WITH THE HEARINGS ON

HUNGARIAN MINORITIES IN RUMANIA AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Prepared by
Frank Koszorus, Jr.
Pro Bono Attorney

May 29,1987

I. DESCRIPTION OF THE LAW GROUP

The International Human Rights Law Group ("Law Group") is a nonprofit, public interest law center concerned with the promotion and protection of international human rights in countries throughout the world. Since 1979, it has monitored the dismal human rights situation in Rumania, with particular regard to the rights of the Hungarian minority. Referring to obligations under the Helsinki Accords and the two International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Law Group has raised instances of gross and persistent human rights violations by Rumania before various fora. The Law Group also has testified at Congressional hearings on the inadvisability of blanket extensions of Most Favored Nation ("MFN") status to Rumania in view of that government's increasingly callous disregard for even the most minimum standards of fundamental human rights and because of that country's manipulation of the MFN process.

The Law Group also has been involved in cases relating to the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. For example, the Law Group actively participated in efforts to secure the release of Dr. Miklos Duray, a member of Charter 77 and an advocate of Hungarian minority rights in Czechoslovakia. As part of this effort, the Law Group was prepared to send an attorney to Bratislava to observe Dr. Duray's trial in 1984.

II. THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT OBLIGATES PARTICIPATING STATES TO SAFEGUARD THE RIGHTS OF NATIONAL MINORITIES

Principle VII of the Helsinki Final Act specifically defines certain fundamental rights of national minorities as follows:

> The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will, in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.

In addition, Principle VII stresses that the signatories will act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and adhere to the provisions of the

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international declarations and agreements in this field, including the International Covenants. In this respect, Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides:

> In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right in community with other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own language.

The commitment of the "Helsinki Process" to the protection of national minorities was reinforced in the concluding Document to the Madrid Follow-up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, wherein the participating States underscored the

> importance of constant progress in ensuring the respect for an actual enjoyment of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities as well as protecting their legitimate interests as provided for in the Final Act.

Rather than ensuring progress, Rumania, and to a lesser extent Czechoslovakia, actually have promulgated and implemented policies which grossly violate the rights of their respective Hungarian minorities.

III. EXAMPLES OF RUMANIAN POLICIES AND PRACTICES AIMED AT FORCIBLY ASSIMILATING ITS HUNGARIAN MINORITY

In addition to the general repression faced by the population at large, Rumania has intensified its policy aimed at forcibly assimilating and extinguishing the cultural life of that country's approximately 2.5 million Hungarian minority -- the largest minority in Europe. The overwhelming majority of these ethnic Hungarians live in the area known today as Transylvania which constitutes the western third of Rumania and includes the historic province of Transylvania, the Banat, the Crisana and the Maramures regions. The total population of this area is approximately seven million which, in addition to the Rumanian majority and ethnic Hungarians, also includes smaller minorities. Although the vast majority of the ethnic Hungarians live in Transylvania, they can also be found in other areas of Rumania. For example, Bucharest has an estimated Hungarian population of 200,000. Another Hungarian

group known as the Csangos, who number about 250,000, live in Moldavia outside the Carpathian basin.

A persistent problem in assessing the actual size of the nationalities is the consistent under representation by Rumania of the Hungarian minority in official statistics. Nevertheless, it is established from a variety of sources, including extrapolations from official Rumanian figures of church attendance, that the number of Hungarians in Rumania exceeds two million. The two million plus figure includes the Szeklers who are an autochthonous population of Transylvania but are nevertheless an inseparable part of the larger Hungarian group. They expressly identify with and are consciously aware of their Hungarian language, culture and Roman Catholic faith, but are never classified as Hungarians by the Rumanian government despite their undeniable Hungarian nationality.

The Law Group is seriously concerned about the consistent pattern of gross violations of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of this large minority by the Rumanian government. The widespread oppression under which the members of that minority live include: The closing of Hungarian language educational institutions at the elementary and high school levels and the elimination of Hungarian universities; the dissolution of compact Hungarian communities; the suppression of Hungarian and other minority languages; curtailment of human contacts and cultural exchanges, as well as the cultural opportunities within Rumania; harassment of churches and religious groups and the confiscation of archives; and falsification of census figures and history. Opponents of forced Rumanianization and religious discrimination often are harassed, intimidated, arrested, savagely beaten and imprisoned. Individuals traveling from the United States who meet with Rumanian citizens of Hungarian nationality have been detained and interrogated by Rumanian authorities.

Ironically, earlier Rumanian propaganda literature admitted the importance to the minorities of certain minority cultural opportunities and institutions. For instance, materials distributed by the Rumanian embassy in Washington, D.C. recognized the significance of minority-language radio and television broadcasting. See, e.g., Hungarians and Germans in Rumania Today, Address by Hegedus Ladislau, Secretary of State in the Council of Socialist Culture and Education, to the Plenum of the Council of Working People of Magyar Nationality, at p. 77 (Meridiane Publishing House, Bucharest, 1978). ("If ten years ago there were only 78 hours of broadcasts in Hungarian, now [1978] there are 156 hours a year. Over the

same period the programs on the radio have expanded from 1,500 hours to 2,072 hours every year.")

Nevertheless, all minority-language radio and television broadcasting reportedly has since been terminated.

Similarly, Rumania proudly proclaimed the importance of minority-language schools. See, e.g., id., Address by Ladislau Lorincz, Secretary of State at the Ministry of Education and Instruction, at p. 67. ("In keeping with the Romanian Communist Party's revolutionary national policy . . . a large school network has been created and is now functioning in our country, securing all conditions for the youngsters belonging to co-inhabiting nationalities to learn both in their mother tongue and in Romanian, according to each and everyone's wish." (Emphasis added.)

Yet, this once wide-ranging network of Hungarian schools is being dismantled, as exemplified by the reported elimination of all secondary schools teaching in the Hungarian language.

Cases which are of particular concern to the Law Group include the matter of Attila Kun, M.D. of Cluj-Napoca who has been arrested, repeatedly beaten and recently convicted of alleged "nationalism" as a result of his providing regular medical assistance to the inhabitants of the Hungarian community of Sic beyond his official duties.

Similarly, the Law Group believes that Erno Borbely and Laszlo Buzas remain imprisoned after being convicted in 1983 by a secret military court of "treason" for protesting an anti-Hungarian flyer inciting Rumanians against Hungarians.

The Law Group also understands that Bela Pall, who was arrested and sentenced in 1983 on unknown charges upon returning from a visit to Hungary, still languishes in prison. The Law Group urges the Commission to raise their cases and seek their immediate release.

Finally, although the Law Group affirms its past and present assessment of Rumania's human rights record, it has been and is willing to consider additional evidence and facts relating to the foregoing concerns. In fact, to assess the human rights situation in Rumania and to determine what effect that government's stated commitment to international agreements has had on State law and policy, the Law Group has requested permission to visit Rumania several times over the past eight years. Despite an invitation by Rumanian officials to the Law Group in 1979, and despite the Rumanian government's representations that it is an open country, it has consistently

refused to issue visas to proposed members of a fact-finding team.

In denying the visas, Rumanian officials have stated that a human rights fact-finding mission amounts to interference in Rumania's internal affairs. Given the developments in international law during the past 40 years, the argument that human rights conditions in one country are not the concern of the international community has no validity. In fact, by signing the Final Act in 1975, Rumania undertook to "act in conformity with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter and Universal Declaration for Human Rights." As part of this undertaking, Rumania should be expected to permit independent human rights monitoring groups to visit and assess the state of human rights in that country.

IV. PROBLEMS FACING THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA

The number of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia, which is a multi-ethnic state, is over 600,000. This minority is concentrated in Slovakia and constitutes approximately 12 percent of that Republic's population. After an exceedingly harsh period following the Second World War, conditions for Czechoslovakia's Hungarian minority improved somewhat during the 1950's and 1960's. Even during this period, the Hungarian minority faced a host of measures which violated the rights of the members of that minority. Thus, for instance, only Hungarian sections in Slovak schools were available to Hungarian students even in compact Hungarian communities.

The Prague Spring in 1968 resulted in significant improvements in the rights of the Hungarian minority. These rights, however, were as shortlived as was the Dubcek regime. With the crackdown following the Prague Spring came a new wave of anti-Hungarian measures.

In 1978 the onslaught against Hungarian culture and national identity continued as exemplified by the decision to eliminate virtually all Hungarian language classes beginning in the fifth grade. As a result of this renewed effort against the rights of the Hungarian minority, the Legal Defense Committee of the Hungarian Nationality in Czechoslovakia ("Committee") was established and Dr. Duray became a leading advocate for the rights of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. Following the efforts of the Committee and the concomitant international publicity relating to the proposed measure to curtail Hungarian language instruction, the proposal was tabled. Dr. Duray, however, was arrested and tried on or about January 31, 1983 on charges of subversion. In addition to his

outspokenness on the language instruction issue, Dr. Duray's specific "crime" was writing a book about the Hungarian minority in Slovakia entitled "The Choke Collar". Although Dr. Duray was released after the trial adjourned, the threat to his personal freedom was ever present insofar as the charges against him were not dismissed.

In November, 1983 yet another measure was proposed which would have resulted in the elimination of all Hungarian language classes. Dr. Duray spearheaded a successful campaign against this direct threat to the cultural rights of the Hungarian minority. He was duly arrested on May 10, 1984 in Bratislava, incarcerated and on October 9, 1984 charged with "damaging the interests of the Republic abroad" and "spreading alarming news which is false." During his pre-trial incarceration, Dr. Duray was not permitted to receive visitors, including his wife and lawyer and his health deteriorated significantly. Following wide-ranging international attention and protest, including efforts by the Law Group, Dr. Duray was released on May 10, 1985, one year after his arrest.

In view of the continuing pattern of persistent violations of the rights of the Hungarian minority, the Hungarian News From Czechoslovakia ("News")recently appeared. According to the authors, the objective of the News is to disseminate factual and objective information about the plight of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia. Consequently, the News (No. 5) reported certain highly disturbing incidents of vandalism directed against Hungarian cultural institutions in Bratislava on March 8, 1987. Charter 77 document No. 23/87 (attached hereto as an Appendix) entitled "Anti-Hungarian incidents in Bratislava," also courageously protested the "violent acts that occurred ... against the offices and buildings of Hungarian minority cultural institutions." The signers of the document further regarded "said acts of violence as alarming ... because ... they are the culminations of various regrettable expression[s] of nationalist intolerance ...." This document concludes with the laudatory and incisive "conviction that public life, the mass media and education in schools should be permeated with the idea, that it is necessary as well as desirable for the citizens of all nationalities in Czechoslovakia to live together in tolerance and friendship."

The Law Group urges the Commission to monitor the situation of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and raise the abuses of the rights of that minority whenever and as effectively as possible.

Translation

Charter 77 document No.23/87

Federal Government of the CSSR
Federal Assembly of the CSSR

Anti-Hungarian incidents in Bratislava

We became acquainted with papers of the Committee for the Defense of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, which concern the violent acts that occured during the night of March 8th 1987 against the offices and buildings of Hungarian minority cultural institutions in Bratislava. The papers of the Committee speak about the possibility that the attacks could be either an expression of nationality hatred or an action of a terrorist group, directed to provoke trouble, fear and hatred among the citizens of Czechoslovakia.

We regard the said acts of violence as alarming also because of the fact that they are the culmination of various regrettable expression of nationalist intolerance, such as provocative slogans and the damaging of Hungarian property, insulting and belittling of citizens speaking Hungarian on the streets and even the dirtying of the statue of the world famous Hungarian poet Sandor Petofi.

We are convinced that relations among nationalities of one state can be influenced by its citizens and that the constitutional organs have a special responsibility to keep peace. We demand, therefore, that you devote to the investigation of these terrorist acts the maximum effort. We further request that you direct the Czechoslovak media - and especially the Slovak media - to make public detailed information about these violent acts, as well as information about the course of the investigation.

We also demand for the state organs to take a stand with regard to these events in accordance with the legal system. It is our conviction that public life, the mass media and education in schools should be permeated with the idea, that it is necessary as well as desirable for the citizens of all nationalities in Czechoslovakia to live together in tolerance and friendship.

Prague, March 27, 1987

Jan Litomisky	Libuse Silhanova	Josef Vohryzek
Charter 77 spokesman	Charter 77 spokeswoman	Charter 77 spokesman

Appendix K

INDIANA UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA INDIANA, PENNSYLVANIA 15705
Department of Political Science • Keith Hall Annex • 412-357-2290 June 2, 1987

The Honorable Steny H. Hoyer
Chairman
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Congress of the United States
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman: (Attention: Judith Ingram)

Attached, please, find a statement submitted by me on behalf of the National Committee of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia, Incorporated, for the records of the May 5, 1987, hearing by your Commission concerning the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

We are grateful for the opportunity to share our views with the Commission on this issue, and hope that the information submitted will contribute to the noble efforts of the U.S. Government in trying to end violations of human rights and minority rights in Czechoslovakia and Rumania.

Respectfully yours,
Edward Chaszar

Edward Chaszar
Professor
International Legal Advisor to the
National Committee of Hungarians from
Czechoslovakia, Inc.

Encl. 1

STATEMENT ON THE SITUATION OF THE HUNGARIAN MINORITY IN THE SLOVAK SOCIALIST REPUBLIC

submitted on behalf of the

National Committee of Hungarians from Czechoslovakia, Inc.

(302 Portola Rd., Portola Valley, CA 94025)

by Edward Chaszar, Professor of Political Science

Indiana University of Pennsylvania

Background to the Situation of the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia.--At the end of the First World War, by virtue of the peace treaty, over one million Hungarians suddenly found themselves separated from their mother country and were transformed into a national minority within the newly created Czechoslovakia. According to British historian Alfred Cobban, "It was ironic that a settlement supposed to have been largely determined by the principle of nationality should have produced a state like Czechoslovakia, with minorities amounting to 34.7 per cent of its population, quite apart from the question of the doubtful identity of nationality between Czechs and Slovaks." (The Nation State and National Self-Determination. London: Collins, 1969, page 86.)

Charles Seymour, American delegate to the Paris Peace Conference, noted that the boundaries of the successor states did not even "roughly" correspond with the ethnic or linguistic line. In the case of Czechoslovakia, the border was drawn far to the south of the ethnic, or linguistic, line. In November, 1938, due to the shifting European balance of power, the border between Czechoslovakia and Hungary was redrawn as a result of an arbitral process mutually agreed upon by the affected parties. Based on the ethnic principle, the Vienna Award of 1938 returned to Hungary some of its lost territory (12,103 square kilometers, or approximately 4,600 square miles) with a population of 1,030,000 inhabitants, over 80 per cent of them Hungarians. However, the Axis-sponsored Award did not survive the Second World War; it was annulled by the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947. Again, a sizeable Hungarian minority was created inside Czechoslovakia.

Today the overwhelming part of this Hungarian minority lives in the Slovak Socialist Republic, where it constitutes 11.2 per cent of the population according to the census of 1980. Estimates, however, run as high as 14 per cent

and more. In contrast, the proportion of Hungarians in the Czech Socialist Republic is a mere 0.2 per cent. The 1980 census gives the total figure of Hungarians in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic as 580,000. The 1977 edition of the Hungarian Encyclopedia of Ethnography, published in Budapest, Hungary, estimated the number of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia--cautiously-- at 700,000 to 730,000.

Grievances of the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia.--Minorities in Czechoslovakia possess in theory all the rights assured to them by the Constitution of 1960, as amended in 1968.

The Constitution of July 11, 1960, proclaims that Czechoslovakia is a socialist state, founded on the alliance of workers, farmers and intelligentsia, with the working class at its head; furthermore, that it is a unitary state of two fraternal nations, the Czechs and the Slovaks, each possessing equal rights. Article 25 ensures citizens of Hungarian, Ukrainian and Polish nationality "every opportunity and all means for education in their mother tongue and for their cultural development." In addition, according to Article 74, the Slovak National Council (the organ of legislative and administrative power in Slovakia) has the competence to "ensure, in the spirit of equality, favorable conditions for the full development of the life of citizens of Hungarian and Ukrainian nationality."

In October, 1968, two constitutional laws (amendments) were passed by the National Assembly. Constitutional Law 143/1968 trasformed the unitary state into a federal state of a Czech and a Slovak Socialist Republic. Constitutional Law 144/1968 dealt with nationality affairs, extending the rights of national minorities also to Germans in Czechoslovakia, but otherwise not fulfilling the expectations which minorities had during the so called "Prague Spring." Provisions of Constitutional Law 144/1968 have not been implemented due to the lack of enabling legislation, especially in the Slovak Socialist Republic.

A Statement drafted by the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian Nationality in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic in Bratislava (Pozsony) in 1979, and addressed to the highest state and party authorities, gave the reasons why Constitutional Law 144/1968 did not fulfill the expectations of the national minorities as follows:

1. It failed to secure the social, economic, and cultural development of the nationalities aiming at the reduction of differences that developed since 1945 vis-à-vis the two /majority/ nations.

2. It failed to secure the collective participation of the nationalities in the state's political life.

3. It failed to secure the proportional development of all levels of education for the nationalities.

4. It failed to stop the forced assimilation of the nationalities.

The Statement added that "The failures listed above are the result of non-implementation by supportive legislation either by the National Assembly or by the Slovak National Council." Next, it listed how the unconstitutional discrimination against national minorities manifested itself in the areas of education, culture, economic life, and political life, and suggested specific measures for the development of legal remedies and the achievement of a full equality of rights.

A Report, drafted by the same Committee in Bratislava in February, 1980, and disseminated to the signatory governments of the Helsinki Agreements of 1975, listed all of the international agreements relevant to the human rights and minority rights of the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia. According to the Report, the policies of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic regarding nationalities are, in several essential matters, contrary to the spirit and letter of valid international agreements, namely:

--The provision in Paragraph (1) of Article 22 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights is violated by the limitation of the right of assembly of citizens of Hungarian nationality;

--In the Socialist Republic of Czechoslovakia there are laws still in force which should have been revoked on the basis of Paragraph (1c) of Article 2 of the 1965 International Convention Regarding the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination;

--The provision in Article 27 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights is violated by the limitation of the use of the Hungarian language;

--The economic and educational policies pursued by the Czechoslovak state and, most of all, by the Sloval Socialist Republic, in the areas inhabited by Hungarians, are contrary to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights;

--The educational policies of the Czechoslovak state, and most of all, those of the Slovak Socialist Republic, particularly the dictatorial limitations of the Hungarian language as a language of instruction implemented against the intentions of the parents, cannot be reconciled with the substance of Paragraph (a) of Article 4, and with Paragraph (1c) of Article 5 of the Convention against Discrimination in Education;

--The policies of the Czechoslovak state, and most of all, of the Slovak Socialist Republic regarding kindergardens and schools do not correspond to Principle 2 of the 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child;

--The provisions of the last paragraph of the Chapter entitled "Cultural Cooperation and Exchange," and that of the last paragraph of the Chapter entitled "Cooperation and Exchange in the Area of Education" of the Final Document of the European Conference on Security and Cooperation are not carried out

by the Czechoslovak state.

On the basis of the aboves, the Committee declared that the obligations assumed in Clause VII of the Chapter entitled "Questions Related to European Security" of the Final Document are not carried outby the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

Current and recurrent problems of the Hungarian minority.--Regrettably, the grievances and violations listed above continue even today. Nowhere is this more visible than in the field of education.

The right to use their own language in everyday life as well as in educating their children is considered as one of the fundamental rights of national, ethnic, and linguistic minorities. Consequently, when the Slovak government in 1978-1979 made an attempt to curtail the use of the Hungarian language in the public education system, a sharp reaction had set in among the Hungarian minority, including the founding of the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian Nationality (sometimes referred to as the Committee for the Protection of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority) in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.

In a Statement, submitted in May 1979 to the highest state and party authorities of the Republic and its two constituent parts, the Committee listed unconstitutional discrimination in education in the following terms:

--Neglect in establishing Hungarian language nursery schools;

--Reduction in the number of Hungarian language primary and secondary schools;

--Reduction of the number of pupils by about 30 per cent in Hungarian language primary schools in proportion to the number of children of school age;

--Experimental substitution of Slovak for Hungarian as the language of instruction;

--Unsatisfactory quality and level of Hungarian secondary education in technical schools and industrial vocational institutes;

--Abolition of the Hungarian Division of the College of Education of Nitra (Nyitra), effectively ending teacher training for basic schools with Hungarian as the language of instruction;

--Low number of Hungarian students in the colleges and universities of the CSSR;

--Hindering of study and acquisition of academic degrees at the colleges and universities of the Hungarian People's Republic;

--A deepening educational chasm between the Hungarian minority and Slovak majority.

The Statement pointed out that the measures and actions listed were in violation of Constitutional Law 100/1960, Chapter II, Article 19, Paragraph 2; Article 20, Paragraph 2; Article 24, Paragraph 3, and Article 25, as well as Constitutional Law 144/1968, Article 3, Paragraph 1/a. It then called for remedial action.

However, instead of instituting remedial action, the Slovak government proposed a new plan in schools in which the language of instruction was Hungarian. Under the plan, the language of instruction--with the exception of the subjects of Geography, History, and Hungarian Language--was to become Slovak, starting with the 5th grade and including high-schools (both vocational and academic). The plan would have changed the character of Hungarian schools completely.

The Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority at this point issued several memoranda, pointing out the unconstitutionality of the proposed plan. In the end the plan was not implemented, mostly because of the widespread opposition to it manifested in protests. At the same time,

however, the Slovak authorities launched an investigation to uncover the members of the Committee, and in this connection they arrested and interrogated a number of Hungarian intellectuals. Ultimately one of these, Miklós Duray (a geclogist, aged 39), was arrested and,accused with "incitement" and "subversion," was put on trial early in 1983.

The outcome of Miklós Duray's trial was unexpected: Due partly to the lack of convincing evidence, partly to international pressure--such as the presence of numerous foreign observers at the trial--the process was suspended indefinitely, and Duray was set free. Yet, the charges were not dropped. One could guess already then that both the suspended plan and the suspended process would be taken up later, at an opportune time.

The plan was taken up again in the fall of the same year, and Duray was re-arrested in May, 1984. The details are worth considering.

The question of the use of the Hungarian language as a language of instruction in the schools was to be taken care of within the new Law of Education which was to be passed by the legislature (Slovak National Council) in the Slovak Socialist Republic. In order to avoid the charge of unconstitutionality, the article dealing with the language of instruction was rewritten several times, until finally it was submitted by the Government to the Slovak National Council on November 25, 1983, with the following text:

Article 32a. The language of instruction.

(1) The language of instruction is either Slovak or Czech; Czech is the language of instruction in schools (classes) indicated by the Ministry of Education.

(2) In schools or classes created for students of Hungarian, German, Polish, Ukrainian (Ruthenian) nationality, the language of instruction is that of the nationality.

(3) Inasmuch as in a school the language of instruction is not Slovak or Czech, it is mandatory to teach the Slovak or Czech language.

(4) In schools created pursuant to Paragraph 2 and using a nationality language of instruction, the Ministry of Education may permit the teaching of certain subjects in Slovak or Czech, if this is proposed by the territorially competent National Committee in agreement with the parents of students attending these schools.

(5) The Ministry of Education may require in certain schools the teaching of specific subjects in a language other than the language of instruction of the school.

Note, that Paragraph 4, as proposed, was a contravention of the right of nationalities to use their language, disguised so as not to make it look unconstitutional, by shifting the burden of the change in the language of instruction to the easily coercible parents. (The National Committees referred to in the text are organs of state power and administration.) Paragraph 5 went even farther; it authorized the Ministry of Education to change the language of instruction without "consulting" parents.

Under the circumstances it is understandable that the proposed bill encountered widespread resistance and protest. The latter was directed by the "Group to Defend the Hungarian Schools in Slovakia" (Szlovákiai Magyar Iskolák Védelmi Csoportja), supposedly lead by Miklós Duray. The Group allegedly issued a circular letter in about 600 copies, addressed to the Hungarian teachers, parents, and members of CSEMADOK, the cultural organization of Hungarian workers in Czechoslovakia, urging them to use their constitutional right of free speech and protest the passing of this unconstitutional Bill. Duray himself addressed

a letter to President Gustav Husak, to the Slovak National Council, and the Slovak government, expressing the same views and his opposition.

As a result of the circular letter, an unprecedented wave of protest swept the Hungarian-inhabited parts of Slovakia. By the middle of March, 1984, approximately 10,000 signatures were collected, protesting the proposed action. Not surprisingly, the Western European information media picked up the story in Bratislava (Pozsony), capital of present-day Slovakia; newspaper articles and radio reports started to deal with the tense situation. Public opinion in Hungary reacted to the news adversely, putting pressure on government and party organs to abandon their policy of strict non-interference, and approach the authorities in Prague and Bratislava to alleviate the problem.

After repeated delays, the Bill was placed on the agenda of the Slovak National Council on its meeting of April 2, 1984. Surprisingly, the two paragraphs which were objectionable to the Hungarian minority (and would have affected other minorities as well) were omitted from the text passed by the Council. As a matter of fact, they were withdrawn by the Council of Ministers after an extraordinary meeting held on March 19, 1984. However, the Minister of Education, Juraj Buśa, made it clear in a press conference on March 23, that measures omitted from the text would be accomplished eventually through administrative and educational practices. This seemed to indicate that the chapter concerning the use of the Hungarian language in education was far from being concluded. Moreover, the regime did not hesitate to indicate its displeasure with the attitude of the Hungarian minority; in retaliation, and as a first step in a campaign of intimidation, Miklós Duray was arrested again on May 10, 1984, for "harming the interests of the State abroad," and for "spreading alarming news."

This time Duray was kept in jail--incommunicado--for a full year, without a formal indictment, and in poor health, until finally released on May 10, 1985, under a partial amnesty order marking the 40th Anniversary of the end of

World War II. Note, that the detailed story of Duray's two imprisonments, and that of the Hungarian schools, together with a formidable collection of documentation in several languages, is readily available in a publication titled In Defense of Hungarian Schools in Slovakia: Documents on the Struggle for Self-Protection of the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia (New York: Hungarian Human Rights Foundation).

Recent developments.--Discrimination against the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia manifests itself not only in the field of education, but in the worsening of the attitude of the general public regarding the question of minorities. According to the French daily, LE MONDE (page 6 of the March 24, 1987, issue), at the beginning of March several attacks were directed in Bratislava against buildings of the Hungarian minority. The report was confirmed by the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia. The details of the attacks were given by LE MONDE as follows:

> During the night of 8-9 March unknown persons set fire to the meeting room and rehearsal hall of the folk dance ensemble of the Hungarian minority, Ifju Szivek (Young Hearts), using bottles of gasoline. Also in Bratislava, unknown persons destroyed the glassed-in hall of the Hungarian-language daily UJ SZÓ (New Word) and broke the window panes of the cultural center of the organization of Hungarian workers in Czechoslovakia, CSEMADOK. In a letter addressed to the attorney general of Slovakia, the Committee /for the Defense of the Rights of the Hungarian Minority/ also indicated that the statue of the national poet of Hungary, Sandor Petofi, was also systematically damaged in Bratislava, that employees of Hungarian institutions had received threatening telephone calls, and that the inscription "Death to the Hungarians" had appeared on

walls in the village of Rimavska Sobota (South East). According to the Committee, these acts are the result of an official policy that aims at "oppressing the Hungarian minority in the economic and cultural area and at inciting anti-Hungarian hatred."

It is interesting to note, that while the news of the fire and other vandalism was reported in detail in Paris, the local Slovak press hardly noticed it. The evening paper in Bratislava, VECERNIK, devoted two lines, and the Slovak youth daily, SMENA, devoted four lines to the events.

In contrast, the Czechoslovak civil rights/human rights organization, known as Charter 77, reacted to the events in a courageous and much more appropriate way, by issuing a document, No. 23/87, adressed to the Federal Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, and to the Federal Assembly. The translation of the document is reproduced below in full.

Charter 77 document No.23/87

Federal Government of the CSSR
Federal Assembly of the CSSR

Anti-Hungarian incidents in Bratislava

We became acquainted with papers of the Committee for the Defense of the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia, which concern the violent acts that occured during the night of March 8th 1987 against the offices and buildings of Hungarian minority cultural institutions in Bratislava. The papers of the Committee speak about the possibility that the attacks could be either an expression of nationality hatred or an action of a terrorist group, directed to provoke trouble, fear and hatred among the citizens of Czechoslovakia.

We regard the said acts of violence as alarming also because of the fact that they are the culmination of various regrettable expression of nationalist intolerance, such as provocative slogans and the damaging of Hungarian property, insulting and belittling of citizens speaking Hungarian on the streets and even the dirtying of the statue of the world famous Hungarian poet Sandor Petofi.

We are convinced that relations among nationalities of one state can be influenced by its citizens and that the constitutional organs have a special responsibility to keep peace. We demand, therefore, that you devote to the investigation of these terrorist acts the maximum effort. We further request that you direct the Czechoslovak media - and especially the Slovak media - to make public detailed information about these violent acts, as well as information about the course of the investigation.

We also demand for the state organs to take a stand with regard to these events in accordance with the legal system. It is our conviction that public life, the mass media and education in schools should be permeated with the idea, that it is necessary as well as desirable for the citizens of all nationalities in Czechoslovakia to live together in tolerance and friendship.

Prague, March 27, 1987

Jan Litomisky	Libuse Silhanova	Josef Vohryzek
Charter 77 spokesman	Charter 77 spokeswoman	Charter 77 spokesman

Conclusion.--An exhaustive and complete report on the situation of the Hungarian minority in Czechsolovakia would require considerably more space than that allotted for our written testimony. Such report would have to deal with grievances outside the fields of education and culture, and take up those in economic and political life as well. Without going into detailed discussion of these, it might be worth to present a list as a reminder for the necessity of remedial action.

Grievances in Economic Life

--Lag in the development of areas inhabited by citizens of Hungarian nationality;

--The structuring of industrial development in such areas with the aim of assimilating the Hungarian ethnic bloc, or, conversely,

--The undesirable dispersal of Hungarians by job opportunities outside their home areas, instead of within them;

--Inadequate technical training and expertise among the ranks of Hungarian youth for the long range needs of industries in such areas;

--Promoting an undesirable social stratification of Hungarians;

--Slowing down the overall development of Hungarian inhabited areas due to the lack of improvements in the infrastructure.

Grievances in the Political Life

--Non-recognition of the collective, communal political rights of the Hungarian minority;

--Exclusion of CSEMADOK (Cultural Federation of Hungarian Workers in Czechoslovakia) from the Slovak National Front;

--Distorted social composition of Hungarian delegations in the elected organs;

--Abolition of the functions of a Minister /Secretary/ for Nationality Affairs as part of the government of the Slovak Socialist Republic;

--Delay in the creation of authorities of oversight securing the effective protection of nationality rights within elected bodies and state executive organs.

These lists are suggestive of the many areas in which problems exist regarding the Hungarian minority, due to the non-compliance of the Czechoslovak authorities with existing international agreements, and even their own Constitution.

It is to be hoped that the U.S. Government will continue to insist on compliance by Czechoslovakia with its international obligations, including the Helsinki Final Act, and will urge the Czechoslovak Government to promote, rather than deny, the democratic ideals and practices reflected in the Charter 77 document above, in the interest of international peace and security.

Appendix L

Stála konferencia
slovenských demokratických
exulantov
NAŠE SNAHY

The Permanent Conference
of Slovak Democratic
Exiles
OUR TRENDS

The Honorable
Steny Hoyer
Chairman
Commission for security and
cooperation in Europe.
Washington .C.Capitol Hill

Dear Sir,

I am informed that the Commission for security and cooperation in Europe will discuss the situation of the Hungarian minority in Roumania and Czechoslovakia on May 5/87.

I am taken the liberty to present to you a copy of the Memo I sent to the Honorable The Secretary of State George Shultz on behalf of the Permanent Conference of Slovak Democratic Exiles and of Council for a Free Czechoslovakia last year.

I beg you to pay your attention to it.

Sincerely yours:

Martin Kvetko
sec,general
Permanent Conference of Slov.dem.exiales.

Martin Kvetko
83-45 Broadway,Elmhurst,N.Y.11373.

Stála konferencia
slovenských demokratických
exulantov
NAŠE SNAHY

The Permanent Conference
of Slovak Democratic
Exiles
OUR TRENDS

Martin Kvetko
Secretary General
83-45 Broadway
Elmhurst, New York 11373

Elmhurst, January 21, 1986

The Hon. George Shultz
U.S. Secretary of State
The State Department
Washington, D.C.

Your Excellency:

On May 10, 1985, groups of Hungarian refugees in Canada staged a protest demonstration in Ottawa against Czechoslovakia and Romania. According to estimates published by the Canadian press, some 3,000 individuals took part. The march led to the Canadian Parliament Building and the hotel where a conference was being held on European cooperation and security. This meeting was to inquire to what extent the signatory states have been observing the provisions of the Helsinki Accords, specifically the Third Basket on respecting human rights.

The demonstrators protested against the conditions under which the Hungarian minority lives in Czechoslovakia and Romania and displayed slogans such as "Save Hungarian schools in Czechoslovakia and save Hungarian schools in Romania."

At the Conference on European Cooperation and Security in Ottawa, the Hungarian government's delegate spoke glowingly of how the Hungarian regime treats its minorities, in what exemplary fashion it is fulfilling the directives of the Helsinki declaration. His reasons and arguments were so widely accepted that some delegations, among them Ambassador Shifter of the American delegation, characterized the Hungarian's presentation as an example to be followed by other countries, especially Czechoslovakia.

The demonstration by the Hungarian exiles in Ottawa was not an isolated act of the group. Rather, it is an integral part of the systematic and worldwide activities of Hungarian expatriates. It is a well-organized irredentist movement aimed at Czechoslovakia's national integrity and reminiscent of the actions organized by Hungary in the 1920s with the support of Lord Rothermere. Hungarian newspapers published by exiles systematically carry articles on the alleged discrimination against the Hungarian minority in Czechoslovakia with attacks against that country. They are also publishing books on this issue written by authors living in Czechoslovakia as well as by exiles. It often happens that the books authored by residents of Czechoslovakia are revised and doctored in order to serve the purposes and aims of the Hungarian irredenta.

And judging how the Hungarian regime proceeds in the matter by protests in Prague and Bucharest in its discussions with its neighbors, an observer cannot but reach the conclusion that there is a coordinated effort between the Hungarian regime and the Hungarian exiles abroad.

In the Congressional Record, memoranda were published inspired by the Hungarian exiles touching on the matter, such as extensions of remarks by Senator Robert Dole. In these memoranda it is brazenly claimed that the attitude of the international public toward the Hungarian state had been antagonistic and that the Hungarian nation was forced to accept the Trianon Peace Treaty under duress. All these activities are aimed at preparing the ground for "the righting of that wrong and for the revision of the situation in Central and Eastern Europe."

In view of the foregoing, we deem it imperative to submit our views and attitudes concerning this alleged Hungarian grievance, to present an objective view concerning the conditions under which the Hungarian minority lives in Czechoslovakia, and in this manner to bring the issue raised by the Hungarian exiles into proper focus.

In this endeavor we quote statements and facts contained in an official Czechoslovak document, prepared and published by the Secretariat of the Slovak Socialist Republic in Bratislava. In this connection we emphasize that if the declaration of the official Hungarian delegate at the Conference on European Cooperation and Security in Ottawa is approved without reservations and without verification of his assertions, then similar credibility is asked for the official document released by the office of the presidium of the Slovak Socialist Republic in Bratislava.

The document in question is entitled "Report and Facts on Minorities Residing in the Slovak Socialist Republic" compiled by the Secretariat of the Council for Minorities of the Slovak Socialist Republic. It contains detailed information on the settlement of Hungarian and Ukrainian minorities in Slovakia, their deployment in the land, their representation in elected organs of the state and public institutions, on schools for minorities and the instructional methods used in these schools, on their social position and cultural life, and details on their cultural institutions. A separate section is devoted to their constitutional status in the Republic. In our report, however, we shall limit our presentation to the situation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, which is the location of residence of 95.9 percent of Czechoslovak citizens of Hungarian origin.

In the aide-memoire that we are attaching herewith, we quote statistics from the Bratislava report on the cultural and social life of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia and about its schools and its representation in state and public offices.

It can be clearly concluded that neither Hungarian schools nor Hungarian cultural life are endangered to the degree represented by the Hungarian irredenta abroad and publicized by Hungarian newsmen in exile and in memoranda distributed by Hungarian exiles and their organizations.

It would be highly desirable to have the same or similar assurances for the Slovak minority groups living in Hungary as are now current for the ethnic Hungarians in Czechoslovakia.

Yours respectfully,

for The Permanent Conference of Slovak Democratic Exiles

Rudolf Fraštacky
Chairman

Martin Kvetko
Secretary General

for The Council of Free Czechoslovakia

Mojmir Povolny
Chairman

Jiri Horak
Secretary General

Enc.

Stála konferencia
slovenských demokratických
exulantov
NAŠE SNAHY

The Permanent Conference
of Slovak Democratic
Exiles
OUR TRENDS

AIDE-MEMOIRE

The Hungarian Minority in Czechoslovakia

Basic statistics

According to the census of November 1980, a total of 579,660 Czechoslovak citizens claimed Hungarian ethnicity. Out of an aggregate population of 15,283,095, Hungarian ethnics represented a mere 3.8 percent. Of their number, 19,676 were in the Czech Socialist Republic, or 0.2 percent. In the Slovak Socialist Republic, 559,490 citizens claimed to be ethnic Hungarians, or 11.2 percent of the total population of Slovakia.

Density of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia

Ethnic Hungarians were in the southern and southeastern regions of Slovakia as follows:

Region	Number	Percentage
Bratislava-vidiek	10,313	7.2
Dunajská Streda	91,482	87.9
Komárno	79,363	71.9
Galanta	62,543	44.4
Levice	40,490	33.1
Nitra	14,567	7.1
Nové Zámky	63,141	41.2
Lučenec	22,893	24.0
Rimavská Sobota	46,823	47.5
Veľký Krtíš	14,536	31.7
Rožňava	22,464	26.2
Košice-vidiek	13,800	13.9
Košice	8,070	4.0
Trebišov	45,801	38.9

The above listing indicates that out of 14 regions two, Dunajská Streda and Komárno, had an absolute majority of ethnic Hungarians while five regions, Galanta, Nové Zámky, Levice, Rimavské Sobota, and Trebišov, had a substantial number of ethnic Hungarians.

Constitutional rights of minorities in Czechoslovakia

The constitutional rights and privileges of minorities in Czechoslovakia are guaranteed in the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of July 11, 1980, and detailed in Collection of Laws No. 100, in Constitutional Law No. 144/1968, and the Compendium of Laws whose paragraph 20 clearly states: "The equality of all citizens before the law, without regard to ethnicity or race, is guaranteed."

Law No. 144/1968 provides for the participation of minorities in government. Paragraph 1 of this document declares that "The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is a common state of the Czech and Slovak nations and of minorities living on its territory." For Czechoslovak citizens of Hungarian, German, Polish, and Ukrainian (Ruthenian) origin, the order in which ethnic groups are listed is established by law according to numerical size, thus insuring overall equity. Paragraph 2 states that the minorities are to be represented in representative bodies and elected organs according to their numerical size. Paragraph 3 guarantees the following rights to the minorities:

1. The right to education in their own language. 2. The right to a wide-ranging cultural life. 3. The right to use their language in transacting official business in regions populated by the minorities in question. 4. The right to associate in national, cultural, and social organizations. 5. The right to publications and information sources in their own language.

Paragraph 4 prescribes that a Czechoslovak citizen shall decide freely his ethnic identification. All forms of pressure to alter a citizen's ethnic identity are prohibited.

The right to speak in a minority language in elected bodies and Parliament as well as in the Slovak National Council and in the courts is also assured by law.

In regions populated by ethnic Hungarians these minority citizens are assured the free use of their native tongue in their contacts with the local, regional, and state authorities, committees, and offices. In villages and provincial cities and the state capital, public and commercial buildings are also marked by signs in the Hungarian language.

Participation of ethnic Hungarians in state and other public offices

In the two chambers of the federal Parliament, namely, in the Peoples' Assembly and the Assembly of Nationalities, the Hungarian ethnic group is represented according to the results of the 1976 elections. Of the 200 delegates in the Peoples' Assembly, seven delegates, or 3.5 percent of the total, belong to the ethnic Hungarian group. In the Assembly of Nationalities, 11 members, or 7.3 percent of the total of 150, are ethnic Hungarians.

This representation reflects the relative strength of ethnic Hungarians in the Republic. However, in the case of membership in the Assembly of Nationalities, the percentage of ethnic Hungarians exceeds the existing proportion to a considerable extent.

In the Slovak National Council, out of 150 delegates 16, or 10.7 percent, are ethnic Hungarians. This is also an adequate representation compared to the number of ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia's population.

For administrative purposes, the land of Slovakia is divided into three land and 38 district national committees. Of these, 36 are district and two are city national committees--the National Committee of Bratislava and the National Committee of Košice--with similar duties and privileges.

In the three land or regional national committees, the Hungarian ethnic group is represented as follows:

Region	Population total	Ethnic Hungarians (percentage)	Ethnic Hungarians (total)	Ethnic Hungarian delegates Number	Percentage
Western Slovakia	1,683,891	21.5	362,675	22	21.2
Central Slovakia	1,524,766	5.7	86,689	16	16.0
Eastern Slovakia	1,402,252	6.5	91,395	15	12.5

The city of Bratislava with a total population of 380,259 had 18,731 Hungarian ethnics, of 4.9 percent, with a representation of five ethnic Hungarian members, or 4.2 percent.

This also holds true in those district national committees wherever a larger ethnic Hungarian group lives.

It is self-evident that this representation need not necessarily be in keeping with the number of ethnic Hungarians nor that it need be considered in comparison with the number of Slovak inhabitants in the region. Rather, the number represents the choice of the people. In communist systems it is understood that as far as the right of representation is concerned, both the Slovak and Hungarian communities may have common interests to claim and protect, so that they may act in unison to promote their demands.

Hungarian schools in Slovakia

For ethnic Hungarians the state maintains kindergartens, elementary schools, high schools (*gymnasia*), intermediate technical schools, other types of technical schools, and vocational schools. The Teachers' College of Nitra includes a Hungarian section.

In the 1983/84 school year, there were 340 kindergartens for ethnic Hungarians with a total of 630 classes and an enrollment of 16,084 pupils, or 6.5 percent of the total number of children in the same age group.

In the 1983/84 school year there were 277 elementary schools with a total of 1,966 classes and an enrollment of 16,084 students, or 6.9 percent of the total number of children in elementary schools.

During the same period there were 10 high schools (*gymnasia*) using Hungarian as the language of instruction while in eight intermediate schools Hungarian sections were maintained. A total of 141 classes had an enrollment of 3,747 students, or 7.5 percent of the total number of high school students in the country.

In the 1983/84 school year there were five intermediate technical schools with Hungarian as the language of instruction and 18 others with Hungarian sections. In all such schools there was a total of 155 classes and an enrollment of 4,861 students, or 5.9 percent of the enrollment in all such schools. There was one higher technical school with an enrollment of 229 students, or 5.3 percent of the total student body. In the 1983/84 academic year, the universities had a total of 2,291 ethnic Hungarians, or 4.3 percent of the student body.

The number of students of Hungarian ethnicity in kindergartens, elementary schools, and high schools was lower on a percentage basis compared to the size

of the ethnic Hungarian population. Two reasons may be suggested for this discrepancy:

1. Some ethnic Hungarian students attend Slovak-language schools of their own free will and accord.

2. The average percentage of ethnic Hungarian students is lower than the percentage of children in Slovak families because of strict birth control practised in Hungarian families. For example, in the age group up to four years, the percentage in Slovak families is 10 while it is only 7.8 among ethnic Hungarians. In the five- to nine-year old age group, Slovak families have 9.1 percent while ethnic Hungarians only 7.4 percent.

Similarly, among children between 10 and 14 years old, Slovak families account for 7.7 percent while ethnic Hungarians for only 6.8 percent.

In the category of adolescents between 15 and 18 years of age, Slovak families have 8.2 percent while ethnic Hungarian families only 7.6 percent.

The percentage of ethnic Hungarian students in universities is also relatively low. This circumstance is explained as follows by government sources: "Ethnic Hungarian students in high schools do not master a sufficient level of proficiency in the Slovak language to enable them to continue their studies at the university level." The Slovak authorities have attempted to remedy the situation in the same way that the Hungarian government does in the so-called Slovak gymnasia in Budapest and Békéscsaba, where instruction in the Slovak language is restricted to courses on the Slovak language, geography, and history. Instruction for all other subjects is given in Hungarian. Thus, the language of instruction in these two gymnasia has been predominantly Hungarian despite the official designation of the schools as "Slovak." The Slovak government has ordered that the sciences in schools be taught in Slovak so that Hungarian students may acquire better skills and fluency and thus succeed at the university level. Miklós Duray and other Hungarian minority spokesmen opposed this measure and the Slovak government rescinded it.

For the sake of the cultural development of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia the government authorized the creation of CSEMADOK, an association of ethnic hungarian workers in Slovakia. This association has about 80,000 members, committees in 13 districts, and two municipalities. The association sponsors large cultural and folklore-oriented events in centers with sizable Hungarian ethnic communities.

Communications media

The Hungarian daily Új Szó (New Word) published in Bratislava has a circulation of 100,000.

In addition, there are five weeklies with a total circulation of 114,000, two biweeklies, nine monthlies, and one biweekly for women.

In Bratislava, the Kadách publishing house specializes in books and pamphlets for the Hungarian reading public. In Komárno there is a year-round theater for the Hungarian ethnics, while Košice houses the Hungarian-language "Thalia" player group. Numerous cultural centers and libraries have been built for the ethnic Hungarians.

Of course, all of this is being done under the sponsorship of the communist party, the same as in the case of the Slovaks whose books and newspapers must toe the line of the party and communist ideology.